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1. Introduction: International Terrorism  
 Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall
Headline after recent headline has been broadcasting the increase in ter-
rorist attacks being launched in urban areas all over the world. Many of 
these attacks have targeted centrally-located businesses and commercial 
entities in metropolitan spaces, whether the Westgate Mall in Nairobi,1 
the public transport systems of London and Madrid,2 hotels in Mumbai, 
Tunis, and Ouagadougou,3 restaurants and cafés in Kampala, Copenha-
gen, and Sydney,4 or, more recently, the Charlie Hebdo offices,5 the Hy-
per Cacher supermarket,6 and the Bataclan concert hall in Paris.7 Urban 
terrain and populated central city spaces comprised of shopping centers, 
hotels, transport hubs, concert halls, cafes, theaters, and restaurants have 
become, in effect, “the battlegrounds of the future. And the urban siege, 
with its commando-style tactics and guerrilla infiltration of a big city’s 
ebb and flow, is increasingly the tactic of choice for a wide range of adver-
saries.”8 
Terrorist attacks against urban commercial enterprises have become 
worryingly frequent, seemingly arbitrary, and increasingly internation-
al. With widespread availability and access to information and commu-
nication technologies, these incidences have become highly publicized 
through corporate news media networks and personal social media 
platforms, affecting people with a heightened fear of public spaces. As 
extremists engage in open urban warfare, official responses are comple-
mentary in their combative stances with an enhancement of the security 
apparatus and an entrenchment of surveillance structures. With the es-
calation of urban atrocities, there is a concomitant and intensified infil-
tration of the military-industrial complex into everyday public spaces and 
increasing representation of violence in the media and on both sides of 
the ideological divide. The standoff between terrorist crime and policing 
Target Markets—International Terror ism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall10
progressively imbues global cities, and places of business, with increas-
ingly visible hallmarks of war, including a perceptible surge in weapons, 
patrols, barricades, and city streets filled with masked gunmen on both 
the terror and anti-terror fronts—to say nothing of the many reactionary 
policies and incremental erosions of civil liberties that heighten the sense 
of urban conflict, fear, and fortressing. In many urban commercial spaces, 
capitalism and terrorism as the most powerful discursive forces of con-
temporary culture—the most mainstream and the most extreme—meet 
in increasingly militarized urban space. 
During times of political and economic unrest, shopping centers and 
other retail businesses are often targeted as private spaces for the public 
enactment of political dissent and violence, such as when the suffragettes 
“protested against their lack of the vote by smashing shop windows” in 
Newcastle,9 or when a variety of retail businesses became the targets of 
the 1948 Accra riots,10 the 2007 Kenya riots,11 and the 2011 England riots,12 
to name but a few occurrences. Shopping centers, malls, and retail spaces 
are common targets for all kinds of opponents, including spontaneous 
civil disobedience protests as well as more extreme premeditated attacks 
against people and property. Terrorist attacks against shopping malls, es-
pecially, have become an increasingly common occurrence. In the period 
between 1998 and 2006, there were over 60 shopping mall attacks in 21 
countries,13 and there are further warnings of increased threats in which 
shopping malls “are likely to feature in the attack plans of terrorist organ-
isations in the future,” since these spaces “afford the potential for mass 
fatalities and casualties.”14 Attacks against shopping malls have been mo-
tivated by a variety of ethnic, religious, political, and economic ideologies 
and perpetrated by a number of disparate actors all over the world, in-
cluding Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) attacks in Spain, Kurdish 
Workers’ Party (PKK) attacks in Turkey, Union of Revolutionary Writer at-
tacks in Russia, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs attacks in South 
Africa, Maoist rebel attacks in Nepal, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co-
lombia (FARC) attacks in Colombia, and al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya.15
Specifically, for the purposes of this study, al-Shabaab’s 2013 Westgate 
Mall attack is used as a contextual case study that allows for an interactive 
reading of the relationship between capitalism, globalization, and terror-
ism, and how these grand narratives relate to people’s lives within every-
day space. Since it is difficult to examine each of these disparate disci-
plines exhaustively, this study examines their intersections at a particular 
1. Introduction 11
meeting point: the shopping mall. From this vantage point, spatial, soci-
oeconomic, and political implications of the mall’s existence can be read 
against the history of urban commodity forms, both local to the Kenyan 
context, as well as globally. Because of the complexity involved in studying 
a commercial venue that is subject to so many interpretive paradigms, I 
do not purport to examine these issues uniformly, or progressively, nor 
entirely within the strict confines of their disciplines. Rather, through the 
lens of the shopping mall, unifying theoretical threads can be highlighted 
within the broad methodological understandings of cultural studies as 
underpinning contemporary everyday experience.16
Studying the shopping mall as a center of the contemporary urban 
experience is a truly multidisciplinary project. The concept and construct 
of the mall speaks to, and is spoken by, a variety of different academic 
disciplines, including marketing research, studies in psychology, cultur-
al studies, media studies, architectural scholarship, and security studies, 
among other targeted disciplines such as demography, political geogra-
phy, and urban planning. The analysis of a shopping mall is as multifac-
eted as the shopping mall itself, and, by turn, examines various elements 
related to the historical evolution of the mall, its relationship to society 
and consumption patterns, and its alignment with media and market re-
search. The shopping mall, regardless of one’s position on matters of con-
sumption, is a key center of contemporary social life in many countries of 
the world, and has been successfully designed to attract attention—not 
always positive—to itself. Thus, the shopping mall locates key social and 
political tensions that oscillate between the quotidian and mundane and 
the spectacular and violent. The shopping mall, thus, becomes not only 
a site of cooperative consumption, but equally a site for the production of 
contestation.
A shopping mall’s simultaneous role as an agent of global corporate 
capitalism, and yet as a place of everyday encounter, serves to localize 
many international tensions. The US Army, for example, uses al-Shabaab’s 
Westgate Mall attack to make direct—yet global—connections to mitigate 
against similar hostilities should they occur in the United States, arguing 
that “although the Westgate Mall attack was a long way from the U.S. 
homeland, the methods on display during that attack provide lessons that 
can guide preparatory efforts and information collection to help prevent 
or respond to a similar event involving the Army community worldwide.”17 
The concept of the shopping mall can be used as a constant reminder of 
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broader dynamics of global exchange, even as Westgate Mall is anchored 
to a specific locale. As such, this study is not solely about Westgate Mall 
and al-Shabaab’s attack against it. The Westgate Mall story provides a con-
duit for examining key contemporary global concerns within a local set-
ting, including the complex relationships between corporate capitalism, 
socioeconomic inequalities, and the menace of terrorism. In this sense, 
the shopping mall becomes a site for and a site of communication and 
contestation.
Terrorism at the Mall
On September 21, 2013, a news headline read: “Gunmen Kill Dozens in 
Terror Attack at Kenyan Mall.”18 On what was incidentally, and ironically, 
the United Nations’ declared International Day of Peace, four members of 
the Somali extremist group, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM), 
or al-Shabaab meaning “the youth” in Arabic, staged an armed attack on 
the Westgate Mall in Nairobi. To inflict maximum damage, and to garner 
worldwide publicity, the attacks took place on a Saturday at lunchtime—a 
day and time when the mall was guaranteed to attract thousands of visi-
tors, including a large number of children and their families attending a 
cooking competition.19 The attack has been labeled a “swarm attack” that 
“featured two teams of two (or more) assailants who attacked from two 
different points and then linked in the mall supermarket.”20 
For a variety of reasons that remain largely unexplained, the attack 
turned into a four-day, or 80-hour,21 siege, ending with “65 civilians, six 
soldiers and police officers, and four terrorists among the dead. Hundreds 
more were injured and 27 people were listed as missing by the Kenyan Red 
Cross.”22 True to the globalization tenets of the shopping mall, the victims 
were citizens of Kenya, the United Kingdom, India, Canada, France, Aus-
tralia, China, Ghana, the Netherlands, Peru, South Africa, South Korea, 
and Trinidad and Tobago.23 Similarly, the attack exhibited international 
characteristics in which it was reported to have been “conceived in So-
malia, planned from a United Nations refugee camp and executed from 
Eastleigh in Nairobi” by a group of al-Shabaab terrorists—one of whom 
was raised as a refugee in Norway.24
Westgate Mall, which opened in 2007, consisted of five levels, eighty 
shops, a cinema, two banks, and a casino.25 As the al-Shabaab terror-
ists stalked the mall’s corridors and shops for the first three and a half 
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hours of the attack, government forces attempted to organize themselves, 
with many departments, such as the Kenya Police and the Kenya Mili-
tary, wrangling over who was in charge.26 While the government depart-
ments squabbled, armed civilians, off-duty police officers, and Kenya Red 
Cross medics formed ad hoc tactical teams, rescuing hundreds of people 
from the mall.27 Because there were so many different armed responders, 
plainclothes law enforcement officers, as well as armed civilians stealth-
ily roaming the mall corridors with little communication between them, 
there was a great deal of confusion as to who was a terrorist, who was a vic-
tim, and who represented an authority. Witness testimonies of the attacks 
vary wildly, with many disagreeing on what they saw.28 
The contemporary regularity of such urban terror attacks, and the 
ubiquity of surveillance systems in commercial settings, increases the 
chances that these atrocities are recorded, disseminated, and consumed 
through a variety of media. Through an extraordinary diversity of cam-
era angles and feeds, the Westgate Mall siege was a made-for-television 
event from the beginning. What is understood to have transpired is what 
can be gathered from investigating the visual evidence recorded by “more 
than 100 security cameras inside the mall, video from television crews 
and modest cellphones, as well as still photographs.”29 Additionally, in-
formation about the attacks was delivered by the perpetrators themselves, 
with al-Shabaab live-tweeting their actions, marking Westgate as “the first 
major terrorist attack in history in which the group that mounted the op-
eration used Twitter to announce to the world it was responsible.”30 Using 
social media, al-Shabaab “confirmed it was behind what it described as 
the ‘Westgate spectacle,’”31 tweeting “258 times between September 21 and 
September 25.”32 
Much of what we know about the Westgate Mall attack is what was 
reported by the media and screened on news networks, including how vi-
olently, and arbitrarily, victims were interrogated and killed, and how long 
and silently survivors hid in, behind, and under desks, storerooms, refrig-
erators, air vents, and anything that could conceivably conceal a human 
body. With all the elements of a reality show drama, the footage also shows 
how some government units “looted shops, broke open safes, and emptied 
tills.”33 A number of false reports emanating from government officials, 
witnesses, terrorists, and the media only added to the salaciousness and 
longevity of the “live event.” 
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This wealth of visual evidence, however, was suddenly disrupted when 
“a rocket fired by the Kenyan army collapsed the back of the mall, drop-
ping the rooftop car park into the basement,”34 turning the area into a 
volatile war zone, burying the bodies of the injured and the dead, and 
destroying much of the forensic evidence.35 To this day, it still cannot be 
definitively confirmed if the four attackers were killed, how they were 
killed, and, indeed, if there were only four perpetrators. At the time of 
writing, more than two years after the events, the Kenyan government, 
working in conjunction with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
and British and Israeli intelligence, has yet to deliver conclusive answers 
on the sequence of events over the four days.36 In the aftermath of the 
attacks, “President Uhuru Kenyatta announced his intention to appoint a 
commission of inquiry into Westgate ‘lapses and how we can avoid them 
in the future,’ but no such report had been released.”37 In the current con-
frontational climate, buoyed by the divisive discourse of the war on ter-
ror, the official media-infused stance appeals to the “state of exception,”38 
where no justifications are deemed necessary for how investigations are 
conducted, how accusations are accumulated, and how punishments for 
terrorists are concluded.  
The formulation of the modern terror discourse necessitates the per-
petuation of entrenched and oppositional ideological positions by reduc-
ing complex conflicts to simple binaries. However, despite the many ide-
ological oppositions between the terror and the anti-terror narratives, the 
two discourses are surprisingly similar in their basic assumptions. In the 
latest incarnation of the meaning of modern terror, both the terror and 
anti-terror discourses are in agreement when emphasizing the religious 
underpinnings of the majority of contemporary attacks. The dominant 
media narrative frames atrocities as an exercise in militant Islam, as do 
the terrorists themselves whose language is saturated with religious ideol-
ogy as they set about killing victims. Even though al-Shabaab announced 
that they had come to “save” Muslims, suggesting that Muslims were 
being held, against their will, in the corporate capitalist structure of the 
shopping mall,39 they fired indiscriminately into the crowd. Although 
al-Shabaab claimed to be avenging Muslims, and at times spared mall 
visitors if they could correctly answer questions on Islam, the gunmen 
launched grenades, and shot people at random, killing many Muslims in 
the process.40 
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As this study shows, there is a much more complex story underlying 
the Westgate Mall tragedy, and conducting an analysis of the attacks re-
quires examining more than the singularity of the religious approach. 
During the Westgate Mall attack, al-Shabaab used a multitude of com-
munication platforms, especially Twitter, to deliver an extraordinary vol-
ume of online public communications in which they announced a series 
of other justifications for the atrocities: that they were, in turn, revenge for 
political injustices and military incursions into Somalia; a response to eco-
nomic inequalities; a retaliation against Western government and corpo-
rate exploitation and injustice; as well as vengeance in the form of jihad, or 
religious holy war.41 Many of these myriad grievances can be identified in 
al-Shabaab’s statements claiming that the attack was “retribution against 
the Western states that supported the Kenyan invasion and are spilling the 
blood of innocent Muslims in order to pave the way for their mineral com-
panies,”42 and in retaliation to “the persistent theft of their land’s resources 
which the Kenyan leaders and Western companies have conspired to plun-
der,”43 and to foil “the clandestine schemes of the Zionist Jews in Kenya.”44 
The official media and government narratives, as well as those of al-
Shabaab, gave precedence to the militant jihadist angle of the story, despite 
the many complex grievances articulated over the course of the four days. 
Although the modern terror discourse has been embedded in religious 
ideology, with a particular focus on holy war, much can be understood 
about extremist groups by examining the real or perceived political and 
economic grievances directed at powerful globalizing forces, with an em-
phasis on the “West.” Extremist networks often take on the self-ordained 
duty of destroying global symbols of modernity and conspicuous con-
sumption. With its ubiquitous products offered by powerful global capital-
ist distribution networks, it is in the shopping mall that Nairobi most re-
sembles New York. An attack on one can be read as an attack on the other.
Since the kaleidoscopic declarations given by al-Shabaab regarding the 
attacks cannot be studied in their entirety, it is important to concentrate 
on the intersections of many of these issues as they encountered each other 
in Westgate Mall, and as they became reflected through the prism of the 
shopping center over the four days. In this way, the shopping mall be-
comes contextualized as a primary signifier of global consumer culture, 
and as a site for the juncture of longstanding socioeconomic and political 
tensions. By using Westgate Mall as a contextual case study, I analyze the 
overlap between two of the most prominent issues defining the contempo-
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rary era, namely, the relationship between the twin forces of international 
terrorism and global capitalism. The victims of the Westgate tragedy expe-
rienced first hand, and in a situation of extreme violence, the tensions aris-
ing from being caught in between these supposedly opposite ideologies. 
The tragic story of Westgate Mall shines a light on many international 
concerns that, while pertinent to the Kenyan context, are symptomatic of 
broader global challenges related to socioeconomic and political inequali-
ties. The shopping mall becomes exemplary of the contemporary invisible 
divide between what can be considered a normal and everyday urban space 
for those who can afford to partake in it, and an alien and discordant one 
for those who cannot. The shopping mall, in this formulation, represents 
a coalface of contemporary culture—a space where hostilities are ignited 
through the increased friction of local and globalizing forces. The West-
gate Mall case study unearths the many competing socioeconomic and 
political tensions that have troubled this particular shopping center since 
its conception, having occupied an affluent area of the Westlands neigh-
borhood directly bordering a sprawling Nairobi slum.45 In a city where 
half of the population “lives in slums or informal settlements,”46 Westgate 
Mall had been the subject of contestation long before al-Shabaab’s attacks. 
Similarly, malls in urban spaces around the world are embedded in such 
socioeconomic matrices of access, prohibition, and global exchange. 
Despite these many brewing hostilities, witness testimonies and news 
reports on the Westgate attack are unified in their expression of disbelief 
regarding the sudden intrusion of violence into such an everyday setting. 
Permeating the entire edifice is shock at the incompatibility of shopping 
and violence, and an incomprehension of how mass murder can occur in a 
mall. Terrorism is articulated as being so out of place in the typical bright, 
colorful, and cheerfully designed setting of a shopping center. Violence 
and shopping simply do not go together. Or so it seems. 
The Politics of Shopping
Shopping malls provide more than just the benign, upbeat shopping 
centers typically characterized in everyday narratives and popular cul-
ture—in many ways, they represent an essential extension of the mili-
tary-industrial complex. There is an underlying history of militarism that 
permeates the concept and architecture of shopping malls as contempo-
rary commercial bunkers. These complexes are shelters custom-built to 
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safeguard contemporary corporate culture, and represent the architec-
tural epitome of globalized capitalism. Fortified by a panoptic security 
apparatus, malls guard against undesirable and disruptive elements of 
modern society in order to protect the continuous circulation of money 
within the mall and, ultimately, around the world in a network of global 
flows. As commercial powerhouses, these giants of the retail industry are 
of such value that “yearly sales at Wal-Mart,” for example, “exceed the GNP 
of three-quarters of countries in the world.” 47 In the United States alone, 
retail sales numbers for 2013 “registered nearly $2.5 trillion in sales,” and 
“shopping center-related employment accounted for almost than 12.5 mil-
lion jobs.”48 In order to protect these ideal spaces of corporate capitalist 
practice and the massive revenues they generate, shopping malls become 
subject to an intense underlying militarism in terms of how they operate 
as well as how they are secured against external threats.
With increased threats of terrorist activity and the concomitant inten-
sification of security measures, enclosed urban developments, including 
shopping malls, are being advertised as “safe places” where “you can leave 
your troubles behind.”49 Especially in the urban contexts of many devel-
oping countries defined by sharp socioeconomic divides, these corporate 
enclosures are being built with security in mind from their conceptual 
stages, and are erected with visible signs of outward aggression and hos-
tility in their design, as exemplified by the height of the walls, the thick-
ness of the barbed wire, the sharpness of the spikes, and the programed 
paranoia of the all-pervasive security systems. For the foreseeable future 
of the security industry, fighting terrorist activity “is limited by neither 
time nor space nor target. From a military perspective, these sprawling 
and amorphous traits make the War on Terror an unwinnable proposition. 
But from an economic perspective, they make it an unbeatable one: not a 
flash-in-the-pan war that could potentially be won but a new and perma-
nent fixture in the global economic architecture.”50 
Even as these fortifications and “gated communities” are being built 
for security, they have other economic implications, driving up property 
values, and making these walled-off sections of the city the most expen-
sive as well as the most sought after areas—for good or ill. Increasingly, 
the rising costs of installing and operating a private and pervasive secu-
rity apparatus is transferred onto the public in the form of higher com-
modity prices, steeper transactions, and increased government service 
fees.51 Thus, ultimately, ordinary people—whether defined as citizens 
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or consumers—are the ones who bear the combined brunt of terrorism 
and anti-terrorism measures, and become the target markets for both. As 
terrorists engage in open battles against shopping malls and places of lei-
sure, the response of governments and urban developers is declared in the 
language of real and symbolic violence, and in the barricading, privatiz-
ing, and securitizing of urban areas in a kind of “low-intensity warfare.”52 
Especially since September 11, 2001, both terror and the war on terror 
have been progressively extending into everyday commercial spaces. The 
Mall of America has its own private counterterrorism unit made up of 
hundreds of security guards,53 and Westgate Mall “had precautions simi-
lar to an airport; cars are checked with mirrors for bombs and pedestrians 
are frisked”54—although many admit that security checks were performed 
in a “perfunctory manner.”55 Shopping malls have become embroiled in 
the war on terror as an everyday extension of the military-industrial com-
plex and advocate for merging of shopping with notions of patriotism. In 
the United States, for example, “the security services industry is an ide-
al career for transitioning military,”56 with many war veterans working 
as private security guards. US companies providing security services for 
shopping malls regularly employ veterans as part of the “Hire our Heroes” 
program, cementing a circular relationship between the military, private 
security, terrorists, and shopping malls. Private businesses have increas-
ingly become directly involved in anti-terrorism measures with active at-
tempts at politicizing the act of shopping. In the aftermath of al-Qaeda’s 
attack on the World Trade Center—a locus of global capitalist power—the 
Bush administration’s immediate response was to tell Americans: “We 
cannot let the terrorists achieve the objective of frightening our nation to 
the point where we don’t—where we don’t conduct business, where people 
don’t shop.”57 Within the war on terror narrative, stimulating the economy 
by spending has been framed as a patriotic duty and as a way for citizens 
to “stick their thumb in the eye of the terrorists”—an act of retaliatory 
aggression through increased commerce.58 
Mass consumption is promoted as an engine of the economy with 
citizens billed as being directly responsible for the state of the nation’s 
economic success. Within this consumption-oriented rhetoric, the citizen- 
consumer is located as “a critical part of a prosperity producing cycle of 
expanded consumer demand fueling greater production, thereby creating 
more well-paying jobs and in turn more affluent consumers capable of 
stoking the economy with their purchases.”59 When an economy is framed 
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as being dependent on individual spending habits, “the best measure of 
social consciousness is now the Index of Consumer Sentiment, which charts 
optimism about the state of the world in terms of willingness to spend.”60 
Within this frame, shopping malls become a central locus around which 
other forms of social life orbit. This conceptualization, although part of 
a normalized contemporary discourse, has been in the making for some 
time. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, “business leaders, la-
bor unions, government agencies, the mass media, advertisers, and many 
other purveyors of the postwar order conveyed the message that mass con-
sumption was not a personal indulgence. Rather, it was a civic responsibil-
ity.”61 Conspicuous consumption has been historically tied to perceptions 
of patriotism and, by spending to strengthen the economy, it is imbued 
with a notion of altruism. 
Creating a continuity between state politics and shopping malls, and 
forging a direct link between patriotism and consumerism is unabashedly 
and undisguisedly presented in the likes of the Mall of America, where 
the shopping mall purports to represent the interests and ideology of the 
nation, and is saturated in US symbolism, colors, and flags.62 Countries 
all over the world have followed suit, and have directly linked politics and 
commerce by establishing “national” malls, including the Dubai Mall, the 
Mall of India, the Mall of Mauritius, the Mall of Mozambique, the Mall 
of Gambia, and the Mall of Zimbabwe, to name a few.63 By being actively 
promoted as national symbols of patriotism, however, malls also become 
national targets of contestation, with one survivor of the Westgate Mall 
attack, Raheem Biviji, noting that it “looked like there was a war inside the 
mall.”64 And there was.
In this sense, the al-Shabaab terrorists entered Westgate Mall as 
though it was a mutual battlefield. Since consumption is politicized as a 
patriotic pastime by investors, developers, and governments all over the 
world, the al-Shabaab terrorists responded to this politicization by attack-
ing it as a suitable target. Westgate Mall was an attractive target for al-
Shabaab’s high profile attack with its high-end stores catering to wealthy 
shoppers so out of sync with the rest of the poverty-stricken Kenyan—and 
Somali—landscapes. A tweet sent by al-Shabaab during the attacks di-
rectly addressed this: “If #Westgate was Kenya’s symbol of prosperity, it 
is now a symbol of their vulnerability.”65 Al-Shabaab did not necessarily 
perceive of mall visitors as helpless victims caught in the crossfire, but 
as the privileged partakers of a prejudiced capitalist system, noting that 
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Westgate “was frequented by ‘the one percent of the one percent’. Most 
victims indeed came from Kenya’s business and political elite, as well as 
the expatriate and diplomatic community.”66 
The “reopening” ceremony of Westgate Mall on July 18, 2015,67 just shy 
of two years since the attacks, was attended by President Kenyatta Uhuru, 
along with a large number of high-ranking government officials and busi-
ness elites, as well as a mob of local and international media networks.68 
The terror attacks were used to promote and publicize the reconstruction 
of a “new and improved” Westgate Mall, highlighting how “the disrup-
tion to business, although not insignificant, is temporary.”69 Although 
Westgate Mall was destroyed, both physically and as a symbol of a safe 
space to enact a modern lifestyle, the new Westgate is now billed as big-
ger, better, and safer than before. A number of US brands including KFC, 
Subway, Domino’s, Cold Stone Creamery, and Converse, that could not be 
persuaded to set up shop in the old Westgate are now being introduced 
to the Kenyan market with great fanfare.70 There is a strategic ideological 
alignment drawn between these US brands and how international cap-
italism can play a role in conquering international terror. That the mall 
has been rebuilt to exceed its former self is evidence that the corporate 
capitalist paradigm considers itself ultimately victorious.71 The reopening 
ceremony was used as an opportunity to encourage more people in Kenya, 
and elsewhere, to think of shopping as a civic duty, thereby constructing 
consumerism as the direct opposite of terrorism, even though one is in a 
binary interdependence with the other.
Ironically, even as al-Shabaab claimed it was attacking the mall as a 
symbol of consumerism, the terrorist group was attracted by, and respond-
ed to, the “call of the mall,”72 as any other “consumer.” Even though ter-
rorism and consumerism are conceived as antithetical practices in their 
respective literatures, Westgate Mall provided a ground zero for these sup-
posedly oppositional ends of the spectrum to meet on common ground—a 
space where daily consumption is increasingly militarized and where ter-
rorism and security are increasingly commercialized. Within the space 
of the contemporary shopping mall, capitalism and terrorism are both 
products imported through the same networks of global exchange, and 
are engaged in an act of brutal reciprocity. Thus, terrorists attack symbols 
of consumerism as a political act and the anti-terror discourse similarly 
highlights shopping as an act of political resistance against terrorism. Po-
liticized shopping has been consistent for both capitalists as well as those 
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who most vehemently oppose them. The discourse of consumption and 
the discourse of terror have been in synthesis for some time, with one 
relying on the other for increased publicity on both sides of the ideological 
divide.
The Ideological Complexities of Terrorism and Capitalism
In an inescapable twist, in order to compete against a predominantly 
Western capitalist system, al-Shabaab militants must first appeal to it, and 
engage with the very ideology they are supposedly opposing. Despite an-
ti-capitalist pronouncements on the part of al-Shabaab and other terrorist 
networks, they must necessarily operate within an enveloping capitalist 
and neoliberal framework. As one of the most voracious global forces, the 
corporate capitalist model is adept at infiltrating economic systems and 
subverting many forms of resistance, turning opposition into begrudg-
ing collaboration. The contemporary model of neoliberalism has “become 
hegemonic as a mode of discourse and has pervasive effects on ways of 
thought and political-economic practices to the point where it has become 
incorporated into the commonsense way we interpret, live in, and under-
stand the world.”73 Terror groups like al-Shabaab have been vehemently 
anti-capitalist in their public pronouncements and in the targets of their 
attacks, even as they themselves engage in capitalist enterprise, and as 
they utilize the latest digital communication technologies as integral to 
their operations.74
Despite widespread opposition to the corporate model, many incarna-
tions of modern international terrorism, in the form of loosely affiliated, 
ideological networks, are stealthily following the trails blazed by networks 
of international commerce. Al-Shabaab “has shifted from one illegal busi-
ness to another, drawing money from East Africa’s underworld to finance 
attacks like the recent deadly siege at a Nairobi shopping mall.”75 In order 
to fund its activities, al-Shabaab has engaged in a number of profit-mak-
ing business ventures, including illicit international trade in ivory and 
charcoal.76 Thus, the neoliberal model, despite its formal discursive dis-
tancing from illegal activities, has been of direct benefit to the formation 
of international crime syndicates and terrorist networks. The differences 
between markets and black markets, and terrorists and entrepreneurs, are 
not always easy to define and often become subject to prevailing discours-
es.
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Even as terrorist acts disrupt businesses locally and internationally, de-
lay operations, and cause financial losses, especially for enterprises related 
to tourism, aviation, and hospitality, these disturbances are reflective of 
only one side of the story. Conversely, there are many legitimate business-
es that find their genesis in terrorist activity. Especially since September 
11, 2001, governments and private enterprises all over the world increased 
spending on security industries and emergency responses in their fund-
ing of the “war on terror.”77 The security industry has grown exponentially 
in operation and profits, and has had a great impact on the strengthening 
of the military-industrial complex in order to both secure and stimulate 
the economy. The war on terror quickly became a “for-profit venture, a 
booming new industry that has breathed new life into the faltering U.S. 
economy,”78 with many traditional government functions regarding the 
safety and security of citizens outsourced to private companies. 
In modern metropolitan settings such as Westgate Mall, corporate cap-
italism, terrorism, and the military-industrial complex meet head on. De-
spite it being under siege and paralyzed by the attack, the mall still played 
a part in the global circulation of capital and performed its market role, 
albeit under a different guise. While the activity of shopping was halted 
during, and in the aftermath of, al-Shabaab’s attacks, the wider capitalist 
apparatus was still in motion, and the circulation of capital was transposed 
to other areas of operation, including the corporate media frenzy that sur-
rounded the Westgate Mall attacks, and that prolonged their salience, and 
the immediate investment in a more robust security apparatus. Even as the 
cash registers ceased their ringing in the mall, they worked overtime in the 
surrounding security industries and media networks. 
The pervasiveness of mobile technology, social media connectivity, 
and corporate media network competition means that most of these trag-
ic events are inevitably turned into global media spectacles that happen 
for home audiences in real time to the twin delight of extremists, whose 
message is reverberated internationally, and the media, which is provided 
audience share and advertising revenues.79 The mainstream of capitalism 
and the extreme of terrorism do not always inhibit each other, but often 
align symbiotically to produce new markets and new networks. Westgate 
Mall became an archetypal site for the production, consumption, and com-
modification of terror, where corporate news media, terrorist networks, 
and government authorities all took part in the events, and competed for 
control of the emerging narrative. 
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Even as the al-Shabaab terrorists entered Westgate to wreak havoc on 
the corruption of an unjust capitalist system, and to battle against the ide-
als of consumerism, their oppositional actions became as commodified 
as many of the other items on sale in the mall. The Westgate attacks have 
now passed through the hands of many corporate systems, and the vio-
lence of these events have been packaged, circulated, sold, and consumed 
as news stories, documentaries, DVDs, books, internet content, and social 
media materials supported by online advertisements.80 Continuities be-
tween terrorism and capitalism are most visible in the immediate com-
modification of terrorist acts, and the rush to condemn (or support) the 
ideology by producing and distributing a multitude of symbolic products, 
turning the tragedy into a further spectacle to be consumed. Immediate-
ly after the Charlie Hebdo atrocities, for example, the “Je suis Charlie” 
slogan was mass produced, distributed, and consumed through “Je Suis 
Charlie items retailing on Etsy (seven pages of products, from bracelets 
to pendants), Amazon, Spreadshirt (34 different T-shirts, sweats and 
mugs) and Zazzle.”81 Importantly, both the agents of terror and anti-ter-
ror played roles in the production and consumption of these products. As 
more aspects of daily life become increasingly subjected to market forces, 
increased commodification practices serve to complicate matters to the 
point where it is not entirely clear where terrorism ends and where the 
market begins.
Terrorism and the war on terrorism have become staples of daily dis-
course—at once alarming, and yet increasingly normalized. The study of 
terrorism is usually event-driven and policy-driven,”82 and, unsurprising-
ly, peaks at specific periods of time and especially in the wake of political 
unrest and spectacular attacks. To date, the sheer volume of research pub-
lished in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, is indicative and unprece-
dented.83 The literature is inundated with research dedicated to decoding, 
describing, defining, and deconstructing terrorism as a phenomenon, 
with many academic studies working in tandem with government depart-
ments to support, enhance, or steer government policies towards a more 
stringent characterization of terrorism. 
Other studies, such as this one, take a less deterministic approach by 
arguing that terrorism remains the product of discursive forces and can be 
considered as much a creation of the anti-terror discourse as it is of particu-
lar attacks and atrocities. This approach provides a necessary complication 
of often simple and artificial binaries by engaging in a more critical read-
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ing of terrorism “both as a social relation and as embedded within a wider 
set of social relations.”84 Complex contemporary concerns require critical 
social research from perspectives other than those espoused by the politi-
cally powerful and economically dominant institutions. In this way, criti-
cal investigations yield narratives that challenge those relayed by corporate 
media networks and other official or government-influenced sources that 
attempt to frame terrorism as the antithesis of capitalism and neoliberal 
practice. This is despite neoliberalism’s many inherent contradictions, its 
enactment of institutional and industrial violence as an inexorable part of 
production and expansion processes, and its deliberate or inadvertent ap-
peal to symbolic violence, especially through the media.85 Still, neoliberal-
ism is portrayed as the symbol of an idealized Western notion of individual 
freedom, while terrorism is portrayed as its opposite, even though both, in 
many cases, lead to displacement, disarticulation, and death all around the 
world.86 An analysis of the characteristics of corporate capitalism and ter-
rorist activity in the current globalized economic environment shows how 
they are not only similar, but indeed often working in tandem. 
The opposition between modern global capitalism and modern global 
terrorism is reinforced in discursive constructions of difference that do 
not necessarily exist in practice. By denying any wrongdoing, the “genuine 
anxieties brought about by an unstable economic system whose victims 
are almost invariably the most vulnerable in society are thereby displaced 
onto a host of threats disconnected (or apparently disconnected) from the 
chronic instabilities of post-industrial capitalism.”87 It is only by deflect-
ing or projecting internal contradictions and rogue elements upon others, 
whether the subcontractor or the terrorist, that the monist institutions of 
corporate capitalism are able to represent themselves as lucid, coherent, 
and functional entities. 
Such complexity and incoherence, multiplicity of discourse, and sup-
plementarity of logic are subject to a particular type of epistemological vi-
olence in that they must be excised in order to fit into a singular meta-nar-
rative that defines corporate capitalism as a positive norm, and any attack 
upon it as a necessarily negative disruption.88 It is only by subscribing to 
a binary logic that it becomes possible to mark clear delineations between 
the borders of the supposedly holistic ideologies of capitalism and those 
of terrorism. 
The ensuing analyses in this study, including how neoliberal capitalist 
practices, and by implication shopping malls, assist in the propagation of 
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unequal power relations, should be read as adding nuance to a subject that 
has become increasingly bound by oppositional and binary discourses. Un-
derstandably, as authorities attempt to appease a frightened citizenry, and as 
publics attempt to grapple with the brutality of terrorist violence encroaching 
into everyday urban spaces, they shape the discourse of the “war on terror” 
according to sharp binaries. This allows for a necessary intellectual-abridge-
ment in which terrorism falls outside of the realm of comprehension. Many 
news articles and reports on the Westgate Mall attacks, for example, do not 
count the four terrorists in the casualty list of deaths at the mall. In many 
ways, the politically-charged anti-terror discourse means that the debate re-
mains truncated, making further investigation into the many surrounding 
stories, histories, and discourses not only necessary, but critical.
This study presents readers with an opportunity to engage in a more 
critical examination of the events that were the focus of limited media 
attention, and that passed without a more thorough examination of the 
underlying complexities regarding the relationship between capitalist and 
terrorist practice in metropolitan settings. While this study cannot fully 
explain the many atrocities and acts of violence perpetrated by extrem-
ists in urban settings, it does attempt to provide a contextual framework 
for these contemporary contestations. The various critiques of capitalist 
structures and landscapes of consumption articulated in this study are an 
important part of the history of shopping malls in general, and Westgate 
Mall in particular, and should not be read as a distraction from, but rather 
an elaboration on, the atrocious circumstances in which many people lost 
their lives.
With the reopening of Westgate Mall in 2015, there was no mention 
of the tragedy in any of the mall’s public pronouncements, website, or 
social media sites. Westgate Mall’s Facebook page shows a two-year gap 
between the last abrupt post on September 20, 2013—the day before the 
attacks—inviting people to “come and enjoy the Westgate Get-away fair,” 
and the new celebratory post about the commencement of the mall’s activ-
ities on July 1, 2015.89 There is no explanation for why there was such an 
extended gap in communication, and why the mall was closed for so long. 
Westgate Mall’s silence on the attacks is a strategic public relations elision 
of the events, and, with it, a deliberate forgetting. While the Kenyan public 
and government encourage annual memorials, the mall itself displays no 
official commemoration of the victims in its communication efforts. Since 
recalling a tragic event will, undoubtedly, interfere with sales, “the mall 
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suffers an amnesia without which the smooth advancement of its busi-
ness would be impossible.”90
The specter of al-Shabaab’s Westgate Mall attack is woven throughout 
this study, serving as a local conduit for the play of global forces. These an-
alytical passages from Westgate to the world, and back, integrate particu-
lar socioeconomic contestations into a wider reading of the shopping mall 
in twenty-first century transnational society. The next chapter addresses 
the rise of the shopping mall in the context of emerging economies in tan-
dem with these nations’ attempts at prompting neoliberal development. It 
emphasizes how the shopping mall has become a symbol of national pride 
as well as a supposed testament to successful national economic develop-
ment. In charting the rise of the prestige mall, the chapter draws atten-
tion to the simultaneous development of a new urban underclass. Defined 
antithetically by the shining steel and gleaming glass of a new imported 
modernity, many inhabitants of this new social paradigm react to it with 
a not altogether unexpected social violence. The chapter provides an over-
view of the history and development of the shopping mall both as a site of 
commerce and consumption as well as a site of encroaching security con-
cerns, such that it remains a prime indicator of ideological contestation. 
2. Developing the Shopping Mall
Countries considered to be “developing” on the prescribed scale of global 
economic growth—a status used to describe many African nations—are 
encouraged to promote themselves as active partakers in the global econo-
my. The identity of the post-colonial nation as projected by contemporary 
corporate and government discourses is one that is increasingly based on 
such a globalized imaginary—a nation that has overcome its past colo-
nial disarticulation and become resilient enough to compete in the new 
world order of economic globalization.1 Entry into the global economy, 
however, is only accessible by emphasizing business-friendly and open 
markets and demonstrating increased middle-class wealth and disposable 
incomes—the hallmarks of the modern state. Developing nations are thus 
obliged to conform to a pervasive neoliberal institutional framework that 
is largely “characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, un-
encumbered markets, and free trade.”2 Citizens of developing economies 
are central to globalization processes, and are encouraged to partake more 
actively in a shared consumerist culture. 
In response to these demands, developing countries have created 
strategic policies to prompt economic growth within a targeted period of 
time.3 Kenya’s development plan over the next two decades, for example, 
has been spelled out in its strategic Vision 2030, which is the developmen-
tal constitution of the nation, aiming “to increase Kenya’s global competi-
tiveness, to promote growth based on efficiency, and to attract more invest-
ment locally and internationally.”4 In Kenya, like most other developing 
nations, there is an indoctrinated ideology of nation-building that requires 
governments to keep pace with the global trends of progress exhibited by 
wealthy nations. Following the paths set by industrialized predecessors 
is a key step taken by postcolonial nations in their attempt to compete 
on an international scale. Kenya’s Vision 2030 openly states that it emu-
Target Markets—International Terror ism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall28
lates other “developed” countries, and follows their set patterns of growth 
couched in terms of strengthening the economy. This is achieved through 
a neoliberal agenda with an “emphasis on the deregulation of markets and 
the new priorities awarded to private business interests in the formation of 
policy and the delivery of public services.”5 
As colonial governments and militaries began their withdrawal, many 
newly independent governments were obliged to retain the already exist-
ing structure of economic advisement. In the African context, “imperial 
businesses did not collapse alongside colonialism, but instead successfully 
adapted their operations by highlighting their role in the economic de-
velopment of the continent” by cooperating with the newly formed inde-
pendent governments as well as with local business elites.6 To this day, the 
single largest source of foreign direct investment in postcolonial nations 
often comes from the former colonizer. For both Kenya and Egypt, for 
example, most foreign direct investment comes from the United King-
dom.7 Many postcolonial nations “are today part of the Commonwealth 
of Nations, an intergovernmental organization that facilitates political, 
commercial, and cultural ties with the United Kingdom. All that makes it 
easier for businesses to set up shop abroad, send employees to work as ex-
patriates, and hire local talent. Companies are also better able to negotiate 
special commercial ties and preferential access to markets.”8 It follows that 
contemporary investments in former British colonies will allow for the 
former colonizer to have a direct mimetic influence on the ways in which 
elements of postcolonial economies operate—a global imaginary facilitat-
ed by historical transnational ties. Thus, many developing countries must 
perform a balancing act as they attempt to reconcile the burdens of a colo-
nial history with the demands of a global economy.
The Making of a Middle Class
Capitalist cultural competency is, in many ways, an extension of the ways 
in which the colonial empire positioned itself as the hegemonic locus 
of wealth and power, and the center towards which colonies gravitated, 
and of which colonial societies were expected to frame their imaginaries. 
Whether celebratory or begrudging, discourses of development are a cru-
cial frame of reference, with many complex colonial inheritances being 
extended into the contemporary period under the guise of free market 
globalization, creating a strong progressive link between colonial legacies 
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and contemporary neoliberal policies.9 Even today, the same type of colo-
nialist language is utilized by international investors who perceive of de-
veloping countries as “virgin” ground ripe for economic exploitation, and 
as “the Next Big Thing.”10 Developers are calculating the benefits accrued 
from investing in emerging economies where a “young and connected 
middle class is growing fast and still deciding on its favorite brands. In 
short, it is brimming with potential.”11 Market researchers report that “in-
stitutional investors now regard Africa’s emerging middle class and its 
growing consumerism the most attractive aspect of investing in Africa, 
more than its commodity wealth.”12 
In order to attract international investment and “to transform Ken-
ya into a newly industrializing, ‘middle-income country providing a high 
quality of life for all its citizens by the year 2030,’”13 the Kenya National Bu-
reau of Statistics (KNBS) has “re-classified” Kenya as a “middle-income” 
country, rather than a “low-income” one. This is a deliberate discursive 
rearticulation of the state of Kenya’s economy that is not necessarily re-
flected in economic reality. Kenyan Minister for Devolution and Planning, 
Anne Waiguru, admitted “that an increase in GDP per capita does not 
necessarily mean that Kenyans will be better off nor does it imply that the 
existing social economic challenges have ceased to exist. Kenyans will be 
just as poor—or just as wealthy—as they were a year ago.”14 
This “reclassification” of Kenya as a middle-income country is thus 
largely symbolic and is meant to position the country as more interna-
tionally competitive, and as more attractive to foreign direct investment 
rather than instigating any real form of poverty alleviation.15 As part of the 
“trade, not aid” strategy, inflating the public’s purchasing power means 
that countries like Kenya will have to forgo specific international aid quo-
tas set for social development in favor of appealing to more foreign invest-
ment directed towards economic development. Symbolically increasing 
the purchasing power of a nation serves to entice foreign investors with 
“increasingly attractive opportunities to supply goods and services to con-
sumers with rapidly increasing disposable incomes.”16 In such ways, “con-
sumers” are being discursively created with the anticipation that this will 
lead to action in the form of increased consumption. 
Now that developing countries have “created” a middle class and have 
proposed people’s increased purchasing power, there must be a place spe-
cifically designed to capture this wealth and to circulate it within the glob-
al economy. That place is the shopping mall; the portal between develop-
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ing countries and the global economy. To share in the consumerist codes 
of a global corporate capitalism, “from Nairobi to Johannesburg, major 
urban centers across the continent have seen a construction boom take 
hold—and the world of shopping is at the heart of it.”17 Neoliberalism in 
the guise of shopping malls has infiltrated most, if not all, global mar-
kets, where investors and governments have eagerly adopted the design 
and marketing successes of these commercial venues. By encouraging 
increased “consumer confidence,” new national identities are constructed 
on the basis of economic performance, inviting citizens to find consola-
tion in consumption. This is despite the fact that poverty is endemic in 
many developing countries, and only a fraction of the population is able to 
partake in this new consumer identity.
The Globalization of Consumption and Contestation 
Every era is defined by an architectural testimonial that physically locates 
prevailing elements of its collective social state. As an international sig-
nifier of a globalized modernity, shopping malls rate high on the list of 
important landmarks defining the contemporary era. The progressivist 
hopes of a nation have long been pinned to the concept of the shopping 
center, where the commercial establishment has served as a sign of pro-
gress for decades. As early as 1878, department stores were billed as “a 
place where almost anything may be bought,” a boast that has been sys-
tematically repeated in the contemporary era.18
Similar to how shopping malls are currently characterized as harbin-
gers of globalization, the establishment of the Selfridges department store 
in 1909 “was considered a ‘monument to modernity’ and was one of the 
most frequented tourist venues in London.”19 This sentiment was echoed 
almost verbatim in Ghana in the 1950s, over half a century later, when the 
United Africa Company (UAC) was tasked with the “duty” of developing 
“a modern department store in time for independence,”20 as a sign that 
the nation had arrived into its modern incarnation. The Kingsway depart-
ment store was duly erected in Accra, and, in the language of its developer, 
was a symbol of “future peace, progress, prosperity and stability.”21 Thus, 
a direct correlative link was created between the notion of independence 
and the act of shopping. Another half a century into the future, when the 
Accra Mall was established in 2008, its founder, Joseph Owusu-Akyaw, 
noted that the commercial complex would usher the nation into a hitherto 
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unknown age of modernity.22 In the contemporary period, the opening—
and reopening—of Nairobi’s Westgate Mall was geared towards embody-
ing and exhibiting these developmental ideals.
The surge in popularity of this commodity form is exemplified by its 
rapid growth. In the immediate post World War II period, “there were only 
eight shopping centers in the United States,”23 a figure that had grown to 
114,485 in 2013.24 In the developing country context, nations are encour-
aged, and increasingly obliged, to become educated in the language of 
progress, and to become literate in its associated codes by building shop-
ping malls as a sign of socioeconomic development. Nigeria opened its 
“first modern shopping mall in 2005,” and, in Rwanda, “the construction 
of shopping malls is changing the retail market from high street trad-
ing to enclosed centres which is gradually becoming popular with locals 
adapting to formal retailing under one roof.”25 Although there were only 
40 malls in Kenya in 2014, a figure that might seem low compared to the 
number of malls in the United States, this is, in fact, a relatively rapid in-
crease, with scores more shopping malls being planned.26 
Cosmopolitan marketplaces, trading traditions, consumption practic-
es, identity formations, and international networks of communication un-
derline a rich and varied history of global connectivities. While traditional 
market forms exist in many nations, the shopping mall as the architectur-
al epitome of corporate capitalism has superseded these in importance as 
a symbol of globalization, a signifier of economic progress, and a ready-
made commodity form and spectacle. As an essential sign of a nation’s 
social and economic progress, within the discourse of globalization, the 
mall is seen as a sophisticated urban necessity, regardless of how it fits 
within existing—and resisting—social, economic, and urban formations. 
The wholesale importation of the contemporary shopping mall is especial-
ly extolled in developing nations, since it can be transplanted, with little 
modification, into whatever local market exists. 
Governments and investors all over the world have been enthralled by 
the idea of erecting shopping malls as self-enclosed and profit-generating 
miniature cities that are capable of operating on their own terms and with 
little connection to traditional marketplaces. In most contemporary urban 
environments, the shopping mall is promoted as “a point of reference, 
making the city accommodate its presence.”27 Many shopping malls intro-
duced into the developing country context do not have to work their way 
into the existing social and market structures since they are being built as 
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“mixed use complexes” complete with hotels, houses, private services and 
infrastructure, and can often even be accessed by private roads. 
Because of the significant investments necessary to develop and con-
struct shopping malls, there is only a handful of international architec-
tural firms that specialize in mall construction. This monopolization has 
meant that shopping malls follow an “international standard,” and do not 
need to fit into the local existing market structure; they can be “trans-
planted” fully formed with little need for interaction with their surround-
ings. As can be seen in many developing countries, the design of the 
urban mall can—and in many cases does—appear fully formed.28 This 
transplantation prevents—and protects—shopping centers from growing 
organically over time to encounter, be shaped by, and overcome the many 
social, economic, and political pitfalls and problems associated with urban 
growth.29 
When the Kingsway department store in Accra was accused of mo-
nopolizing the market and sidelining African retailers in the 1950s, its 
developers responded by noting that “department stores formed no part 
of the indigenous system of trading in West Africa,” and that they thus 
did not “trespass in the field of the African trader.”30 Clearly, department 
stores, as precursors to shopping malls, were considered a uniquely West-
ern phenomenon transplanted into a racially segregated African context. 
With their own rules of business, distribution systems, and customer 
base, such stores claimed to be divorced from the broader environment. 
Even though the mall does not always fit, and is not always welcome, in 
some urban contexts, where it is assembled onsite and introduced in its 
wholesale form, it remains socially and economically successful for those 
who can afford to partake in the social world offered within its walls, and 
for those who can afford to invest in it.
Standardization of Consumption
The concept of the contemporary enclosed shopping mall, as a product 
and an agent of globalizing forces, is an exercise in homogenization that 
demands to be uniformly understood and adopted all over the world. Out 
of the perceived chaos of modernizing nations, the mall is heralded as a 
mark of certainty and familiarity—a commercial comfort of a dominant 
consumer culture. Such standardization is meant to ease the process of 
doing business in countries with highly variable legal cultures, urban en-
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vironments, infrastructures, and levels of economic and urban growth. 
Since generating profits is central to mall design, they are custom-built 
according to similar design principles all over the world, making them 
“ageographic.”31 Testament to the “global” and simultaneous “placeless” 
ideology of the contemporary shopping mall, the world is full of homog-
enous Westgate Malls—none of which are related. In the United States 
alone, there are Westgate shopping malls in Minnesota, South Carolina, 
Ohio, Massachusetts, California, Texas, and Pennsylvania, to name a few. 
Elsewhere in the world, there are Westgate malls in Shanghai, Zagreb, 
Ottawa, Singapore, and Oxford. 
As a representative of the modern, global city, the shopping mall ful-
fills many of the requirements of globalization by facilitating the standard-
ization of international business so that foreign entities do not have to deal 
with the overwhelming differences between each nation’s legal cultures, 
structures, and requirements. To facilitate this regularity, and to promote 
a recognized “international standard,”32 shopping mall developers have 
banded together into powerful trade associations, such as the Internation-
al Council of Shopping Centers, with strong global influence and lobbying 
leverage.33 These consortia provide international representation of real es-
tate firms specializing in the wholesale design and installation of malls, 
ensuring that the many diverse cultures, markets, languages, and wealth 
disparities in developing countries do not impose unnecessary barriers to 
global retail expansion. Within the language of globalized business opera-
tions, this is a key benefit. In many developing country contexts, however, 
this can become a source of contestation. While Westgate Mall’s estab-
lishment was an appealing prospect for many who could afford to shop 
there, it did much to disrupt the livelihoods of others in the surrounding 
informal markets and settlements.
Although the evolutionary histories of these commercial spaces and 
how they fit within their social surroundings are multiple, the homoge-
nizing forces of global corporate capitalism have meant that commercial 
forms are being progressively standardized and unified. In developing 
countries, “international architectural firms replicate models first tested 
in the United States or Europe, which are then filled with globally iden-
tifiable chains and brands.”34 Specific points of reference and design that 
emerge from a dominant Western consumer culture are then universal-
ized.35 For example, “people who have worked their way around a mall 
once can use any other in a different city, even abroad, without ever having 
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to learn the local language or customs.”36 Malls are built with the same 
kinds of tried and tested homogenous features to enhance functionality 
and efficiency.37 This ubiquity of design has also meant that the security 
responses are also made homogenous, and “a strategy to reduce the risk 
of terrorism will be similar for most shopping centers” regardless of their 
particular socioeconomic or political contexts.38
Neoliberalism and the Cit y
Cities like Nairobi, considered to be “emerging” on the scale of glob-
al economic development, have become beholden to private investors to 
construct the urban landscape in a manner that it becomes indicative of 
economic viability, attractive to foreign investment, facilitative of a strong 
tourist trade, and protective of middle classes.39 As governments and pri-
vate interests attempt to attract foreign investment “they must market the 
city itself as a commodity.”40 With increased global connectivities, many 
“cities have become more like city states, no longer tied to local or nation-
al borders but linked into an international network of urban economies 
and cultures. And the cities themselves are splintering into a multitude 
of semi-autonomous zones, creating murky regions of private/public part-
nerships and commercial interest.”41 Such emerging cities are being ac-
tively positioned as nodes of modernity that have more in common with—
and can better connect to—other globalized cities, rather than with the 
impoverished districts in their own surrounding vicinities.
Many developing postcolonial cities have been shaped by a long his-
tory of private interests, causing sharp rifts and contestations between 
communities. There is a continuation of a colonial legacy formulated on 
capital accumulation in certain urban areas at the expense of the majority 
of poorer populations. While many public spaces in postcolonial cities re-
main fractured along historical racial and economic divides, these segre-
gations are often enhanced in the contemporary period. The postcolonial 
city is geared to represent “a market-driven urbanity; it is a city shaped 
more by the logic of Market than the needs of its inhabitants; respond-
ing more to individual or corporate interests than public concerns. It is 
marked by an increasing deregulation and privatization of production, 
collective consumption, and urban space.”42 By concentrating investments 
in some areas of the city while ignoring other poorer ones these develop-
ments serve to enhance segregation and polarization. These tensions are 
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“most evident in the gated communities of the middle- and higher-income 
neighbourhoods” that often border slum areas, causing direct visual and 
communal frictions between the two types of daily lived experience.43
Nairobi’s Deep Sea slum is one such example that is located in the up-
coming and wealthy Westlands district, home to Westgate Mall. The slum 
hosts approximately 12,000 people, many of whom have settled there since 
1963.44 The Westlands neighborhood is thus home to some of the richest 
and poorest areas of Nairobi that must sit side by side and tolerate the daily 
friction this juxtaposition entails.45 Even though the growth of shopping 
malls is expected to promote job creation and better infrastructure, these 
urban developments do not complement other demographic factors. The 
population growth of Nairobi is increasing at a rate that “is not commen-
surate with the country’s capacity to create jobs, not only in urban areas, 
but also in rural economies. The issue has led to proliferation of slums 
and gross inequalities. About 60 percent of Nairobi’s 3.5 million residents 
live in slums where provision of public services are inadequate.”46 
As economic and infrastructural development projects reshape mar-
kets and landscapes, “urban poverty appears to be increasing as life in the 
city has become more expensive. Unemployment in the formal sector has 
risen, while real wages have not kept up with price increases,”47 causing a 
variety of hostilities directed towards places of consumption, and especial-
ly the shopping mall. To become part of a culture of consumption, “urban 
lifestyles require cash; which is difficult to access legally in countries with 
high unemployment levels. As a result, crime rates are higher in cities.”48 
Frustrations are increased when those most excluded from the distri-
bution of wealth are still required to aspire to acts of conspicuous con-
sumption. The growth of the economy and the increasing popularity of 
shopping malls do little to hide the uneven processes of development and 
unequal capital flows creating the sharp divide between rich and poor.49 
The signifiers of modernity, including open markets, luxury shopping 
malls, and credit card systems, are erected and established in many de-
veloping countries even before the public’s ability to become integrated 
into these systems or to partake in them in any meaningful way. Despite 
evidence to the contrary, the shopping mall is still billed by developers 
and advertisers as a space that can be universally enjoyed. However, such 
a seemingly democratic ideal can only be achieved through equity in pur-
chasing power. As a point of comparison: in a country where “more than 
45% of Kenyans live below the Kenyan national poverty line,”50 and where 
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“more than 43% of Kenyans live on less than USD 1.25 per day,”51 a burger 
at Westgate’s Gourmet Urban Burgers “sold for between $8 and $9.”52 A 
consumerist culture is being actively encouraged in places where shop-
ping malls will be frequented by only a fraction of the population, and 
envied, endured, or opposed by many others. 
Make Way for the Mall
Governments, property developers, retail chains, and marketers, to name 
a few entities promoting a neoliberal ideology, are converging to create a 
“formal shopping culture” in many developing countries where the retail 
landscape is often dominated by informal markets.53 While some slum 
residents might find employment as security guards and other service 
staff at formal shopping centers and malls,54 others are often absorbed 
into the surrounding informal markets—ones that are often regarded as 
illicit and criminal. These are defined by a “diversified set of economic 
activities, enterprises, jobs, and workers that are not regulated or protect-
ed by the state,” in which independent stores, kiosks, cottage industries, 
and open markets, account for a large share of retail.55 Despite providing 
a large variety of market forms, traditional and informal markets are not 
only marginalized by expansionist policies, but are often discounted by 
investors who argue that “as incomes rise across Africa, there remain rel-
atively few retail options.”56 
In order to address this supposed lack of retail spaces, many govern-
ments have formally enshrined the shopping mall in their future devel-
opmental plans. Kenya’s relationship with the mall has been etched into 
its 2030 Vision, with Westgate Mall serving to satisfy some of these eco-
nomic objectives along with the construction of a variety of other shop-
ping and mixed-use complexes in the coming years.57 A largely privatized 
infrastructure of roads, housing developments, and shopping malls are in 
the process of replacing—and displacing—informal markets where the 
majority of the population operates,58 and igniting a variety of hostilities 
along the way. 
Increasingly, traditional market forms are being gradually marginal-
ized as antiquated and outdated. As phrased by one retail consulting or-
ganization: “most African cities lack the existing shopping infrastructure 
of other markets, so malls are likely the only way organized retailers can 
open new stores.”59 The Kenyan supermarket chain Nakumatt—West-
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gate Mall’s anchor store—attempts to formalize grocery retail and entice 
customers away from informal and traditional markets, causing contes-
tation in the process.60 Nakumatt was the scene of many of al-Shabaab’s 
atrocities during the attack, and it was in the Nakumatt storeroom packed 
with potential products and profits that the terrorists took refuge. The su-
permarket became an outlet for imported goods and imported terrorism, 
both of which followed similar global distribution routes to arrive at the 
destination of the shopping mall.
In rapidly developing cities, polarization, confrontation, and hostility 
are on the rise, and “the unfolding pattern is one of disjointed, dysfunc-
tional and unsustainable urban geographies of inequality and human suf-
fering, with oceans of poverty containing islands of wealth. Socio-econom-
ic conditions in African cities are now the most unequal in the world.”61 
In Kenya, like many other developing countries with radically unequal 
wealth distributions, the poor “are encroaching and stretching their heavy 
presence into the streets and other out-door public spaces, where they ap-
pear as if ‘they are everywhere.’”62 Since informal markets and settlements 
are often regarded as “a spatial problem rather than a social one,”63 the day 
before the Westgate Mall attacks, on September 20, 2013, Kenyan media 
announced that Nairobi was set to unveil an “anti-Hawking squad.”64 The 
Inspector General of Police, David Kimaiyo, organized “a team of 450 of-
ficers to help get rid of hawkers from the streets of Nairobi,”65 riling up 
public anger in the surrounding slums. The informal settlements that 
have grown around the Westlands district have regularly come under at-
tack by the Kenyan authorities, with many residents experiencing bru-
tality and intimidation over the years, resulting in violence enacted on 
both sides.66 Describing the struggle over a prior forced eviction from the 
informal Westlands market, one trader notes: “We used street children. 
We trained them to fight. We made petrol bombs, and we had bows and 
arrows” to defend against forced evictions.67 
Informal traders “are a part of the economy that spurs consumption, 
yet they function as quintessentially vagrant figures requiring disci-
pline.”68 Through increasingly restrictive government and corporate pol-
icies, crime and poverty are being made synonymous and a conceptual 
link is being created between informality, illegality, and, increasingly, ter-
rorism.69 In order to separate formal and informal markets, and to take 
control of the discursive boundaries between them, there are sustained 
attempts at formalizing markets into government approved corporate enti-
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ties. Informal market activities come under constant threat by authorities 
in their attempt to clean up the city and rid it of all kinds of crime. 
In cities that are in the act of reconstituting themselves according to 
modern infrastructures, existing informal settlements are routinely de-
stroyed to make way for new developments. Governments’ neoliberal pol-
icies have assisted “in pushing the poor with insecure tenure rights out 
of city centers to grab high-value lands to hand over to corporations in 
pursuit of mega projects like shopping malls, leisure sites, or office build-
ings.”70 The informal markets around Westlands are prime real estate,71 
and so are being eyed by developers who designate these areas as “unde-
veloped land.”72 Such designation is the classic justification for colonial 
takeover of foreign assets, where “British imperial ambitions engendered 
a process of violent enclosures beginning in the early 1890s.”73 Ironically, 
such rhetoric is now being revived by post-colonial governments claiming 
to resist the history of such colonial manipulation. 
As global corporate networks become increasingly powerful in their 
spheres of influence, governments and national policing efforts are grad-
ually withdrawn as part of an ideology that “advocates the economy and 
society be freed from the state regulations, and be controlled, instead, by 
individuals and corporate bodies in accordance with their self interests, 
mediated through the invisible hands of the market.”74 In many cases, 
governments all over the world, but especially those of developing coun-
tries, are often only too willing to give up, and give up on, social services 
and welfare programs, and to pass on infrastructure projects to private 
interests. This situation poses serious questions for the ethics of business, 
and blurs the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate modes of 
capital accumulation. In many ways, “global governance has failed to keep 
pace with economic globalization. Therefore, as unprecedented openness 
in trade, finance, travel and communication has created economic growth 
and well-being, it has also given rise to massive opportunities for crim-
inals to make their business prosper.”75 A combination of capitalist pro-
duction, open markets, poverty, organized crime, and terrorism becomes 
embroiled in a complex global network. 
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Transnational Networks of Capitalism, Terrorism, and Povert y
In al-Shabaab’s native Somalia, the collapse of the government and formal 
economic system has provided a space for all kinds of businesses to flour-
ish and for terrorist networks to profit, whether defined as legal or illegal.76 
A series of catastrophic historical events led to the current unstable polit-
ical situation in al-Shabaab’s native Somalia, and the rise of a particular 
type of militant Islamist ideology. Somalia’s civil war is over two decades 
old, and has been defined by the breakup of the country into a variety of 
locally-ruled territorial enclaves, and the onset of a deadly drought and 
famine forcing many to seek refuge in neighboring countries, including 
Kenya, and further afield.77 The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took control 
of the country in 2006, with al-Shabaab as their militant wing,78 displac-
ing the warlords and forming a fragile political unity based on an ideology 
of militant Islam. This nascent stability was welcomed by many Somalis, 
but not by Western nations, especially the United States who orchestrated 
the demise of the ICU by supporting an Ethiopian military invasion.79 
While a Transitional Federal Government was created and propped up 
with foreign aid and troops, al-Shabaab managed to take control of much 
of Somalia as well as the capital. During this time, “Mogadishu earned 
its reputation as the most dangerous city on earth. In a harbinger of the 
Islamic State’s ambitions, al-Shabab administered territory, provided ser-
vices, and levied taxes—none of which the Western-backed Somali gov-
ernment could manage.”80
Despite al-Shabaab’s power being much reduced in recent years, it still 
managed to create international networks with similar terrorist organiza-
tions, including al-Qaeda, and to attract a number of foreign fighters. In 
many ways, terrorist organizations work to better their own organization-
al practices, whether in terms of surveillance, internal communications, 
outreach to external markets and audiences, marketing and branding, or 
engaging in profit making through both legal and illegal means. As nec-
essary sources of income, terrorist networks rely on a range of businesses 
and learn from the corporate model and its means of accumulation, pro-
duction, and distribution.81 Employing a variety of methods, “terrorists 
and their abettors utilize existing traditional frameworks—such as com-
panies and nonprofit entities—to raise funds, receive support, and inte-
grate themselves into the community.”82
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The encouragement of both material and imaginary global exchanges 
has had a variety of other consequences, and has simultaneously paved 
the way for global networks of terror to operate, communicate, spread, and 
converge. Globalized and diffuse corporate and terrorist networks capital-
ize on the same form of flexible organizational structures. Importation 
of global business practices is not just something that governments and 
corporations practice; terrorist networks and other forms of organized 
crime are also products of economic globalization and liberalization of 
international markets.83 Even as terrorist networks disavow the corrup-
tion and trappings of Western modernity in many of their ideologies, 
they simultaneously emulate global capitalist ventures in their structure, 
commercial activities, and their use of technologies of warfare and digital 
communication.84 Terrorist networks have learned from global capitalist 
networks and follow tried and tested business models to finance their op-
erations. There are estimates that al-Shabaab’s attack in Westgate Mall 
“cost the group ‘close to $100,000,’ calculating the price of the automatic 
rifles, bullets and grenades that were used, along with training costs.”85 
While this figure is speculative, it does pose interesting questions regard-
ing the terrorist group’s financial capabilities. There is further evidence 
of collaboration between corrupt elements in government and terrorist 
organizations, as they “build alliances with political leaders, financial in-
stitutions, law enforcement, foreign intelligence, and security agencies.”86 
For example, many “reports from United Nations investigators have found 
Kenya’s forces involved in an illicit charcoal trade from which the Shabab 
and local administrators shared revenues.”87 
Increasingly, there is a blurring of clearly defined lines separating 
legal and illegal activities, and there are many actors who muddle the 
distinction and confuse any notion of the legitimate. In many instanc-
es, “connecting these converging threats are ‘facilitators,’ semi-legitimate 
players such as accountants, attorneys, notaries, bankers, and real estate 
brokers, who cross both the licit and illicit worlds and provide services to 
legitimate customers, criminals, and terrorists alike.”88 Criminal transna-
tional “networks rely on industry experts, both witting and unwitting, to 
facilitate corrupt transactions and to create the necessary infrastructure to 
pursue their illicit schemes, such as creating shell corporations, opening 
offshore bank accounts in the shell corporation’s name, and creating front 
businesses for their illegal activity and money laundering.”89 With Kal-
ashnikov weapons, for example, produced “at the rate of a million a year,” 
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many of the weapons used by terrorists “are manufactured—legitimately, 
for international trade—in more than 30 countries, with China leading 
the way. But legal weapons can quickly become illicit contraband. China 
exports principally to African states. There, they can end up on the illicit 
market either because underpaid soldiers sell them on, or because states 
supply rebel forces in other countries.”90
In its global business transactions, al-Shabaab is known to have “ben-
efited from several different sources of income over the years, including 
revenue from other terrorist groups, state sponsors, the Somali diaspora, 
charities, piracy, kidnapping, and the extortion of local businesses,”91 as 
well as profits accrued from Somalia’s Kismayu port, which “not only ac-
corded al-Shabaab regular income in terms of port fees and taxes but was 
the main export point of charcoal to the Middle East, which earned the 
group some $25m a year.”92 While any figure related to terrorism profits 
and financing is difficult to calculate accurately because of the opaque 
and clandestine nature of many of these organizations, it does highlight 
how capitalism and terrorism are strange bedfellows, with one supposedly 
oppositional ideology morphing into the other—even as they denounce 
each other. The easing of border restrictions for the promotion of global 
trade has simultaneously contributed to the diffusion and globalization of 
a variety of legitimate and illicit networks of capitalism and terror. 
Many of the profits made through international terrorist business 
networks are used to entice people in poor communities to join terrorist 
groups. Attraction to terrorist organizations is often, directly or indirectly, 
linked to poverty as well as “other factors that may cause support for ter-
ror, such as economic inequality or low levels of education,” rather than 
purely as a result of religious ideology.93 For those who do join al-Shabaab, 
analysts report that “salaries of $100-$300 per month are offered, joining 
bonuses of $400 are paid for the new recruits to hand to their families, 
and the family of a suicide bomber can receive ‘a couple of thousand’ dol-
lars. This contrasts with a gross [Somali] national income per person of a 
mere $107 per annum in 2011.”94 Although al-Shabaab’s rhetoric is steeped 
in religious discourse, the assault on Westgate Mall was not simply reli-
giously-motivated, and, from the outset, was also framed as a response to 
economic inequality among other social and political grievances. 
By appealing to an anti-imperial consciousness, al-Shabaab has at-
tempted to tap into a global network of ethnic Somalis and others who 
respond to the group’s rhetoric against past colonial injustices and con-
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temporary neocolonial ones. Through divisive discourses, al-Shabaab at-
tempts to encourage financial support from sympathizers to engage the 
media to circulate their ideological stance. In a worldwide campaign to at-
tract supporters who share sentiments of exclusion and marginalization, 
al-Shabaab attempts to attract ethnic Somalis at home and abroad, includ-
ing the large refugee population in Kenya as well as those further afield.95
Al-Shabaab’s reach and threats against targets all over the world, in-
cluding the Mall of America, have become increasingly international. 
True to the tenets of global connectivities and the international movement 
of goods and people, the Mall of America is relevant to the Westgate Mall 
story, not only because it has often been heralded as the shopping mall 
par excellence, but also because “Minnesota is home to the biggest Somali 
population in the United States.” These various international connections 
between Somalia and Minneapolis has meant that “Minnesota’s popula-
tion has proven to be a ripe recruiting ground for al-Shabab.”96 Indeed, 
“some of the young men who volunteered to fight in Somalia had grown 
up in the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood of Minneapolis, which is one of 
the poorest places in the United States” where Somali-American family 
incomes are low and unemployment rates are high.97 As economic mi-
grants become trapped within a global cycle of poverty, many of those who 
migrate from conditions of poverty or conflict in their homelands end up 
living in continued disadvantaged conditions far from home. 
In order to attract global funding and recruits, al-Shabaab engages in 
global media campaigns, including one titled “Minnesota’s Martyrs: The 
Path to Paradise,” aimed at a Somali-American population.98 In another 
promotional campaign, the group released a video, using Donald Trump 
as a reason to join the cause. “Citing ‘historical injustices’ against Afri-
can-Americans, including police brutality and racial profiling, the video 
urged them to convert to Islam and engage in jihad at home or abroad.”99 
In the communication war that arose during, and in the aftermath of the 
Westgate Mall attacks, some corporate and government-news networks re-
taliated to al-Shabaab’s recruitment messages by initiating the “Outreach 
to Foreign Muslim Audiences” program on the Voice of America (VOA) 
channel.100 Through similar forms of promotion, targeted members of the 
public have been subjected to a tug of war between the official anti-terror 
efforts and al-Shabaab’s simultaneous recruitment campaigns to join its 
international network of terror.101
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In order to “transnationalize” itself,102 al-Shabaab has positioned itself 
as a globally-identifiable brand by attracting international funding and for-
eign recruits, pledging allegiances to al-Qaeda and to the Islamic State as 
an extension of its franchise, and maintaining international connections 
with other like-minded terrorist networks.103 Ironically, however, even as 
they benefit from globalizing practices, and modern technologies, groups 
like al-Shabaab simultaneously appeal to an anti-imperial consciousness 
in order to tap into an international network of sympathizers. Their mes-
sage of rectifying past colonial injustices and fighting against contempo-
rary neoliberal grievances that are progressively inequitable, unbalanced, 
and exploitative is delivered through information and communication 
technologies with a significant and often sophisticated know-how.104 
Extremist organizations often heed the rules of marketing and public-
ity, even utilizing the same language and terminologies to address their 
audiences as “consumers,” and to publicize their “brand.”105 The language 
and logic of capitalist practice has entered into the casual everyday speech 
of its alleged opposite. The infiltration of corporate language into everyday 
terrorist practice helps to highlight the porous boundaries between the 
ideologies of terrorism and capitalism, and debunks their supposed mu-
tual exclusivity. The twin phenomena of capitalism and terrorism cannot 
always be separated, and just as the inequalities exacerbated by capitalism 
are addressed by a violent militant response, so too do terrorists use the 
very mechanisms of the capitalism they seek to destroy.106
Westgate Mall provided a space in which al-Shabaab terrorists traversed 
this discursive separation to not only do harm to people and property, but 
to damage an imagined community of consumption even as they engaged 
with it. The importance of malls to the global circulation of corporate cul-
ture and their centrality to the contemporary urban experience means that 
they have inevitably become both icon and beacon: icon of consumption 
for some and beacon for disgruntlement for others. Despite the hostility of 
the attack on Westgate, al-Shabaab was enticed by the idea of the shopping 
mall as a target, and became caught somewhere in between these coincid-
ing elements of attraction and aversion. 
In cities marked by ever increasing hostilities, security-oriented “shop-
ping centres have filled a void to become one-stop-shops for those who 
yearn to feel ‘safe.’”107 In these gated communities, there is an “intensely 
privatized and quasi-anarchic vision of urban growth,”108 in which privat-
ized living and shopping complexes are coming under an increasingly mil-
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itant security paradigm. In many areas, it becomes impossible for some 
people to access certain parts of the city, escalating proactive and reactive 
fears and animosities. Those marginalized by neoliberal economic poli-
cies are exploited, and even at times recruited, by terrorist groups, making 
the gap between affluence and impoverishment a space for justifying the 
many violent activities on both sides of the class divide—to secure or to 
contest. Westgate Mall accommodated the multidirectional flows of glob-
al exchanges with a mix of imported goods and terrorist attacks. In this 
sense, the space of Westgate Mall “is not just phenomenological, rooted in 
the presence, memory, or anticipation of dwelling. It is not just semiotic, 
based in the interrelation of legible signifiers. And it is not just the result 
of systems of social exchange, produced by flows of capital and labour. It 
is all of these.”109 
In order to explore some of these intersecting issues, the next chapter 
examines the evolutionary trends of shopping mall design, and how these 
have been adopted all over the world. It emphasizes the initial construc-
tion and design of mall space as dictated by the imperative to encourage a 
culture of increased consumption, then returns to Nairobi’s Westgate as a 
way of measuring the degree to which twenty-first century African urban 
space imported and embedded a capital consumption ideal that nonethe-
less fed a violent anti-capital response. 
3. Designing the Shopping Mall
During al-Shabaab’s four-day siege, Westgate Mall became a site, both 
physical and metaphorical, for locating the intersection of the prevailing 
discourses of terrorism, capitalist practice, cultures of consumption, the 
security apparatus, and corporate media network competition, among a 
number of other issues constituting the contemporary urban experience. 
In order to understand how the shopping mall may host these complex re-
lationships, it is important to map formative moments in the evolutionary 
and historical trends of shopping mall development and to examine the 
architectural impetus of its design in shaping patterns of consumption, 
as well as contestation. 
As a sign of continuously globalizing transnational exchanges, the con-
cept of the shopping mall has a long history of borrowing architectural 
forms and adopting consumption patterns. Greek agoras, Roman forums, 
and the souqs and bazaars of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa stretch back 
into ancient history as the conceptual originators of concentrated retail are-
nas that have been extended into the modern form of the shopping mall. 
These concentrated commercial forms have existed for centuries, and their 
designs have been encountered, exported, and emulated by disparate cul-
tures in different geographies. The history of international trade exchanges 
complicates any definitive way of knowing exactly what came from where 
and how. A variety of converging and diverging factors and events have 
shaped the evolutionary trajectory of the contemporary shopping mall, 
none of which can be captured in its entirety. To echo the extravagant words 
of department store entrepreneur Harry Gordon Selfridge, written almost 
a century ago, “to write on commerce and trade and to do the subject justice 
would require more volumes than any library could hold.”1
The history of landscapes of consumption does not follow a clear suc-
cession from one type of design to another and these spaces, whether con-
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sidered traditional or modern, marketplace or mall, have existed contem-
poraneously and in coinciding commercial spheres. Even though today’s 
corporate consumerist ideology in the shape of the shopping mall stems 
from a particular Western imaginary, it is necessarily ordained as a global 
phenomenon through a dominant neoliberal discourse whose focus “re-
flects principally the interests of its producers. In many ways, what passes 
for international culture is usually the culture of the economically devel-
oped world” in the progressivist lexicon.2 The contemporary shopping 
mall has especially been reflective of the dominant commercial cultures 
of the United States and Europe. 
Because the shopping mall, in its contemporary form as an enclosed, 
air-conditioned retail arena, has had such a long and sustained evolution 
in European countries, in general, and the United States, in particular, 
much of the research on this commodity form has concentrated on West-
ern histories and experiences. The literature abounds with countless arti-
cles, books, journals, magazines, and trade reports dedicated to examin-
ing the history of shopping, and patterns of production and consumption, 
and numerous accounts analyzing in detail every aspect of the shopping 
mall, including its architecture, design, atmospherics, security apparatus, 
as well as its customers and employees and their habits, aspirations, and 
behaviors.3 Since the contemporary shopping mall has existed for a long 
time in the European and US urban and suburban historical contexts, 
the relationship that has been developed between corporate and social el-
ements in the developing country context must thus be read against this 
dominant history. While the origins of the contemporary shopping mall 
might be specific to the US and European contexts, these histories played 
a paradigmatic role, and are essential to understanding other market for-
mations. Key urban and architectural transformations helped, in one way 
or another, shape the contours and concept of the modern mall as well as 
the prevailing culture of the consumption practices within it. 
The concept of the contemporary shopping mall emerges from dec-
ades of research dedicated to the shaping of consumption patterns. Shop-
ping malls, as orchestrated profit-making enterprises, are highly reg-
ulated zones where marketers, administrators, designers, and security 
analysts have spent vast amounts of money and time crafting, promot-
ing, and monitoring the relationship between space, people, services, and 
commodities. Even as they go about their daily activities, mall visitors are 
ushered through a specialized history of architecture; they become the 
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subject of decades of advertising and marketing research; and they be-
come subjected to the latest technologies of surveillance. Because of these 
many moving parts, “the shopping mall cannot be described solely on 
the basis of its floor plan, location or size; it can only be encountered in 
motion, as a matrix of time and space through which passes a multitude of 
trajectories.”4 While mall visitors may not necessarily succumb to all such 
marketing orchestrations, the mall remains a center of contemporary life 
where many people are, in one way or another, implicated in the purpose 
of the business operation, and regularly embedded in, or excluded from, 
an environment engineered for consumption. 
Since the histories of consumption practices stem from a variety of 
different geographic locations, and are shaped by specific socioeconomic 
factors, and since shopping malls have been developed at different stages 
depending on particular national contexts, instead of examining a single 
narrative trajectory, it is important to highlight a series of global overlaps. 
Examining international convergences in the history of shopping malls 
provides an overview of the commercial arena, with particular focus on 
moments of correspondence between how the shopping mall evolved in 
one part of the world and how it was imported and adopted in another. 
Over time, bottom-line financial objectives have outstripped most other 
contextual concerns, and have had direct influence on an increasingly 
standardized design of international shopping malls. 
A Brief Histor y of the Shopping Mall
While histories of consumption are multiple and varied, the industrial 
revolution ushered in a new era of mass production and consumption that 
gradually spread across the world. The novelty and mass availability of in-
dustrial goods attracted the attention of publics and captured their imag-
inations, steering many towards the wonders and possibilities of the me-
chanical age. Technological advances to systems of production, the mass 
manufacturing of goods, the introduction of automated transportation, 
innovations in lighting and ventilation, and changes to roads and urban 
planning, created a larger customer base that could revel in a world of con-
spicuous consumption once reserved for the bourgeoisie. In the context of 
an industrializing Europe, there was “a concomitant rise in incomes,” so 
that “what were once considered luxury goods were now becoming wide-
ly available for purchase by a variety of different socioeconomic classes, 
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rather than just dedicated to a minority of elite.”5 These mass produced 
products needed to be displayed, and their means of production exalted. 
In such ways, the architecture of consumption began to take shape accord-
ing to the need to accommodate, display, and protect increasingly large 
amounts and varieties of goods. Further social and cultural transforma-
tions of the industrial revolution overlapped, kindling a radical transfor-
mation in the relationship between people, places, and products.6 
E xhibitions and Fairs
Beginning as temporary structures, regional and national exhibitions, 
festivals, and fairs, such as the World Fair, unveiled industrial goods to 
inquisitive publics. These quickly became centers of social awe, creating 
a newfound energy in the heart of growing cities.7 These spaces encour-
aged encounters with new and foreign merchandise, including a variety 
of “exotic” cultures and commodities imported from colonies all over the 
world.8 Although such early large-scale exhibitions catered predominantly 
for the publics of industrializing European cities, the movement of goods 
was global and multidirectional, and organized fairs, such as the Inter-
national Exhibition in South African in 1877, were mounted outside of 
Europe albeit less frequently.9 
Creating an early framework for today’s shopping malls and the tac-
tical combination of commerce and entertainment, the popular fairs and 
festivals provided a series of theatrical productions, magic shows, and 
spectacles in order to encourage customers to stay longer, and in order 
to imbue the commodity with a wide range of characteristics. Such exhi-
bitions and fairs served to “glorify the exchange value of the commodity. 
They create a framework in which its use value recedes into the back-
ground. They open a phantasmagoria which a person enters in order to be 
distracted. The entertainment industry makes this easier by elevating the 
person to the level of the commodity.”10
With the mass availability of goods, there was a new emphasis on the 
transformative powers of consumption. “Until the nineteenth century, 
capitalist power was located mainly in production, in the factory, and in 
the labour process, since the early part of the twentieth century, particular-
ly in the developed capitalist countries, power has shifted increasingly to 
consumption.”11 Marketing industries and advertising narratives worked 
towards a creative awakening of desires, enticing and instructing publics 
on new means of identity-making based on conspicuous consumption.12 
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In the age of mechanical reproduction, “art became subject to the logic of 
commerce,”13 and advertising techniques flourished in tandem with the 
consumption practices encouraged, and the goods publicized—all con-
tributing to the expansion of imaginations and identities intertwined with 
commodities and their signifiers in a symphony of “symbolic alchemy.”14
With the combined efforts of advertising and the creation of a carni-
val atmosphere, “the society of the spectacle” flourished.15 By promoting 
the supremacy of the commodity, a wondrous world was being created 
with the power to replace a constrained reality offered through industri-
ous labor. Commodity-based spectacles presented publics with elements 
of a fantastical world that reached beyond the quotidian of daily lives 
ruled by work. In these market-driven spectacles, the worker and regular 
wage-earner, became central to the industrial project, and were invited 
to occupy the foreground as sought-after customer, rather than the back-
ground as mere labor.16 
With the industrial revolution in full swing, and with the public’s cu-
riosity piqued, temporary exhibitions and fairs evolved into more perma-
nent city-central structures with input and capital provided by government 
entities and private entrepreneurs. Thus began the physical and psycho-
logical transformations of industrializing cities; instead of the customary 
congregation of urban activity around a traditional marketplace or town 
square, people’s attentions were now redirected towards shopping arenas 
as the centerpiece of the city dedicated to conspicuous consumption. Ur-
ban planners set about developing new infrastructures, and city centers 
set their gaze towards new focal points.
Arcades
It was only relatively recently, in the twentieth century, that the term 
“mall” became a byword for the ubiquitous, fully-enclosed shopping arena 
we know today. In the eighteenth century, the word “mall” was commonly 
used to describe a “public area often set with shade trees and designed 
as a promenade or as a pedestrian walk.”17 The idea of pedestrian malls 
became increasingly popular as they provided islands of tranquility to cut 
through the increasingly tumultuous, overcrowded, and disorganized city 
centers of an industrializing Europe. 
It was not long before the many urban leisurely strollers, or what 
Baudelaire and Benjamin conceptualized as flâneurs, became the tar-
gets of merchants selling their goods alongside the malls.18 The strolling 
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malls of London and Paris became lined with merchants, and many of 
the promenades were gradually customized in order to make them more 
attractive to the ambler. Physical comfort and shelter from the sun or rain 
were offered over time with the partial covering of walkways. By the nine-
teenth century, covered walkways grew in several different directions of 
the city as they increased in number and popularity, and were gradually 
transformed into a series of interconnected city-central arcades. The most 
notable arcades flourished in Paris and London where the narrow streets 
of the city were ideal for connecting the covered walkways to provide a 
comfortable and extended shopping experience. 
Developed along with a boom in the textile trade, and as a place to store 
and exhibit merchandise and emerging fashions, arcades became attrac-
tive areas for shopping and strolling. Quoting from An Illustrated Guide to 
Paris, Walter Benjamin notes that the nineteenth century Parisian arcade, 
“a recent invention of industrial luxury, are glass-roofed, marble-paneled 
corridors extending through whole blocks of buildings, whose owners 
have joined together for such enterprises. Lining both sides of these corri-
dors, which get their light from above, are the most elegant shops, so that 
the arcade is a city, a world in miniature.”19 It was in the arcades where 
gaslights were first used on a large scale, and for an industrial purpose, 
with entire streets lit up at night to allow for continuous shopping into the 
hours of darkness.
At a time of rapid industrial development, the arcades provided a key 
historical instance when industry, architecture, and consumption be-
came decisively intertwined, leading to a consecration of the commodity 
therein. The arcade was “wholly adapted to arousing desires,”20 and it was 
within the arcades that aesthetics and business were expertly combined, 
and where many art forms became coopted in “service of the merchant,”21 
creating a world filled with the wealth of surplus. This was a commercial 
world that would gradually gain power and influence over the purchasing 
habits of the public by promoting its own rules of design, advertising, be-
havior, and consumption.22 “Arcades as temples of commodity capital,”23 
were the architectural predecessors of modern malls as dedicated spaces 
for commodity adulation.
However, as the commercial spaces of commodity display became 
more refined and organized, industrial waste polluted city streets, and 
industrial promise attracted a steady stream of rural migrants. Many of 
the grievances leveled against the contemporary shopping mall can be 
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identified in the arcades, which were becoming less like public streets 
and more like spaces of exclusion, providing protected walkways predom-
inantly for the wealthy and shielding them from the increasing hazards of 
city centers. Overcrowding, disease, crime, and impoverishment stood in 
stark contrast to the displays of wealth being paraded in and through the 
arcades. With a large variety of shops increasingly facing away from the 
street and towards each other across central walkways, the arcades “were 
built as a way to deal with the increasingly hostile public environments of 
urban centers”—a sentiment of safety that is still being used to character-
ize the modern shopping mall.24
Instead of constantly looking out for the hazards of the street, the 
protected environment of the arcades encouraged people to gaze inwards 
upon the many sights on offer, whether in the form of other shoppers, or 
increasingly elaborate shop windows to display and advertise commodi-
ties. In such spaces, filled with novel and cosmopolitan goods, “signs and 
appearances acquire a new importance and substitute increasingly for tra-
ditional narratives of social and geographical belonging. There is a new 
stress on display and the visual—on looking.”25 This new target on the 
gaze, became even more focused with the incremental enclosure of shop-
ping venues to form stand-alone department stores. 
Department Stores
Nineteenth century department stores were presented as spaces of ele-
gance and entertainment, but their origins can also be read according to 
a more ominous history. The department stores of Paris can trace their 
origins to the widening of city streets and boulevards introduced by ar-
chitect Baron Haussmann that aided in the “speed and free flow needs of 
the security forces,”26 allowing for troops to be deployed in mass numbers. 
Among other infrastructural reasons, wider road systems were designed 
to put an end to the urban revolts and street barricades that were a com-
mon form of the poor’s social resistance in the narrow, irregular streets 
of Paris.27 One such altercation took place in a Parisian arcade when “the 
Passage du Saumon was the scene of a battle waged on barricades, in 
which 200 workers confronted the troops.”28 While the redesign of the city 
improved traffic flow and eased overcrowding, “military concerns were 
paramount” to the redesign of the city, and the subsequent establishment 
of department stores as safe, regulated spaces of commerce.29 
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With the development of automobiles and public transportation sys-
tems, notably in European cities, the intricate pedestrian alleyways and 
arcades were less visited, and eventually fell out of fashion. In their stead, 
road-facing, self-enclosed department stores rose to prominence.30 As 
comfortable and convenient one-stop-shops, department stores outshone 
the arcades with “glittering decor, the great variety of goods on offer, and 
the range of additional services and entertainments that they provided.”31 
A departure from the erraticism of the arcade, department stores present-
ed clean, comfortable, indoor emporia, and an integrated commercial con-
cept owned by a single merchant, and unified in a single architectural 
form. Over time, department stores expanded vertically, taking on more 
floors, as well as horizontally, taking over adjacent buildings and city 
streets,32 all the while growing in a systematic, measured, and controlled 
way. 
Because the older arcades grew organically over time to dominate 
or create a city center, they could not always be easily replicated in other 
cities. The department store, however, was an easy and compact model 
to follow and was emulated in cities all over the world.33 In the colonial 
context, developers in African nations began adapting the model of the 
department store to suit their elite and middle-class customer base.34 In 
the 1950s, for example, representatives from the United Africa Company 
(UAC) traveled to Europe and the United States to interview established 
department store managers in order to collect expertise for the opening of 
the Kingsway department store in Ghana,35 accumulating such advice as 
what kinds of marketing measures should be implemented, as well as how 
to better attract customers. 
Atmospheric technologies and architectonic designs became catalysts 
for fundamental changes on both ends of the marketing spectrum: from 
enhancing the tactical nature of selling techniques to the sustained in-
fluencing of buying behavior. Because the emphasis was now on “observ-
ing,” department stores provided increasingly vivid and theatrical displays 
of merchandise. These spectacles were designed to entice the observer 
with more than just the product, but with the promise of the product. 
Department stores were dedicated to the sale of an increasing variety and 
abundance of commodities that were promoted in ever elaborate designs 
and displays. Through a rapidly revolving cycle of mass production and 
consumption, “the circus-like and theatrical element of commerce is quite 
extraordinarily heightened.”36 These early spectacles of consumption es-
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calated within the setting of the suburban shopping center to include a 
combination of shopping and entertainment facilities.
Since attracting and retaining custom was among the department 
store’s primary goals, it was in these commercial spaces that shoppers 
were first exposed to a variety of technological advances that were not yet 
instituted by the state for public consumption, including such novelties 
as continuous and sustained electricity, escalators, and elevators.37 When 
Ghana’s Kingsway department store was first established in Accra, “one 
of the most memorable features was the store’s escalator, the first of its 
kind in West Africa. Older men and women reminisced about riding it for 
fun as children.”38 The store was lit up all night as most of the city lay in 
darkness, highlighting its importance as a national symbol of modernity 
and progress.39 
Artificial lighting and air conditioning were introduced to department 
stores early in the twentieth century, removing the need for natural ven-
tilation and light.40 Eliminating glass windows and skylights—popular in 
arcades and early department store design—provided more retail space 
for commodity displays to fill the once empty, grand, and open-planned 
interiors, atria, foyers, and centerpieces.41 With no more natural light and 
no direct connection to the world outside, department stores became in-
crementally insulated, isolated, and inward-looking worlds, and the act of 
shopping commenced in an increasingly self-sustaining atmosphere that 
needed little correlation to the outside environment. This is a dislocation 
that has only been enhanced in the design of fully-enclosed contemporary 
shopping malls, and with it an increase in friction and hostilities leveled 
against it. 
The incremental detachment of the department store had a sustained 
effect on the relationship between people, products, space, and services. 
As these increasingly enclosing worlds slowly severed themselves from 
outside environments, they also created their own internal logic for the 
rational and efficient functioning of their operations. The Parisian Bon 
Marché department store, for example, reflected this rationalization in 
“its divisions into departments; its partitioning of Paris for the purpos-
es of making deliveries; its files and statistics, records and data; its tele-
phone lines, sliding chutes, conveyor belts, and escalators,”42 among other 
mechanized, systematized, and streamlined ways of conducting everyday 
business. Department stores were growing into increasingly large and 
far-reaching operations and so “were obliged to introduce modern meth-
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ods of management, stock control, cash handling and staff training, all of 
which led to further efficiencies,”43 and began incrementally removing the 
personal in favor of the automated. 
The relationship between the merchant and hired employees created 
a new service industry based on the characteristics of efficiency and con-
formity and subscription to particular types of behavior. In mass indus-
tries, “the constant and rapid turnover of goods demanded standardized 
methods of organization, subjecting employees to a factorylike order that 
extended beyond working hours into the carefully supervised dormi-
tories and eating halls.”44 In Ghana, for example, the Kingsway depart-
ment store’s employee handbook emphasizes “the connection between 
physical appearance and salesmanship, implying that the more attractive 
a sales person appeared, the better their ability to sell. This correlation 
was applied to both male and female sales staff. The company instructed 
women on how to apply make-up and fingernail polish, and reminded 
them to wash their hands and feet. Men were encouraged to shave daily, 
wear leather shoes and ‘crisp white shirts’, and keep their hair short.”45 
Set against the backdrop of recent or imminent colonial independence, 
investors framed the establishment of department stores as not only a sign 
of modernity and progress, but as a “public service” that would introduce 
“improved techniques in buying and selling, which included the use of 
modern equipment, like accounting machines, cash registers, and refrig-
erators, as well as self-service, merchandise displays, and staff training 
courses.”46 
In traditional marketplaces, personal relationships between customer 
and merchant were built on consistency of contact and the rapport created 
through regular banter about products and price negotiations. In the large 
department stores prices were fixed and visibly marked and sales were 
conducted methodically by hired salespeople with little room for, or inten-
tion of, forging relationships with customers. Here, “the obligation to buy 
implied by the active exchange of bargaining was replaced by the invita-
tion to look, turning the shopper into a ... spectator, an isolated individual, 
a face in the department-store crowd, silently contemplating merchan-
dise.”47 The department store environment began eliminating the need 
for any unnecessary communication between customer and salesperson, 
a relationship that became further eroded in the operation of shopping 
centers.
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The Shopping Center
In the US and European contexts, there was a series of further technologi-
cal, economic, and social developments, including an increase in automo-
bile manufacturing and ownership, a surge in wage labor and concomi-
tant rise in wages, and an increase in women entering the labor market. 
The growing middle classes began a gradual movement into suburbs in 
search of larger houses and better conditions compared to the congestion 
of city centers.48 Redefining the geography of retail in order to cater to this 
movement, Jesse Clyde Nichols designed the Country Club Plaza in Kan-
sas City in 1923. It was the first concentration of shops constructed at a dis-
tance from a downtown, catering to a large-scale residential development. 
For the orderly suburbs, now at a safe distance from the crime, grime, and 
overcrowding of the city, shopping centers provided “sanitized surrogate 
city centers” for shopping, recreation, and social gatherings, and became 
focal points to which suburban life gravitated in the absence of any other 
discernable center.49 Importantly, within these new market forms, the idea 
of the social became increasingly defined by commercial activity, where 
“the center of community life was a site devoted to mass consumption, 
and what was promoted as public space was in fact privately owned and 
geared to maximizing profits.”50
As department stores were gradually surpassed by shopping centers 
and strip malls, such arenas underwent a series of architectural and 
conceptual changes. A far cry from the elaborate and ornate design of 
city-central department stores, the new efficiency-seeking attitude born 
along with the more regimented shopping centers was key to stripping 
away excess features deemed unprofitable. Nichols reasoned: “We have 
found skylights are a source of trouble. They are hot in summer, cold in 
winter, hard to keep clean, are subject to leaking in rainy weather, and 
easy for robbers to enter.”51 Over the years, guidance regarding the con-
struction of shopping centers advised developers to sacrifice “architec-
tural perfection” in order to “serve practical needs in merchandising,”52 
resulting in increasingly ubiquitous structures. Shopping malls may have 
started off with beatific skylights, fountains, and floral arrangements, but 
the marketing impulse matured towards maximizing business efficiency 
with profits trumping any superfluous design considerations.
The lack of appealing outward designs or window displays was part 
of a new profit-maximizing attitude towards economic restructuring and 
cost-cutting on any element that was calculated as unnecessary to the 
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commercial project. More purposefully, however, the lack of an exterior 
design helped in “guiding” shopping behavior and the movement of cus-
tomers within these establishments. The lack of outward embellishments 
discouraged people from walking around the exterior of the shopping 
center and instead encouraged them to park their cars and walk direct-
ly towards the shops. It also meant that “delivery trucks could be driven 
right up to the building and unloaded directly into the ground-level stock 
rooms,”53 thus saving on extra loading space and, importantly, saving time 
and increasing efficiency.
Suburban shopping centers were designed specifically to accommo-
date as comfortably and efficiently as possible the automobile,54 making 
the “invention” of the sprawling parking lot just as important a concept 
as the shopping center itself. Personal automobiles freed people from the 
structures and constraints of public transportation and served to change 
the way people shopped, resulting in an increase in how much time they 
spent in shopping centers, how often they visited, and how many com-
modities they could purchase and carry home, all resulting in a surge in 
the popularity and profits of shopping centers. 
The automobile was similarly one of the driving forces behind the 
urban planning schemes of many African cities in the twentieth centu-
ry characterized by the machinations of colonial trade.55 Combined with 
racial municipal legislation, a racially segregated urban plan for Lusaka, 
Zambia, by British architect, Jellicoe, for example, was designed “to ca-
ter for ‘a car-owning European population and an African population that 
would be walking.’”56 As colonial cities grew in the 1930s and 1940s, cen-
tral business districts (CBDs) expanded. Stimulating the landscape for 
European settlers was to ensconce them in similar retail environments 
as they would experience back in the colonial centers, with names like the 
“Hyde Park Centre” to evoke a sense of “home.”57 
Meanwhile, municipal legislation prohibited African businessmen 
from conducting commercial activities in the towns. Since “the poverty of 
black township residents and the lack of infrastructure development made 
these areas less attractive to retail property developers,”58 African traders, 
and customers, relied on informal markets and wagon or truck trade, con-
tributing to the expansion of an unplanned urban sprawl, a condition that 
has been exacerbated in the contemporary era. By simultaneously accom-
modating a wealthy urban center and an impoverished periphery, cities 
became sharply divided between wealthy and impoverished districts. The 
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trajectory of sharply uneven distributions of wealth and infrastructural 
development has continued to this day in many African cities, and is a 
feature of the “neoliberal city” and a major source of contemporary con-
testation.59
In many emerging economies, shopping malls are erected as signs of 
economic progress and take pride of place in the centers of cities.60 In the 
same way that department stores were some of the first private spaces to 
have sustained electricity when no other public space was given the same 
privileges,61 in many developing cities today shopping malls and office 
buildings are lit up all night in neighborhoods adjacent to slums where 
there is neither sustained electricity, nor running water. The well-main-
tained grounds and intricately designed structures of shopping malls often 
sit in stark contrast to the unkempt surroundings of makeshift stalls and 
street hawkers attempting to capitalize on wealthy mall clientele.62 More 
than just attempting to capture passing trade, the informal settlements 
around Westgate Mall are a congregation of the poor and unemployed in 
the surrounding slums that predate the construction of the mall.63 The 
mall’s security apparatus as well as cultural and entrenched communal 
norms work to ensure that both physical and imaginary socioeconomic 
boundaries are not easily transgressed, and that cross-class encounters are 
kept to a minimum.64 While the strategic location of malls can mitigate 
against everyday friction between the rich and poor, it can do little to stop 
the brazen and targeted violence of terrorist groups. 
The Contemporar y Shopping Mall
The evolutionary design of the contemporary urban mall emerged in large 
part out of the machinations of the military mindset. As many countries 
attempted to revive their post-World War II economies, the very same tech-
nologies of war, and some of the same factories where the machinery of 
war were produced, became available for the mass production of commod-
ities. Instead of building munitions, assembly lines could now mass pro-
duce cars and appliances that could be marketed and sold to the public.65 
In the United States, especially, “products were designed by corporations 
with the aesthetic of advanced weaponry, embellishing a newfound sense 
of confidence while relating it to American military might; economy, pow-
er and visual culture were thus linked like never before. Buildings, cars, 
household appliances and electronic devices, for example, were outfitted 
in chrome-trim shells, mimicking combat machinery.”66 In post-war econ-
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omies engaging in large-scale industrialization, “the new way of life de-
pended on new ways of consuming,”67 and households were encouraged, 
and expected, to accommodate a wide range of products. Mass production 
necessitated concerted efforts at product differentiation through targeted 
advertising, branding, and marketing campaigns to a mass audience via 
mass communication. Commodities made in bulk further necessitated 
that they be sold in bulk to as many people as possible: this place was an 
ever-expanding shopping mall, which has been described as “the delivery 
system of postwar abundance.”68 
The architecture and design of the first fully-enclosed shopping mall, 
the Southdale Center in Minnesota, was pioneered by Victor Gruen in 
1956. For his conceptual design, Gruen “drew influence from the design 
work of America’s governmental and military institutions.”69 Long before 
the idea of the contemporary fully-enclosed mall was made for public con-
sumption, “the idea of combining both shopping and non-retail services 
(like movie theaters, the post office, churches, housing, etc.) in a single 
location came from the U.S. Federal Government.”70 The self-enclosed 
military town combined shopping, leisure, and entertainment facilities, 
as well as other practical stores designed to satisfy the daily needs of the 
stationed troops. For example, “San Diego’s Linda Vista shopping center 
(built in 1942) was an all-encompassing installation built by the govern-
ment for WWII defense workers, and Los Alamos, New Mexico, (built in 
1943) was developed by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission as a com-
bined retail and non-retail facility at the heart of America’s nuclear head-
quarters.”71 Thus, the concept of the contemporary shopping mall carries 
the trace of an underlying militarism imbued with a history of violence 
and was originally conceived as a space of survival, where a variety of daily 
social—and military—activities could be performed within the same pro-
tected, and barricaded, space. 
Since early shopping malls were established, a general trend regarding 
the “modern” experience of shopping, and any related recreational pub-
lic engagement, has increasingly, and architecturally, turned away from 
the public nature of the street and inwards upon itself, creating “a world 
in miniature.”72 Corporate advertising directed at creating new African 
target markets during the 1950s and 1960s are especially expressive of 
this shift. A United Africa Company advertisement from 1960 titled “A 
Change in West Africa” depicts the process of change with a “before” im-
age of a traditional open marketplace and an “after” image of an enclosed 
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shopping center representing the modern way of shopping in an enclosed 
arena.73 
Contemporary shopping malls differ from the individually-owned and 
managed department stores and many shopping centers in that they are 
no longer built and operated according to the philosophies of a single re-
tailer or designer, but are wholly managed by third parties who are, in 
most cases, real estate developers and investors with express interest in 
the bottom line, the mechanics of business, and calculating profits,74 with 
security and control high on the list of operational activities. The architec-
ture of commercial spaces has progressively become more insulated and 
isolated and their inaccessibility reflected in today’s walled, barricaded, 
and privatized complexes guarded by an array of private security forces 
and technologies of surveillance.
With such detailed attention granted to the minutia of the daily com-
mercial operation, the enclosed shopping mall performs an efficient and 
profitable control of private space. It synthesizes social and market re-
search with city planning, necessitating the convergence and interaction 
of disparate groups of actors and institutions in order for the unified con-
cept of the shopping center to thrive. These include, but are not limited to:
architects, planners, civil, structural and mechanical engineers, economists, de-
velopers, real estate owners, shopping center operators, department store and 
chain store organizations, super-market operators, owners of stores dealing in all 
types of merchandise, public officials, building and planning departments, zoning 
boards, traffic consultants, landscape architects, insurance companies, mort-
gage institutions, graphic designers, sculptors and ar tists, store designers and 
lawyers.75
This complex matrix of shopping mall stakeholders produced an increas-
ingly systematized way of doing business in which the “highly structured 
system was designed to minimize guesswork,” and allowed for the devel-
oper “to accurately predict the potential dollar-per-square-foot-yield of any 
projected mall, thus virtually guaranteeing profitability to the mall’s de-
velopers.”76 Even the embellishments deemed wasteful decades earlier in 
suburban shopping centers were now calculated as a necessary means of 
attracting customers and competing against the glut of other malls offer-
ing “a range of conveniences, including light, warmth, longer hours, bet-
ter security, improved store layouts, wider parking spaces, and increased 
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self-selection, all accented by waterfalls, sculptures, fountains, landscap-
ing, mirrors, and neon signs that downtown areas could rarely match.”77
As a concept that could accurately predict and guarantee profits, shop-
ping mall development went into overdrive. The enclosed shopping mall 
concept became so popular with both developers and shoppers that “by 
1960, there were 4,500 malls in America—some open, many enclosed. 
By 1975, that number had risen to 16,400, and by 1987, there were 30,000 
malls accounting for half of all retail dollars spent in the country.”78 This 
latter period was characterized by the global deregulation of markets 
when, in the 1980s, there began “an unparalleled period of growth in the 
shopping center industry, with more than 16,000 centers built between 
1980 and 1990.”79 The contemporary shopping mall design was further 
updated and hyper-modernized in the 1980s and 1990s by Jon Jerde, the 
proclaimed “alchemist of the urban condition.”80 On its website, Jerde 
Partnership International refers to its activities as “placemaking,” and rec-
reating “the communal pedestrian experiences upon which great cities 
were built, while meeting the evolving demands of rapid modernization. 
We see each site as a potential economic and social engine that can recre-
ate the urban experience and transform its environment.”81 The urban ex-
perience was not only transformed, but was also packaged and exported.
As US and European retail environments become saturated, investors 
set their sights abroad on new foreign markets, and particularly on devel-
oping countries, enshrining the shopping mall as an international phe-
nomenon. Emerging from the shadow of colonial disarticulation, many 
African nations opened up their economies to attract international devel-
opment and dedicated prime city center real estate to the construction of a 
variety of private enterprises with a strong emphasis on shopping malls.82 
However, there is only a handful of large-scale developers who can invest 
and compete in such mega retail and entertainment projects. In the 1980s 
and 1990s African context, for example, the active agents of neoliberal 
growth and “this new wave of African ‘modernization’ were South Af-
rican retail multinationals. Wittingly or unwittingly, the South African 
retailers followed the path of European colonial traders who inscribed the 
earlier geographies of retail in the region.”83 Unsurprisingly, South Af-
rica has the strongest retail sector in Africa, one that is matched by the 
length and strength of its colonial experience.84 Today, “a single South 
African development company is currently building some 50 mega-malls 
with grand names like the Mall of Kigali, the Mall of Mauritius, the Mall 
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of Mozambique, and the Mall of Zimbabwe.”85 Eyeing this initial growth, 
international property developers are targeting African cities as untapped 
markets for expansion of standardized shopping malls. 
Architectonics of Entrapment
The design of the ubiquitous shopping mall is an attempt to create a 
self-enclosed world, and one that can be replicated and recognized all over 
the world. The architectural and architectonic designs of shopping malls 
are highly scripted and have been perfected over the decades to encourage, 
produce, and predict a variety of behaviors, whether purchasing behavior, 
crowd interaction, or the speed and direction of movement. The many de-
sign features of shopping malls have been enhanced and refined over the 
decades. In the language of the architectural design of the contemporary 
mall, the “anchor” store is a large tenant store that stabilizes the entire 
operation and serves as the main attraction. In larger malls, there are typ-
ically two or more competing anchor stores strategically placed at opposite 
ends of the building. In this way, the architectural design of the building 
assumes control over the flow of movement by encouraging shoppers to 
traverse the length of the mall between the main anchor stores and directs 
them to visit other stores along the way.86 
When escalator and elevator technologies were still at a nascent phase, 
early shopping center developers did not believe in having a second floor, 
where they thought people would be less inclined to visit. They considered 
the possibilities of installing escalators to guide people to shops on dif-
ferent floors, but felt that “this would not pay its way.”87 Since these early 
days, the installation of escalators has done much to expand the size and 
appeal of shopping malls, and to further entice the public to engage more 
regularly in the act of shopping in a comfortable, yet highly orchestrated 
environment. 
Escalators play a central role in the movement of motion through the 
mall where “free wandering through the space is curtailed, not only by the 
walker’s inability to orient him or herself, but by the secondary role the 
walker plays; the escalator has become autoreferential, and the individual, 
rather than choosing a path, is directed along a designated route.”88 Alfred 
Taubman, an architect of the archetype of the mall illustrates the ways 
in which the structure of the mall encourages the circulation of shop-
per: “We put our vertical transportation—the escalators—on the ends, 
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so shoppers have to make the full loop” of the mall.89 A 1976 shopping 
mall patent illustrates “the way judicious design can combine with human 
nature to even out the split of how many shoppers will take” one of two 
paths, by placing “the ‘up’ escalator further from the entering shoppers 
than the ‘down’ stairs to make the mode of level transfer that calls for 
more effort easier to reach than the mode that calls for less effort.”90 Thus, 
mall visitors are architecturally encouraged to take the long way around, 
since “the more time someone spends in a mall, the more stores they visit 
and the more things they buy.”91
Ironically, in the Westgate Mall attack, the location of escalators and 
other profit-oriented designs of the mall, engineered to keep customers 
walking for longer, meant that those trying to escape had longer to travel. 
Similarly, the open atria and the panoptic design of the mall designed 
for optimum surveillance turned Westgate into a hostage space where 
people found it hard to escape without being seen as they attempted to 
escape through the exit routes.92 In the enclosed and defamiliarized space 
of Westgate Mall during al-Shabaab’s attack, the architecture of the build-
ing served its purpose to the fullest as a “customer trap.”93 The Westgate 
Mall’s anchor store, Nakumatt supermarket, became the scene of much 
carnage during the attacks, and a central site where the two forces of cor-
porate capitalism and terrorism colluded as complementary global agents, 
both simultaneously attempting to influence and retain mall visitors. 
Contemporary mall designs have creatively and strategically devised a 
number of physical, atmospheric, and psychological procedures and perfor-
mances to regulate movement, and to ensure that mall corridors are used 
for constant movement. In addition to looking out for the dangers of terror-
ism, theft, and unauthorized entry, the “CCTV Operational Requirements 
Manual” lists “crowd control” as a key public safety concern as well as a way 
to measure the link between walking speed and “shopping ambition”—
faster for the determined shopper, and slower for the casual ambler.94 The 
architectural and architectonic design of malls encourage an “optimal” 
speed at which people should navigate the commercial space; two oppo-
sitional types of movement—too slow or too fast—are both discouraged. 
Coming to a complete standstill in a non-designated rest area, or breaking 
into a run are flagged by the security apparatus as causes for concern. 
Within the world as defined by the mall, stopping in a non-designated 
rest area is characterized as “loitering” with signs all along mall corridors 
warning people against this “non-action.” The word “loitering” is carefully 
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selected to associate a person who stands still with an underlying sinister 
intent. In non-designated rest areas, “people staying still are not people 
circulating money; consumption is circulation.”95 In the mall, “complete 
stasis is not permitted; one cannot simply sit and concentrate but must 
move through the store, and through the commodities,” and “even when 
stopping to purchase, the consumer is still caught in the movement, but at 
the level of fiscal circulation.” Restaurants and cafes provide rest stops, but 
ones where items must still be purchased for consumption. Shoe shops, 
for example, “provide seating insofar as it will be used as a part of the 
movement of the stores’ goods,” and the few benches dotted along the 
aisles of the mall are strategically placed opposite shop fronts, providing 
only momentary respite for the malls visitor to gather strength for the 
shopping ahead.96 
In the contemporary mall environment, even reflective surfaces have 
been strategically used to ensure that on a slow day, or time of day, a shop-
ping mall feels populated and busy. “Mirrors reproduce and recirculate 
commodities in stores, but also reproduce the crowd as models for and 
purchasers of those commodities. Moreover, the crowd itself may be con-
sidered as part of the commercial goods, sold to and as commodities. As 
an attraction to would-be merchants and other mall visitors, the crowd 
parallels the audience, sold by television executives to advertisers.”97 This 
is yet another aspect of shopping mall design that was disadvantageous to 
the victims of the Westgate attack; as they attempted to stay out of view, 
the multiple reflective surfaces threatened to give them away. A shopping 
mall’s “steel, glass, chrome, plastic, and mirrors serve to double and re-
double images of plenitude, adding further to the cornucopian image 
of abundance.”98 During the Westgate attacks, however, these images of 
plentitude would have served to multiply representations of terrorists and 
victims, affecting the sensory perceptions of each as they were looking out 
for signs of the other. Even if people do take cover during such attacks, and 
avoid being seen through or mirrored in the many glass and reflective sur-
faces, the National Counter Terrorism Security Office reports that “many 
injuries in urban terrorist attacks are caused by flying glass, especially in 
modern buildings.”99 Mall visitors are advised by the office: “Remember, 
out of sight does not necessarily mean out of danger, especially if you are 
not ballistically protected.”100
In addition to the physical architectural designates of standardized 
shopping malls, music has also become essential to a mall’s overall design 
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and has been acknowledged “as a form of architecture. Rather than sim-
ply filling up an empty space, the music becomes part of the consistency 
of that space. The sound becomes a presence, and as that presence it be-
comes an essential part of the building’s infrastructure.”101 In many ways, 
the music can be thought of as “another layer of packaging laid over com-
modities. This packaging contains the real instructions for use—how to 
feel when using the products in the store.”102 The music played in malls is 
highly orchestrated and is delivered as complementary accompaniments 
to particular shops and products.103 Piped music in malls is specifically 
designed and suited to specific times of the day, to regulate people’s move-
ment, as well as a “stimulus progression,”104 that ultimately aids in the pro-
longation of shopping. “Programmed music in a mall produces consump-
tion because the music works as an architectural element of a built space 
devoted to consumerism. A store deploys programmed music as part of 
a fabricated environment aimed at getting visitors to stay longer and buy 
more.”105 Underlining the militarization of contemporary consumption, 
“stimulus progression was invented to combat worker fatigue in weapons 
plants during World War II, functioning on a principle of maintaining a 
stable stimulus state in listeners at all times.”106 Experimental stimulus 
progression of music to help prolong a continuous activity was thus orig-
inally conceived on the production side, rather than on the consumption 
side, of an emerging corporate capitalist industry.107 
During the Westgate Mall siege, the sound of grenade blasts and gun-
shots suddenly and acutely disrupted the enclosed orchestrated fantasy 
of the mall where the “music system kept on playing throughout, inter-
spersed with the shooting.”108 Witnesses reported the eerie displacement 
created as the music emanating from shops continued to echo in some 
parts of the mall and as silence descended elsewhere with customers qui-
etly hiding from the roaming al-Shabaab terrorists. Arnold Mwaighacho, 
a waiter at Urban Gourmet Burgers, recalls how he lay bleeding on the ter-
race of the restaurant. “He smeared blood across his face and played dead. 
He prayed and concentrated on the Justin Timberlake song ‘Mirrors,’ 
which looped over and over again on the restaurant’s sound system.”109 
With a “continuous, nuanced, and highly orchestrated flow of music to 
all its parts,” even with so much death and carnage during the attacks, “it 
is as if a sensorial circulation system keeps the Mall alive.”110 Without the 
regular Westgate crowd noises to fill the void of the mall’s atria and aisles, 
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“the ringing of the unanswered mobile phones of the dead and wounded” 
was amplified, giving away many of those seeking shelter.111 
Al-Shabaab’s invasion of Westgate’s space and ideology defied many of 
the designated rules set by the mall’s design. As people spent hours hid-
ing, and as the terrorists themselves were holed up in the Nakumatt store-
room, “without the circulation of consumers, the space ceases to function 
as a commercial center; moreover, it loses its dynamism and architectonics 
are reduced to static architecture.”112 However, even though the terrorists 
deliberately refused to enter the scripted flow of the mall, and challenged 
it by producing their own flow—the movement of people running, or be-
ing motionless for hours—al-Shabaab inadvertently “agreed to make the 
mall the space in which they act, and thus help constitute the crowd.”113 
Westgate was rearticulated and displaced, but only for a limited period of 
time—the four days of the attack, and the two years after as the mall was 
being rebuilt. Westgate Mall now employs an extraordinary security arse-
nal, is open for business, and defiantly reclaims its original meaning as a 
spectacle in the center of the city. 
Atmospherics of Enchantment
Since shopping malls have become so central to social life, they have ac-
quired the status of “cathedrals of consumption” and often replicate the 
aura of enchantment by emulating the traditional architecture of church-
es and places of worship, with such designs as stained glass windows, 
high ceilings, and arched domes.114 In many instances, the shopping mall 
has directly replaced the place of worship as the central focal point of a 
city’s urban planning, a community’s attention, and the means by which 
to guide or control social behavior.115 In many Western contexts, towns 
“were defined by either a church or a center of government (depicting 
the coalition between Church and State in the production of order that 
characterizes morally based regimes).”116 In one case, the switch between 
church and shopping mall is more literal: the Westgate shopping center 
in Oxford, UK, is currently being built on the site of a thirteenth century 
medieval church, which lies buried “beneath what is currently the Sains-
bury’s supermarket.”117 Constructing a mall on the ruins of a historical 
church is the ultimate embodiment of a cathedral of consumption dedi-
cated to worshiping a consumerist culture.
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The merging of worship and commerce has been taken to another 
level in some countries, where both types of venue have been combined 
within the same retail space. “The scene may appear an unlikely combi-
nation but in the Philippines the Catholic Church has successfully set up 
shop where millions increasingly spend their leisure time” in the mall.118 
Father Rufino Sescon said that “it was Jesus who went to market places to 
preach the good news of salvation. We must go where our people are.”119 
Other than providing a place of and for worship, shopping malls are now 
the primary centers of most towns and cities all over the world and are 
geared to satisfying social and commercial needs, and, increasingly, dedi-
cated to all kinds of entertainment activities. 
Since some malls have replaced the traditional communal city center, 
they provide much more than just a place to shop. The engineering of mall 
atmospherics has evolved over the course of the modern shopping mall’s 
existence, and is the product of years of marketing research, studies in 
psychology, architectural scholarship, and security studies, among other 
targeted disciplines, including demography, political geography, and ur-
ban planning, all geared towards the design, as well as the prediction, of 
consumption practices.120 All these fields have dedicated research geared 
towards the optimum functioning of the shopping mall, making it a 
cross-disciplinary project, and a central concern of contemporary culture. 
Over the decades, a variety of intricate modifications have been made to 
the architecture and design of shopping malls, all geared towards calcu-
lating and controlling the relationship between product, space, marketing, 
and purchasing behavior. 
Designed to appeal to different gender and age demographics, the 
contemporary shopping mall can simultaneously appease the various de-
sires and demands of every family member. Over the years, shopping mall 
developers have added an array of other functions and services, mostly 
geared towards entertainment but also others that propose to satisfy a va-
riety of practical daily needs. Not only can people expect to purchase most 
of their groceries, engage in conspicuous consumption, and go about their 
daily activities, as malls develop in size and scope they are increasingly 
equipped with a variety of different leisure and entertainment activities. 
In 1945, J.C. Nichols identified the relationship between shopping and 
entertainment by advising mall developers that “recreational types of busi-
ness can bring a lot of desirable traffic to your center—such as theaters, 
bowling alleys, and dancing schools.”121 By strategically combining the 
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areas of commerce and recreation over the years, “malls have developed 
an amazing arsenal of new devices to attract consumers,” in what has be-
ing labelled “shoppertainment,” in order to create a new type of economy 
based on “experience.”122 The Mall of America, for example, proudly states 
that Minnesota was “once known mainly as a vacation destination for out-
door activities, tourists now flock to the state for shopping,”123 thereby di-
rectly substituting free, outdoor action with the profit-oriented activities 
housed within the enclosed world of the mall.
Adding to the contemporary shopping mall experience are cinema 
complexes, restaurants, gaming arenas, ice rinks, post offices, banks, 
aquaria, theme parks, sports facilities, hotels, health spas, medical clin-
ics, post offices, live theater venues, and business forums, to name a few 
amenities.124 By placing all these facilities under one roof, this “proximity 
has established an inescapable behavioral link between human needs—
for recreation, public life, and social interaction—and the commercial 
activities of the mall.”125 By creating a continuous actual and conceptual 
thread between daily practical needs and activities of conspicuous con-
sumption, these different spheres of lived experience imbue each other 
with associative meaning, and become indelibly associated with the oth-
er.126 Such cross-commodification is also able to “incorporate fantasy, jux-
taposing shopping with an intense spectacle of accumulated images and 
themes that entertain and stimulate and in turn encourage more shop-
ping.”127 Shopping mall designs try to ensure that the act of shopping is 
not perceived as a chore, but is associated with an enjoyable and recrea-
tional activity. After years of experimenting with styles and designs, mall 
developers and designers have expertly combined shopping and entertain-
ment to satisfy the basic desire-driven elements of contemporary life. 
The contemporary shopping mall’s compulsion for entertainment 
can be located in its etymological origins. The word “mall” stems “from 
obsolete French pallemaille, from Italian pallamaglio, from palla ‘ball’ + 
maglio ‘mallet,’”128 and was a sixteenth century game, similar to croquet, 
where a ball was hit with a wooden hammer through a ring. The word 
“mall” became shorthand for “an alley used for pall-mall,” famously pre-
served as London’s Pall Mall.129 The word “mall” was subsequently used to 
label a pedestrian walkway, and is currently most used to describe a con-
temporary shopping center. Thus, to walk, in the context of the shopping 
mall, is to shop.
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One of the significant features of the contemporary shopping mall 
concept is its powerful merging of shopping and leisure activities into a 
single spatial form, and synthesizing activities—once considered dispa-
rate—under the rubric of the “commodity form” and spectacle.130 By ex-
pertly blending a variety of retail, culinary, and entertainment activities, 
the contemporary shopping mall has created an “experience economy,”131 
changing the way people shop.132 Shopping malls have become “materi-
al structures that use symbolism and mass media connections to invoke 
a consumerist milieu,”133 cementing the relationship between shopping 
and entertainment, and promising to promote this commodified “expe-
rience” to other areas of life. Increasingly, the merging of entertainment, 
leisure, and work, by creating a conglomerated and concentrated retail 
arena with multiple entertainment and commercial outlets is replicated 
by other corporate, private, and public spaces, including museums, hotels, 
airports, sports stadia, restaurants, and increasingly in areas once con-
sidered far removed from such commodification practices, such as places 
of education.134 “This logic of association allows noncommodified values 
to enhance commodities, but it also imposes the reverse process—pre-
viously noncommodfied entities become part of the marketplace. Once 
this exchange of attributes is absorbed into the already open-ended and 
indeterminate exchange between commodities and needs, associations 
can resonate infinitely.”135 
While many popular cultural codes stem from a particular US-centric 
history and experience, the culture of consumption is being actively en-
couraged and promoted all over the world, and especially in countries con-
sidered to be “modernizing.” US-inspired cultural codes are exported to 
other countries and cultures that appropriate, integrate, and shape them 
according to their own local forces. This is a type of “cultural language” 
that is acquired by others. “What they actually say in it is a different sto-
ry altogether.”136 In this sense, US cultural codes become dissociated 
from their specific historical grounding, as they become a shared cul-
tural capital available for global consumption. The Kenyan Vision 2030, 
for example, unabashedly cites Walt Disney as a source of inspiration for 
the government’s infrastructure modernization plans.137 In this context, 
Westgate Mall demarcated the boundaries of very different real and im-
agined worlds. The wealthy elite frequent the controlled environment of 
the mall as a temporary—air-conditioned—refuge from the surrounding 
turmoil of Nairobi. The enclosed world of Westgate attempted to “reima-
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gine” the city based on order, and to create a space where identities based 
on a shopping experience can be shared.
The Spectacle of Consumption: 
A Carnival of Contested Identities
True to the tenets of the society of the spectacle,138 one major South Af-
rican shopping complex claims to be a “Gateway” from one world into 
another. No longer referred to as a shopping mall but as a shopping theat-
er, Durban’s aptly named “Gateway Theatre of Shopping” is the biggest 
shopping complex in Africa and the Southern Hemisphere, and openly 
claims to be formulating a new African consumer identity. Advertising 
for the complex warns shoppers to “prepare your senses for overload,”139 as 
they traverse the threshold between the reality of the developing African 
urban landscape and the new world provided through the spectacle of con-
sumption in shopping malls. 
Especially in the postcolonial context of growing African urbanities, 
the mall is meant to provide an enclosed and safe space for the bold dis-
play and open performance of new “hard-won” modern identities based 
on new articulations of race, class, and gender relations.140 In this sense, 
“the transformation of the mall from a space of goods exchange to a space 
marked by the consumption of lifestyle, entertainment, and culture has 
been explained as a change in the way status is socially defined.”141 In such 
ways, a variety of “cultural and symbolic signifiers are attached to goods 
so that consumption becomes related to identity and to social stratifica-
tion.”142 The mechanisms of maintaining the ethos of consumption “in-
volve the constant production of new desires and wants, generated directly 
through advertisement and more broadly through the culture of material 
‘affluence.’”143 The shaping of desires and wants are extended to the public 
more broadly in which “the suggestive, imaginary reach of the mall brings 
the expanded global consumptive universe within the reach” of those who, 
even if they cannot afford the product, can still afford to imagine and to de-
sire.144 This is a “call of the mall” that instills simultaneous attraction and 
aversion in the imagination of the poorer populaces of developing nations.
In the post-WWII African context, corporate advertisements began ad-
dressing the African consumer as an emerging target market, rather than 
focusing solely on the European elite.145 With slogans such as “men of 
tomorrow,” advertisements were not only about stirring desire in this new 
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market, but also about “educating” Africa into conspicuous consumption. 
A 1955 United Africa Company advertisement titled the “Colonial Cus-
tomer” attempted to reverse customary divisions of labor and purchasing 
behavior by highlighting the postcolonial transition from traditional prac-
tice to modern consumption patterns. The advertisement depicts a young 
African woman, and reads: “It is no reflection on her ability that she un-
dertakes no more than the day-to-day shopping for her family. Purchases 
of capital goods—bicycles, radio sets, sewing machines, cutlery—remain 
a male responsibility only through custom.”146 Through such rhetoric, ad-
vertisements attempted to dismantle traditional gender roles by making 
everyone the target of the campaign as a potential consumer.
Through constant corrective and suggestive advertising, commodi-
ties are tailored to satisfying particular wants or needs, whether actual or 
manufactured. In such ways, “the mall encourages ‘cognitive acquisition’ 
as shoppers mentally acquire commodities by familiarizing themselves 
with a commodity’s actual and imagined qualities. Mentally ‘trying on’ 
products teaches shoppers not only what they want and what they can buy, 
but also, more importantly, what they don’t have, and what they therefore 
need.”147 The act of shopping and the complementary power of the prod-
uct promises to fill any perceived lack in identity. In the shopping mall, 
“identity is momentarily stabilized even when the image of a future iden-
tity begins to take shape, but the endless variation of objects means that 
satisfaction always remains just out of reach.”148 The mall, then, is a place 
of contradiction: the satisfaction of some customer desires through com-
modity purchase, and the simultaneous awakening of innumerable other 
wants that cannot be immediately addressed or gratified.
Putting on an act and trying on an identity are framed as positive steps 
towards creating a shared consumer culture based on global precedents, 
and a shared language of consumption. This identity formation is not just 
something that happens in “developing” countries. In order for corporate 
capitalist culture to be accepted as a normal part of everyday life, people 
all over the world are recast as “consumers,” a label that defines people 
by a dominant characteristic: their ability to spend. Shopping malls, as 
self-proclaimed theaters of consumption, openly and actively encourage 
people to embrace their roles as consumers by performing shopping du-
ties.
Through the architectonics of the enclosed mall and the systematized 
and optimized lighting, sonic effects, organized shelving, and colorful 
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aisles, commodities come to life and signifiers run wild as they combine, 
contradict, play, negate, simulate, and stimulate the thousands of desires 
that are in turn aroused and gratified. Consumption in the shopping 
mall provides “a playground of subjectivity” where identities can be si-
multaneously created and dissolved.149 In these playgrounds and “spac-
es of consumption are the articulation points of individual psychology, 
social pressures, the media, fashion, personal desire, the compulsion to 
buy, forms and structures of material culture, and the realization of group 
belonging.”150
In countries where the enclosed shopping mall is a relatively new 
phenomenon, the contours of the civic-corporate relations defining the 
mall experience may still be in the process of developing. As postcolonial 
countries attempt to reconstruct themselves in the shadow of their past 
dispossession, they must struggle with the “cultural identity (shifting, 
variegated, and multiple…) of the postcolonial society, caught up in the 
throes of globalization. The vast majority of developing countries have 
emerged recently from the incubus of colonialism; both colonialism and 
globalization have in many ways fractured and distorted their cultural 
self-perceptions.”151 
Even though mall visitors in developing countries might not all be 
spending, they are still undergoing an acculturation to the mall environ-
ment and becoming familiarized with the ways in which it operates. In 
Santiago, Chile, many “visit malls but spend little or no money, seeking 
entertainment or companionship.”152 Similarly, in India, many malls are 
frequented by people who spend time in the mall, but do not shop. In the 
space of the mall, everyone is a potential consumer not only of the com-
modities sold, but of the idea of the mall itself and the cultures of consump-
tion it generates. In these spaces, “consumers must be content to consume 
the spectacle rather than the products being sold in these malls.”153 Shop-
ping malls, thus become sites where people can “participate vicariously in 
global modernity rather than fully participate via shopping.”154 In develop-
ing countries, the mall is “full of ‘neo-cultural’ references, which allow the 
uninitiated to learn a kind of ‘know-how’ acquired just by being there.”155 
Those who cannot afford to spend, can still partake in the outward signi-
fiers of a consumer society, and be educated in conspicuous consumption 
as an aspiration to a particular lifestyle. They can still enjoy the spectacle 
of the mall as voyeurs. 
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Still, there is a delicate balance that must be maintained between 
the mall and visitors; “when the promised footfall and conversions does 
not materialize, then the relationship between the retailer and the mall 
management sours.”156 Ultimately, however, the codes of global corporate 
culture can only be meaningful to those afforded entrance into the es-
tablishment. The more impoverished elements of society are subjected to 
screenings, and are often barred from entering shopping malls based on 
the outward signifiers of their appearance.157 In its promotional efforts, 
Westgate Mall states that it “attracts a highly cosmopolitan and sophis-
ticated clientele, and reaches a well-defined and attractive demographic 
audience.”158 Sectors of society whose members lack the very basics are 
further disadvantaged and barred from reading the signs of modernity, 
even though it reveals itself to them in all its bold and brash signifiers in 
the shape of the shopping mall. 
Just as malls are theaters for encouraging and displaying consumer 
identities and public acts of consumption, they are also spaces where 
counter narratives can also be performed, and where oppositional iden-
tities can be enacted. Westgate Mall exhibited similar theatrical features 
of the typical structure of a shopping mall, where, upon entering the 
premises, visitors are faced with a large, central, and often empty atrium, 
heightening the expectancy that “something is just about to be exhibited 
or performed.”159 The mall became a theater where al-Shabaab staged their 
drama for local and international audiences, which was further publicized 
by the local and international media. In this tragic sense, the mall ful-
filled its purpose as a space of spectacle. In the spirit of the Bakhtinian 
carnival,160 the shopping mall, then, becomes an ambiguous space where 
identities are performed and contested. As with other forms of contem-
porary rioting in urban areas, these public performances of social unrest 
often have a dual, and contradictory, purpose: to destroy symbols of afflu-
ence and exclusion, and to simultaneously engage in looting, and thereby 
in the coveting and consumption of commodities tantalizingly advertised 
and displayed in shop windows. In these moments of rupture, the mall 
encompasses a further ambiguous and hybrid relationship between local 
and global forces, becoming an indeterminate space in which the ideolog-
ical paradox at the heart of consumption and rejection of consumption is 
played out.
Since the world of the shopping mall, and its associated cultural refer-
ences of consumption and spectacle, depends on the imaginary of being a 
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safe and enjoyable space, it must be protected and secured against any alien 
element threatening to break this illusion. In the current climate of fear in-
duced by the rise in terrorist violence and the intensification of the security 
apparatus, it has become standard industry practice for shopping malls to 
offer safety advice on how to react during a terrorist attack, thus dimin-
ishing some of the mall’s elements of fantasy that have been strategically 
crafted over the decades. Increasingly, malls and other places of leisure are 
imbued and viewed with higher levels of trepidation.
The next chapter illustrates how, in their attempt to counter terrorist 
violence and disruption, advocates of neoliberalism begin an inexorable 
march towards a social warfare waged against the general public. The war 
on terrorism has become integrated into the design of the contemporary 
shopping mall and embedded in its architecture from a commercial ven-
ue’s conceptual stage. As a result, military industrial war machinery has 
given way to a military industrial security architecture of which the shop-
ping mall remains the prototype example. Increased acts of international 
terror, along with a heightened anti-terror response, have also led to the 
eager deployment of a private security industry and a growing acceptance 
of its infiltration into public and private spaces. As corporate enterpris-
es enact their own policing, the governance of shopping malls and other 
businesses begins to take on a different shape—one that abides by its own 
rules and is no longer beholden to traditional state authorities. 

4. Securing the Shopping Mall
When early shopping malls were being conceptualized, the various design 
elements were mostly geared towards creating some form of communal 
atmosphere and harmonious continuity between shopping, leisure, and 
profits. In the contemporary period, the minute elements of standard-
ized shopping mall design have a renewed objective of incorporating the 
paradigm of security. In response to the prevailing terrorism discourse, 
anti-terror measures, surveillance, and security have become central to 
the overall shopping mall architecture and design. Particularly since Sep-
tember 11, 2001, the promotion of the global “war on terror” has meant 
significant increases in government and corporate spending on the secu-
rity apparatus in countries all over the world. The mitigation of terrorist 
activity has become a feature of daily discourse and has been embedded 
in the very architectural design and atmospherics of public spaces, and 
especially in shopping malls.
Along with the rise in the number of terror attacks around the world,1 
there has been an increased militant response on the part of authorities—
the effect of which is turning cities into spaces with a persistent underly-
ing sense of warfare. Part of this “military urbanism is the paradigmatic 
shift that renders cities’ communal and private spaces, as well as their 
infrastructure—along with their civilian populations—a source of targets 
and threats.”2 Along with the seemingly permanent threat against physi-
cal spaces, the discourse of war, especially the war on terror, has become 
“the perpetual and boundless condition of urban societies.”3 Increased 
fears and security measures work towards instilling notions of war into 
everyday life and spaces of everyday encounter. Over the years, the secu-
rity architecture of public space, with particular emphasis on shopping 
malls, has evolved along the lines of increasing fortification and surveil-
lance in large part driven by increased security concerns.4
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Since the concept of the shopping mall is presented as a homogenous 
transnational corporate space, anti-terror responses in one commercial 
venue become applicable to another, regardless of their specific national 
contexts. The US army uses al-Shabaab’s Westgate Mall attacks as a train-
ing case study regarding how terrorist attacks can happen and how to pro-
tect against them, noting that “the complexity of four attackers operating 
in synchronized fashion guided by a central command and control argua-
bly represents the most dangerous scenario should a similar attack occur 
in the United States.”5 In 2015, “more terrorist attacks have been carried out 
with Kalashnikov-type assault rifles this year than with any other device. 
In the 13 November Paris attacks, suicide bombers killed few but gunmen 
killed many. Further afield, in Tunisia and Kenya, it was also automatic 
weapons that did the damage.”6 Recent terrorist atrocities have involved 
small coordinated groups of extremists patrolling the hallways and atria 
of hotels, malls, and restaurants, causing mass casualties. In the military 
lexicon these are termed “swarm attacks,” and “are high-risk, coordinated 
assaults sometimes directed against multiple targets or building complex-
es, using mobile groups to circumvent security measures, allowing attack-
ers to inflict casualties, garner news coverage and, in recent years, to inflict 
considerable damage prior to neutralization of the assailants.”7
For all public spaces, government and security agencies offer advice 
on a variety of protective measures that people can employ depending on 
the attack scenario, and especially if it involves explosives and other haz-
ardous devices. However, they acknowledge that a weapons assault like 
the one that occurred at Westgate Mall is difficult to predict, control, or 
avoid.8 Westgate Mall’s security measures could not forestall al-Shabaab’s 
attack, and the mall’s carefully crafted sonic signifiers, architectonics, and 
systems of circulation designed to control the flow of people were ren-
dered inoperable by the brutal simplicity of the terrorists’ use of handheld 
weapons. Still, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has worked 
directly with US shopping malls “to test the readiness of SWAT teams by 
staging fake attacks during hours when malls were closed,”9 thus using 
the mall as a space for rehearsal of impending violence. It has become 
the norm for organizations and large-scale public events to hold regular 
anti-terrorism rehearsals.10 Within this context, shopping malls are in-
creasingly subjected to a variety of military technologies, advanced video 
analytics, and facial recognition systems.11 Monitoring the mall’s popu-
lation from an unseen and yet all-seeing position, the security apparatus 
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becomes an automated system that not only observes, but also records and 
retains information for immediate or future use.12 
The United States, especially, has been keen on influencing interna-
tional partners, and is active in transferring its own security strategies 
to governments of developing countries. Since the Westgate Mall attacks, 
the US government has been instrumental in shaping the security appa-
ratus of Kenya. The US “Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance 
program focused on building law enforcement capacities in the areas of 
border security, investigations, and crisis response, and on the institution-
alization of counterterrorism prevention and response capabilities.”13 The 
Shopping Center Security Terrorism Awareness Training Program offers 
further courses and trainings developed by the International Council of 
Shopping Centers and the George Washington University Homeland Se-
curity Policy Institute in collaboration with the National Center for Bio-
medical Research and Training (NCBRT), among other such security-fo-
cused programs.14
The relationship between the United States and its allies in the war 
on terror is a strategic one revolving around the central pillars of neolib-
eral trade and security, and this stance has been adopted by many other 
supporting institutions. In fighting the war on terror, there has been an 
increasing affinity between state and private institutions, and business 
interests are often aligned with government mandates so that “advocates 
of the neoliberal mindset now occupy positions of considerable influence 
in education (universities and many “think tanks”), in the media, in cor-
porate board rooms and financial institutions, in key state institutions 
(treasury departments, central banks), and also in those international in-
stitutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) that regulate global finance and commerce.”15
By promoting the same anti-terror stance, combined with a neoliberal 
ideology, the forces of these various institutions are united in strengthen-
ing the anti-terror discourse, and promoting security as an integral fea-
ture of public spaces. Under the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting 
Initiative in the United States, “public attractions such as sports stadiums, 
amusement parks and shopping malls report suspicious activities to law 
enforcement agencies.”16 Shopping malls often coordinate with national 
anti-terror stances and surveillance schemes, such as Operation Lighten-
ing in the United Kingdom, which is an intelligence gathering operation 
that records, researches, investigates, and analyzes suspicious sightings 
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and behavior in public places in order to interrupt or monitor “hostile re-
connaissance” missions.17 
In order to further aid in anti-terror campaigns, private businesses 
have been encouraged to take matters into their own hands by investing 
in and employing an entirely private security apparatus. Because the se-
curity industry has become such an internationally lucrative venture, the 
contemporary discourse of terrorism is being actively shaped by terror-
ism opponents. With the privatization of security, there is an increased 
tendency towards the militarization of shopping malls as they attempt to 
enact their own protection and guard against terrorist, and other, threats. 
At the time of al-Shabaab’s attacks, Westgate Mall was regularly guarded 
by forty private and unarmed security guards who were stationed at var-
ious entrances of the building, and who roamed around the mall. Addi-
tionally, the mall’s banks and casino employed their own armed private 
security forces. Westgate’s overall security mechanism and surveillance 
systems, like the private security guards, were outsourced to third-party 
organizations, among them the Securex Agencies private security force.18 
Since al-Shabaab’s attack, the number of private security guards in Kenya 
has shot up to 300,000 “making them the country’s biggest private sector 
employers. A booming trade has also emerged in closed-circuit television 
(CCTV) and access control systems.”19
By comparison, although terrorist acts were rampant in the 1970s,20 a 
1978 Burns Security Institute report on security in shopping malls in the 
United States makes no mention of terrorism, indicating that this par-
ticular discursive fixation and its applicability to securing public space is a 
recent formulation.21 At one time, shoplifting and fraud were emphasized 
as the primary security concerns to be guarded against in shopping malls. 
The 1978 report notes that “no segment of the business community is 
more susceptible to or provides more opportunities for thievery, fraud and 
other crimes than retail stores.”22 The crime of shoplifting is followed by 
other security issues related to loitering and vandalism.23 Tellingly, not all 
the malls surveyed in the 1978 report had “contingency plans—written 
programs that define courses of action in responding to emergencies, ac-
cidents and crimes.”24 The lack of a contingency plan is inconceivable in 
the current climate where the security architecture has become an inte-
gral part of commercial structures, and a central concern of most indus-
tries. Through the design of early shopping centers a new relationship 
developed between how the architecture of a commercial establishment 
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influences other areas of commerce, including transformed techniques of 
marketing and retailing, and a revised relationship between the organiza-
tion and the customer. 
The Architecture of Securit y
Over years of trial and error, shopping center entrepreneurs developed a 
series of standard practices regarding architecture and design that are con-
stantly being updated and refined in the contemporary era. In J.C. Nichols’ 
1945 guide for standard shopping center practice, shopping center pioneers 
identified a multitude of “mistakes” made when first erecting these ven-
ues, and gave advice for optimum design, including standardizing ceil-
ing height, temperature control, store front design, signage size, types of 
lighting, basement usage, width of sidewalks, and width of parking spaces, 
down to minute details, including advice that “exterior switches for street 
floor shops should be provided so a night watchman can turn off and on 
the lights.”25 These original security suggestions were amended and im-
proved upon over the years leading to a more or less “standard” for the 
design of the contemporary shopping mall instituted all over the world.
Today, security is architecturally built into the very structure of shop-
ping malls, from the planning and design phase and even before construc-
tion, through such paradigms as Crime Prevention through Environmen-
tal Design (CPTED), which is “a multi-disciplinary approach to deterring 
criminal behaviour through environmental design. CPTED strategies 
rely upon the ability to influence offender decisions that precede criminal 
acts by affecting the built, social and administrative environment.”26 The 
stated goal of these principles “is to prevent crime by designing a physi-
cal environment that positively influences human behavior. The theory 
is based on four principles: natural access control, natural surveillance, 
territoriality, and maintenance.”27 
Intricate features of the security apparatus have become increasingly 
integrated into the very architecture and design of shopping malls and 
other business complexes, including the installation of “shatterproof win-
dows and bomb-resistant trash cans.”28 In such ways, inventions intended 
to bolster war efforts are harnessed for commercial use and enter into the 
civilian realm. For example, E. R. Weidlein, director of Mellon Institute of 
Technical Research, proposed that shopping malls should avail of a new 
liquid being used by the armed forces that “could be applied to show win-
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dows and showcases, which enables them to be kept clean for a period of 
three months by simply rubbing with a dry cloth.”29 Further, the CCTV 
monitoring systems in place in most shopping malls have their origin in 
military technology, and utilize “near infrared detection systems that are 
sensitive to ‘light’ beyond human vision.”30
The placing, degree, and type of lighting was once standardized for 
aesthetic purposes and to add enhanced visual effect to the commodities 
on offer, but, in the structure of the contemporary mall, lighting has an 
added duty: it is key to CCTV monitoring and becomes a prerequisite for 
effective camera capture. In the contemporary shopping mall, intruder 
alarms, CCTV, and lighting “systems must be integrated so that they work 
together in an effective and co-ordinated manner.”31 A mall’s anti-terror 
effort further merges aesthetics and security, where “pruning all vegeta-
tion and trees, especially near entrances, fence lines and boundaries” are 
key to the surveillance operation.32 In the construction of new shopping 
malls, lighting and CCTV security systems must be installed in tandem to 
“ensure that appropriate lighting complements the system during daytime 
and darkness hours.”33 As such, shopping mall developers are advised that 
“measures you may consider for countering terrorism will also work against 
other threats, such as theft and burglary. Any extra measures that are con-
sidered should integrate wherever possible with existing security.”34 In the 
same vein, parking spaces in older shopping centers were aligned according 
to calculable metrics of traffic congestion and average car size. Today, the 
parking lot must also answer to how it can mitigate terrorist activity. The 
UK’s National Counter Terrorism Security Office advises shopping centers 
to “keep non-essential vehicles at least 30 metres from your building,” as a 
precautionary measure.35 
In addition, mall developers capitalize on combining architectural 
design with security requirements for increased profits. For example, a 
deliberate lack of seating areas in malls plays a dual role: to keep people 
moving—and shopping—and to ensure that explosive devices cannot be 
hidden if furniture is kept to an operational minimum.36 However, there 
are instances where the security-conscious policies introduce elements of 
“irrationality” into the shopping mall setting, including such impractical 
measures as “avoiding the use of litter bins” to prevent the possibility of 
terrorists placing explosives within them.37 In addition, to fully enact se-
curity measures behind the scenes, the mall’s security apparatus must 
also promote vigilance as an outward signifier.
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Despite these threatening stances, however, the security apparatus of 
the mall must find a balance between securing and surveying the prem-
ises at the same time that it does not disrupt the flow of commerce or 
inconvenience customers in any way; it must allow shoppers to go about 
their activates unhindered. A RAND report on terrorism and shopping 
malls identified potential security measures that can be implemented, 
but warns that “some of the high-priority security options identified in 
the analysis are expected to have negative collateral effects that, if great 
enough, may cause some shoppers to shop elsewhere. On the other hand, 
were the threat from terrorism to be perceived as increasing, the psychol-
ogy may be reversed and customers may feel safer in centers with in-
creased security.”38 The report further points out that “screening check-
points, in particular, could have strong negative collateral impacts if they 
cause people to wait in line to enter a shopping center.”39 As is evident, 
within the profit-margin calculus of the private sector business, ensur-
ing the security of customers becomes a question of weighing costs and 
benefits. “As for more elaborate security improvements, those run into 
bottom-line resistance. Like all businesses, retail operations have limited 
dollars. Every mall will be asking itself, ‘Do you invest $100,000 in se-
curity or do you use it to promote an upcoming sale?’”40 As such, most 
shopping malls must balance costs and effects of security measures and 
check points.
Asymmetrical power relations are increasingly at work in the mall 
environment, from “minor” to “major” surveillance techniques, whether 
“voluntarily” through information and communication technologies—
credit card data, mobile phone geolocations, personal cameras, and so-
cial media updates—or involuntarily through pervasive, and perhaps 
unseen, private surveillance mechanisms that are turning these venues 
into latter-day panopticons.41
The Panopticon of Shopping: Discipline and Purchase
Similar to how the panoptic design of the prison was used to control the 
behavior of inmates, so thoroughly examined in Michel Foucault’s Dis-
cipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison,42 the panoptic architecture of 
shopping arenas attempts to induce certain behaviors. The panoptic de-
sign was introduced by Jeremy Bentham to the prison system as a means 
of “efficient” surveillance: a single, central and elevated observation tow-
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er could effectively survey the prison in its entirety, without the guards 
themselves being seen.43 This suggestion of constant surveillance was a 
means of controlling and shaping inmates’ behavior; they, in turn, inter-
nalized and self-administered the disciplining principle. 
While the panopticon was perfected in the prison system, it was orig-
inally conceived in the workplace as a means of enhancing efficiency ac-
cording to a “‘central inspection principle’ which would facilitate the train-
ing and supervision of unskilled workers by experienced craftsmen,”44 and 
“the atrium construction, with surrounding galleries, had already become 
an established principle of industrial architecture” of the factory.45 There 
are many similarities that can be drawn between the birth of the panoptic 
prison and that of the shopping mall, where “the genealogy of the peniten-
tiary parallels a broader order of social differentiation and control within 
society,” including the “desire to instill capitalist work habits and ethics 
on the working classes. Accordingly, the birth of the modern penitentiary 
was linked to other social mechanisms that ensured the systematic opera-
tion and overall success of capitalism.”46
The surveillance impulse of the panopticon began to permeate other 
venues, and was being gradually applied to control certain social behav-
iors. However, as opposed to the panoptic effect on the penal institution, 
and the proposed rehabilitation of inmates, the private security appara-
tus’s dictation of human behavior in shopping malls is not “the redemp-
tive soul-training of the carceral project,”47 and is not directed at ensuring 
or encouraging ethical behavior, but is designed to encourage approved 
consumerist activities. The purpose of surveillance in shopping arenas 
is not only to guard against criminal or disruptive acts, but is simultane-
ously aimed at shaping and disciplining behavior towards the smooth and 
uninterrupted perpetuation of a consumerist culture. 
Since the early days of the department store, the panoptic design and 
the atmosphere of constant surveillance worked towards influencing buy-
ing behavior. It is in the enclosed department store that the first concrete 
panoptic principles of the contemporary shopping mall can be identified, 
along with how the architecture of a commercial establishment can be 
used to influence people’s behavior. Those frequenting nineteenth centu-
ry arcades were advised that “entrance to the galleries is strictly forbidden 
to anyone who is dirty or to carriers of heavy loads; smoking and spitting 
are likewise prohibited.”48 A few years on, the open plan of the depart-
ment store further increased the threat of constant surveillance, and was 
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used to deter shoppers from criminal activity. In the contemporary period, 
surveillance and security have become integral concerns of architectural 
design, where counter terrorism efforts are simultaneously used to deter 
other types of crime and unwelcome behavior. As with most other public 
or private spaces, panoptic observation stems from the particularities of 
the built environment, but also via the integral, indispensable, and all-per-
vasive—and invasive—technologies of surveillance.
The management of shopping mall environments can be seen as a 
form of “governance,”49 one that is extended beyond the walls of the mall 
through a variety of partnerships between the mall and its stakeholders, 
and the collaboration between the private security industry and a nation’s 
police force. The ultimate goal of mall atmospherics is not only to work 
towards increasing profits, but to create an enclosed world that abides by 
its own established rules and principles to be respected with little interfer-
ence. The surveillance architecture employed in shopping malls is geared 
towards ensuring that visitors act like “normal” consumers and do what 
consumers should ideally do: engage in the culture of consumption. Be-
havior in shopping malls is highly regulated, much more so than in the 
street or other public places that must often cater to the “abnormal” ele-
ments of social life. 
This is not to suggest that people who visit malls have no agency, and 
that they are unwillingly and unwittingly subjected to the mall’s circula-
tion of consumption, but that the design of the mall is carefully orchestrat-
ed to encourage, if not produce, certain types of purchasing behavior and 
movement. The mall functions as a world in miniature, and comes with a 
series of rules and regulations. Within this architectural logic, “to come to 
the mall with no intention to shop is counter-consumptive and thus makes 
the non- or anti-consumer a possible target of suspicion, regulation and 
even expulsion.”50 To this end, the Shopping Center Security Terrorism 
Awareness Training Program was launched to train security personnel 
and employees on terrorism awareness and response in which “the first 
goal in the training program is to recognize people who are acting out of 
character for a shopping center.”51 Malachy Kavanagh, a spokesperson for 
International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC), explains that “every-
one acts pretty much the same when shopping… So part of the training 
teaches people to look for anomalous behavior—who is not acting like a 
shopper.”52 Within the enclosed world of the shopping mall, there is a tacit 
agreement between the mall and visitors to engage in certain accepted 
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and agreed upon types of behavior—with such “homogeneity of intention 
comes safety.”53 Unification of purchasing purpose “is the lulling effect of 
the mall—you are surrounded only by fellow shoppers, all drawn together 
in a communion of consumption.”54 The shopping mall becomes “an ex-
emplar of modern private corporate policing,”55 where control strategies 
are embedded in both environmental features and structural relations.”56 
In order to familiarize people with the ways in which they should func-
tion within the mall,57 it is common to have normative prescriptions for 
required behavior, including postings and display notices listing what is 
deemed to be inappropriate behavior.58 The following are examples of pro-
hibited actions listed on the Mall of America website:
• Conduct that is disorderly, disruptive or which interferes with or en-
dangers business or guests is prohibited. Such conduct may include 
running, loud offensive language, spitting, throwing objects, fighting, 
obscene gestures, gang signs, skating, skateboarding, bicycling etc.
• Intimidating behavior by groups or individuals, loitering; engaging in 
soliciting; blocking storefronts, hallways, skyways, fire exits or escala-
tors, and walking in groups in such a way as to inconvenience others 
is prohibited.
• Picketing, demonstrating, soliciting and petitioning are prohibited.
• Guns are banned on these premises.59
The list of prohibited behavior in enclosed, privatized spaces may be as 
detailed as Disneyland’s prohibition of anyone—child or adult—walking 
barefoot.60 Behavior correction through constant policing can usually in-
duce certain behaviors, but cannot fully predict or guard against the shop-
ping mall’s security façade being attacked using brute force, as was the 
case with Westgate Mall.
The surveillance system of shopping malls has a simultaneous and 
dual purpose: to watch people at the same time that it watches out for peo-
ple. Surveillance of criminal activity, potential and actual terrorist attacks, 
and shopping behavior has been uniformly integrated using the same se-
curity apparatus. Subjecting all these activities to the same system of sur-
veillance effectively muddles the distinction between potential criminal 
activity and shopping as both become subject to a single observant securi-
ty system. The UK’s National Counter Terrorism Office advises shopping 
malls to ensure that “the CCTV cameras in use for the protective security 
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of your shopping centre [are] integrated with those used to monitor cus-
tomer movement.”61 In this sense, disciplinary practices are spread evenly 
across the public, and surveillance once reserved to deter crime is “tar-
geted at those simply capable of transgressing social norms and laws.”62 
The mall’s visitors are observed by the same surveillance apparatus that 
does not, initially at least, distinguish between shoppers, criminals, and 
terrorists. In the contemporary language of the security industry, suspi-
cious behavior becomes framed as “activity inconsistent with the nature of 
the building” that is performed by “the same or similar individuals” who 
might engage in such suspicious bevavior “as staring or quickly looking 
away,” or who might take more significant interest in observing “parking 
areas, delivery gates, doors and entrances.”63 Other possible suspects are 
regarded as “people taking pictures—filming—making notes—sketch-
ing.”64 Thus, omnipresent surveillance systems becomes justified when 
any form of behavior that is unrelated to shopping is the subject of sus-
picion. 
In some cases, the surveillance apparatus is the very first concern and 
is installed before the mall is even constructed. For example, the poten-
tial customer can watch Oxford’s Westgate shopping centre being built 
through a “new development webcam, giving you live pictures of progress 
on site every 20 minutes from 7am to 7pm.”65 Such a benign example 
of surveillance shows the increasing “blurring distinction between the 
surveillance and social control practices of the official justice system and 
those existing in the everyday lives of ordinary people.”66 Here, the poten-
tial customer is given the opportunity to be inspector of the mall as it is 
being constructed. Once the mall is complete, this surveillance relation-
ship will be reversed, and targeted at the customer.
During times when the threat, and anticipation, of terrorism is es-
pecially high, the profiling and monitoring of the public are greatly en-
hanced, and lead to the deployment of extra security measures.67 In Feb-
ruary 2015, a highly publicized threat was issued by al-Shabaab via a video 
message posted on a variety of social media platforms and circulated by 
international news networks.68 In the footage, the terrorists named sev-
eral international malls, including the Mall of America and London’s 
Westfield shopping center, as forthcoming targets. In response, the Willis 
Retail Practice, a UK insurance and risk advising organization, released a 
“Security and Terrorism Guidance for Retailers” stating that “it is impor-
tant to raise awareness and make sure that everyone (including cleaning, 
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maintenance, contract and concession staff) is vigilant,” and, further, that 
“all staff should be trained in bomb threat handling procedures or have 
ready access to instructions, such as a bomb threat checklist.”69 By involv-
ing all employees in the general surveillance of the mall as well ensuring 
that they are educated in the technical aspects of explosives—how to deal 
with bombs and bomb threats and how to evacuate people in emergency 
situations—the entire labor force of the mall becomes implicated in sur-
veillance and monitoring. 
Paradoxically in this case, the staff becomes versed in the accoutre-
ments of terror, and become themselves subject to suspicion. In this re-
gard, to ensure that staff are vigilant of other staff members, the report 
notes that “some external threats, whether from criminals, terrorists, or 
competitors seeking a business advantage, may rely upon the cooperation 
of an ‘insider’. This could be an employee, a contractor or an agency staff 
member who has authorised access to your premises.”70 In the complex 
web of heightened vigilance, everybody is under surveillance at the same 
time that everyone is in the service of the surveillance industry. Even the 
control room where the CCTV footage is monitored and does not escape 
observation.71 Such all-pervasive panoptic structures produce a similarly 
panoptic atmosphere wherein everyone becomes implicated in the elabo-
rate choreography of surveillance, with mall management observing secu-
rity personnel and employees; security guards observing employees and 
shoppers; employees observing contractors and shoppers; and shoppers 
observing each other and simultaneously gazing upon the spectacle of 
the mall. It is within systems of surveillance that skewed power relations 
and “information asymmetry” become most apparent,72 “where one per-
son, group, or organization gains important information about a person 
and uses it as leverage to modify their behavior.”73 The mall’s surveillance 
structure keeps a constant watch on patrons, even as patrons gaze upon 
the mall, albeit from different vantage points and within different struc-
tures of power. 
Within increasingly media-saturated spheres, the difference between 
technologies of surveillance and personal cameras and mobile technolo-
gies is further erased, as all are in the service of recording the surround-
ing environment. Shoppers are further encouraged to not only watch out 
for signs of suspicion, but to contact the mall’s central security and even to 
publicly communicate their suspicions through social media.74 The Mall 
of America has set up an Enhanced Service Portal—aptly named ESP—
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which centralizes its “website; social media channels; telephone, text and 
dispatch teams; guest services and security into a newly designed space 
that will allow the ESP team members to actively listen to consumers and 
retailers and promptly respond to them.”75 In the climate of fear induced 
by terrorism and the concomitant anti-terror discourse, the “duty” of sur-
veillance is ultimately passed on to the shopper. Additionally, installing 
security systems is expensive, and “invariably, mall operators pass those 
costs on to their retail tenants, which then pass them on to the shoppers.”76 
The cost of security is also passed on to the customer in many other forms 
of business. For example, “the Passenger Fee, also known as the Septem-
ber 11 Security Fee, is collected by air carriers from passengers at the time 
air transportation is purchased.”77 Thus, the general public must simulta-
neously bear the violent brunt of terrorism as well as the costs associated 
with marketing anti-terror measures. 
Marketing Violence 
Technologies of surveillance are used in the mitigation of terrorist activity, 
but have also been coopted for marketing purposes. Much of market re-
search stems from technologies of surveillance in shopping malls, the re-
sults of which are used to track pedestrian and purchasing behavior, with 
the ultimate goal of increasing sales.78 Retailers watch video analytics for 
clues on purchasing behavior, monitor CCTV footage, and analyze cred-
it card data to not only record which products have been bought, when, 
where, and by whom, but to also predict preferences and future purchas-
ing patterns.79 In this way, the architecture of the contemporary shopping 
mall encourages a number of “predatory, often dubious tactics (such as 
customer tracking devices and focus groups) that allow retailers to sustain 
consumer demand despite volatile markets and trends.”80 Ultimately, gen-
erating profits is the key for any corporation, which must align its overall 
security operation to ensure the smooth running of the business, and the 
compliance of its clientele. Thus, it is not only the economically weak, or 
those exhibiting “abnormal” shopping behaviors, who are subject to the 
disciplining effects of surveillance. In the shopping mall, those who enjoy 
economic benefits of the corporate system are especially courted, studied, 
and observed by the marketing discipline. 
Through blanket surveillance activities, mall visitors can be “consid-
ered as both potential terrorists and a vast consumer market.”81 Mall vis-
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itors are thus treated as both a potential target market to be enticed, and 
as a potential target threat to be excised. This inherent duality of the term 
“target market” serves to reveal the underlying violence of marketing ac-
tivities, even as they attempt to attract custom. In marketing literature, 
people are recast as objects of study in order to quantify behavior and turn 
it into data to be used for experimentations geared towards profit maximi-
zation. CCTV operations manuals list specific regulations for the moni-
toring of shopping malls, and, in the hostile language of militarization of 
public space, refer to the people under surveillance as “targets” and “ob-
jects.”82 The marketing discipline displays a combative attitude towards 
conceptualizing the public, and is awash in symbolic violence. When mar-
keters analyze CCTV footage of people in shopping malls, they engage in 
“object counting” and “object recognition;” societies are segmented into 
“target markets;” retail arenas too close to each other engage in “canni-
balization;”83 and in various studies on markets in Africa, and especially 
in South Africa, populations are segmented according to race, with black 
populations termed “black markets”—a term that is shared with illegal 
markets and all the negative connotations this terminology entails.84
The synergizing of violence and consumption has long been a feature 
of the shopping center. An early shopping center developer, J.C. Nichols, 
experimented with introducing a shooting gallery as a recreational activity 
in 1945, but admitted that this was a mistake. The idea was abandoned, not 
because of the shooting gallery’s association with violence, but because 
of the noise.85 While modern malls might not provide sanctioned shoot-
ing galleries, large department stores like Wal-Mart are the United States’ 
prime retailers selling firearms and ammunition to the public.86 Unsur-
prisingly, the biggest sale day for firearms in the United States is “Black 
Friday”—the nationwide sale day after Thanksgiving.87 As customer fight 
over discounted products, Black Friday sales have produced a cycle of fren-
zy in the shopping spectacle and especially in the media spectacle that 
accompanies—and encourages—the histrionic purchasing behavior. The 
injurious, and sometimes fatal, rough and tumble violence of Black Fri-
day sales have become normalized incidences, a form of organized chaos, 
that shoppers and television audiences have come to expect. Testament to 
the globalizing flows of corporate capital practice, and the increasing con-
nectivities of international markets, while the tradition of Black Friday is 
specific to the United States, and to the Thanksgiving holidays, it is being 
introduced to other countries, including the United Kingdom, Brazil, and 
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India.88 These countries have adopted the same formula, and conduct the 
same sales on the same day as the United States, and with it the attempt to 
garner the same buoyant economic effects. 
During such orchestrated special events in shopping malls and other 
commercial arenas, there is always the possibility of “violence erupting 
over sneakers or a chance to see a favorite celebrity.”89 Even though there 
might be serious casualties and consequences emanating from these 
types of events, they are nonetheless framed as not only acceptable, but are 
geared towards increased publicity of the corporate capitalist model, and 
are used to spur the notion of consumption as a most coveted contempo-
rary cultural act. Violence, in this case, is good—the epitome of enacting 
the ideology of consumption at the expense of others. When it is connect-
ed to promoting economic activity and is in service of the capitalist project, 
violence is endorsed by the structure of the mall and by the ideology of the 
market.90 
Sur veillance for Terrorism
Just as marketers and mall management study the behavior of shopping 
mall visitors, and isolate particular characteristics for study to mitigate 
against terrorist activity or to turn such surveillance data into profit-ori-
ented results, the al-Shabaab terrorists used their knowledge of shopping 
malls to strike Westgate at a day and time—a Saturday at lunchtime—
when they could be guaranteed higher numbers of casualties. In this 
sense, both marketers and terrorists heed the same industry advice by 
tracking mall visitors, or “target markets,” during times of highest traffic; 
in the case of marketers, for increased publicity and sales, and, in the case 
of al-Shabaab, for increased publicity and carnage.91 
While the growing security industry is indispensable for policing au-
thorities and profitable for private enterprises, many of the same technol-
ogies of surveillance used in the war on terror are being simultaneously 
utilized by terrorists to plan and execute their attacks. For example, “open-
source intelligence is readily available via the Internet and with the ad-
vent of web-based interactive maps and web-sharing media (e.g., photos of 
public crowded spaces) terrorists can actually view targets at street level.”92 
The al-Shabaab terrorists “had scouted Westgate before the attack,”93 and, 
during the assaults, communication and coordination were key features of 
the operation. CCTV footage of the Westgate Mall attacks show the terror-
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ists communicating, presumably with each other or with others coordinat-
ing events from outside the mall, over mobile phones. Similarly, during 
the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, “authorities were caught off guard in 
a well-orchestrated assault by commandos with superior firepower and 
technology.”94 In the Mumbai attacks, emulated by the Westgate terrorists,
the commandos employed digital technology to conduct preoperational surveil-
lance of the target properties, traversed the Arabian Sea using global positioning 
systems, quickly located their targets from Google Earth satellite images, and 
used satellite telephony and voice over Internet protocol to remain in constant 
contact with their handlers. Instantaneous communication enabled the handlers, 
watching the events unfold on live television, to aler t the commandos to the move-
ments of security forces, thereby prolonging the attack.95
In a world in which the corporate capitalist mode of production and con-
sumption defines the structure of everyday life, terrorists cannot but use 
“business services to advance their operations.”96 In an obvious example 
of the capitalism/terrorism matrix, the September 11 terrorists purchased 
airline tickets,97 but, more profoundly, they also paid fees to rent planes 
at a flight school.98 Similarly, the al-Shabaab terrorists premeditated their 
attacks on Westgate Mall by utilizing a variety of businesses, both legal 
and illegal, to aid in their operations: they withdrew money from a bank, 
they rented a car, they purchased mobile phones and activated sim cards, 
they obtained weapons, ammunitions, and related military-style gear, they 
surveyed the mall, and they used social media to publicize the attack.99 In 
a chilling distillation of this regimen of exchange, at one point during the 
Westgate Mall attacks, those still alive and hiding behind the meat coun-
ter of Nakumatt supermarket were approached by one of the al-Shabaab 
terrorists. Before killing one of the mall employees, the terrorist asked: 
“where do we find Safaricom scratch cards?”100 In addition to intricate 
pre-planning and use of sophisticated surveillance technologies and strat-
egies, terrorists must also engage in everyday acts of consumption to aid 
in the execution of atrocities. 
Shaping Employee Behavior
Constant policing is not just about mitigating crime and controlling cus-
tomer behavior. Since power is productive, as Foucault has argued,101 sur-
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veillance systems in malls are designed to be much more than instru-
ments of repression.102 Those who work within the mall are especially 
subjected to the watchful gaze. The disciplining structure of the mall plac-
es employees under constant observation in an attempt to modify their 
behavior according to the particular needs of the institution. Efficiency 
is high on the list of desirable characteristics, which in turn is translated 
into greater productivity, predictability, and, ultimately, higher profits for 
the operation.103 
Shoprite Holdings, a South African retail multinational, is a major 
investor bringing shopping malls to countries all over Africa, and with 
them a new sense of business ethos and integration into the global capital-
ist economy. In the shopping malls of developing countries, “working in 
this ‘space of consumption’ puts the employee in the midst of this prom-
ise of modernity.”104 A study of Shoprite employees in Zambia examines 
how their tailored uniforms serve to distinguish them from the poverty of 
their surroundings. “Unlike the dreary smokestack environs of the facto-
ry worker, the mall employees’ labour power is consumed under glamor-
ised conditions.”105 The uniforms set Shoprite workers apart as privileged 
members of a global capitalist culture that extends beyond Zambia, and 
into a shared global consumer culture. 
Similarly, during the Westgate Mall attacks, the uniforms of the Na-
kumatt supermarket staff served to distinguish them as mall employees 
and to set them apart from the terrorists. The Kenyan security forces en-
tered the mall with little information about what was happening on the 
ground—much of which was distorted by the corporate news media net-
works reporting an inflated number of attackers. Since “there were just 
a lot of men without badges or any other identification waving guns in 
different corners of the mall,”106 it was difficult to know who was a civil-
ian and who was a terrorist. Emerging from their hiding place behind 
the meat counter, Nakumatt supermarket staff, Edwin Omoding, Daniel 
Mwongela, and Jared Odhiambo, drew attention to their uniforms for the 
security forces to see that they served the shopping mall and not the ter-
rorists.107
Many allegiances to Westgate Mall, however, were short-lived during 
the attacks, with security guards abandoning their posts and refusing to 
engage any further in protecting the mall. Private Kenyan security guards 
do not always have weapons, body armor, or portable radios,108 and what-
ever safety mechanisms were in place during al-Shabaab’s attacks—guard 
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force, bomb screenings, CCTV system—proved to be mostly cosmetic. 
The only confrontation the terrorists faced “was from a policeman guard-
ing a bank on the first floor who had fired, wounding Sudani [one of the 
al-Shabaab terrorists] in the lower right leg, leaving him limping.”109 While 
security service corporations are some of the fastest growing and lucra-
tive enterprises, security guards themselves are often poorly paid and, in 
many cases, come from poorer neighborhoods to work in upscale shop-
ping malls and other private complexes. Maurice Adembesa Ombisa, a 
security guard who died during the Westgate attack, commuted to the 
mall from the Kawangware slum. Similar to many other “private security 
guards in Nairobi, Ombisa worked 12-hour shifts, six days a week for the 
minimum wage of 10,912 shillings ($123 [per month])—without overtime 
or sick pay. It was a thankless job that ultimately cost him his life.”110 
Especially in the context of developing countries, even though shop-
ping mall workers are employed in a highly consumer-driven environ-
ment, many cannot themselves afford to engage in acts of conspicuous 
consumption. As mall employees are promised entry into a consumer 
culture, their uniforms simultaneously discipline them into corporate-ap-
proved behaviors and salaries. “The suggestive, imaginary reach of the 
mall brings the expanded global consumptive universe within the reach 
of the retail worker. Any perceived or real deprivation due to wage levels 
is thrown into sharp relief when working in such commodity havens.”111 
Even though retail employees share the space of the mall, they are often 
excluded as consumers.112
The Westgate atrocities highlighted the disjuncture between the world 
presented by the mall and the engulfing environment of poverty and polit-
ical struggle that define much of Kenya and neighboring Somalia.113 Ken-
yan “police officers are badly paid (about $200 a month) and often deeply 
corrupt. There is no 911 to call, and even if there were, it might not have 
mattered … because most officers do not have cars.”114 A lack of training 
for government forces meant that there was a total lack of coordination 
and communication between the Kenyan army and SWAT teams who en-
tered Westgate three and a half hours after the attacks began. When they 
did arrive, they began shooting at civilians as well as at each other.115 The 
Kenyan military and the Kenyan police also shot at each other across the 
corridors, killing a police officer, and wounding two more, in what official 
reports stated were acts of “friendly fire.”116 It is within the shopping mall 
and the sharp divisions of the urban environment that “the relations of 
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capital, technology, labor, and the unequal distribution of wealth engen-
der … conflict,”117 such as we have seen in the case of Westgate Mall located 
within the rift of the affluent Westlands neighborhood and surrounding 
slums.
These complex socioeconomic backgrounds give more context to why, 
in the aftermath of the Westgate siege, CCTV footage showed several Ken-
yan soldiers stealing merchandise, and exiting the mall with plastic bags 
full of goods.118 Ultimately, what was captured by the recorded footage 
served to reveal much more about the attacks than the simple binaries 
of victims and terrorists, and terrorists and authorities. The recordings 
revealed the many complexities that existed within the space of the mall, 
including the simultaneous abundance of privilege and poverty, the dis-
illusion of the mall’s capitalist imaginary, and the ambiguous fidelities of 
the privately hired security apparatus and state authorities.
Within the panopticon of the shopping mall, behavior is under con-
stant surveillance and control. The security apparatus becomes absorbed 
and integrated into the mall’s architecture along with the omnipresent 
CCTV surveillance systems, which, at times, feeds into the wider media. 
During the Westgate Mall attacks, there was a wealth of footage captured 
via the CCTV surveillance system, from wide-shot crowd control angles 
to high definition close-ups of events on the ground.119 Before al-Shabaab 
struck the mall, the CCTV footage broadcast on corporate news networks 
revealed that the cameras were in a “monitor” position, where people 
could be observed, at some distance, going about their activities. As the 
attacks commenced, news networks broadcast footage from camera an-
gles that moved into an “identify” setting, where the al-Shabaab terrorists 
were given close-up treatment as they fully embodied their central role 
for the cameras as protagonists of the Westgate Mall drama. By analyzing 
the video footage, it is clear that the CCTV operators followed the surveil-
lance guidelines prescribed by the official CCTV operation requirements 
manuals.
Ultimately, the Westgate Mall attacks were presented to international 
audiences “through the mass media in video imagery that has become 
the primary source of our cultural knowledge.”120 The next chapter ex-
amines how both state authorities and terrorists use media to broadcast 
their messages, with an emphasis on “the spectacle of terrorism.”121 The 
Westgate Mall tragedy illustrates the degree to which contemporary ter-
rorist organizations compete with mainstream media for a market share 
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of the promotion and publicity of terror attacks. Even as al-Shabaab broke 
the “commercial contract” of the shopping mall by disturbing the con-
sumption patterns therein, their actions served to disrupt only the par-
ticular, localized capitalist node of the shopping mall. Outside Westgate, 
the commodification of terror, the deployment of media networks, and the 
stimulation of the security industry meant that the wider capitalist struc-
ture went into overdrive, compensating for the shopping mall’s temporary 
financial loss. 
5. Spectacles of the Shopping Mall
Over the four days of al-Shabaab’s Westgate Mall attacks, the movements 
of the terrorists and their victims were captured on a multitude of record-
ing devices, including by over 100 CCTV cameras, and scores of personal 
phone cameras, and news cameras. Audiences all over the world watched 
as corporate media networks competed for minute-by-minute scoops, as 
al-Shabaab announced the success of the operation on their social media 
sites,1 and as government forces entered into the fray, also claiming vic-
tory.2 International audiences watched as the mall became a microcosm 
for the intersection of international terrorism, corporate news networks, 
and the military-industrial complex, as each attempted to grapple with the 
events and take control of the emerging narrative. All these elements coa-
lesced, turning the tragedy into one of the most viewed—and sustained—
media spectacles of recent times, with footage being constantly broadcast 
over the four days of the attack, and for some time after. 
In addition to inflicting mass casualties, with the increasing availabil-
ity of, and access to, information and communication technologies, even 
poorly-equipped and poorly-funded terrorist organizations can produce 
media “spectacles” to publicize their ideological messages. Through the 
media, terrorists wield a power that “is judged not by their actual num-
bers or violent accomplishments, but by the effect these have on their 
audience.”3 The casualties resulting from the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the 
2013 Westgate Mall attacks, and the 2015 Paris attacks were able to have 
detrimental effects on international publics, even though these atrocities 
were perpetrated by a small group of terrorists. The shock of such terror-
ist spectacles reverberates through corporate media networks as well as 
through a variety of social media channels.4 If communication is consid-
ered to be at the heart of human activity, then extremist communication is 
no exception, and terrorist attacks can be read as acts of political commu-
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nication. These ideological conflicts are taking place as much in the media 
as they are on the ground, and, in this sense, “terrorism is communication 
and, as such, is really aimed at the people watching.”5
The pervasiveness of mobile technology, social media connectivity, 
and corporate media network competition meant that the Westgate Mall 
attacks were inevitably turned into a global media spectacle that served 
both the terrorists, whose message was circulated around the world, and 
media networks, which were provided audiences and advertising reve-
nues.6 Because of this interdependence, “the relationship between media 
and terrorists is often described as a ‘symbiosis.’”7 Corporate news net-
works compete for audience share often by broadcasting sensationalist in-
formation, with terrorist acts providing a steady stream of content—espe-
cially for 24 hour news networks. In a perverse paradigmatic shift, “news 
organizations supply terrorists access to their audiences in exchange for 
the right to publish information about events that will entice consumers 
to purchase their products.”8 Similarly, terrorist organizations make full 
use of information and communication technologies to connect with each 
other, with other international networks, and, to communicate their vari-
ous messages to authorities and international audiences. Modern terrorist 
networks understand the need to create synergies with international news 
organizations in order for their message to be picked up and disseminated 
further across media platforms. This has become a relationship of mutu-
al interdependence “since both terrorists and news organizations benefit 
when information about terrorist attacks is turned into the commodity of 
news.”9
Increasingly, the conditions in which news media and entertainment 
media operate are aligning, especially in cases where the same parent cor-
poration owns both news channels and entertainment channels.10 Such 
sharing of business plans and content strategies means that previously 
unique areas of media are being integrated, making their products similar 
in style and substance.11 The fierce competition between media networks 
is largely a result of the structures in which they operate and the many 
commercial pressures they face. In order to streamline the operations of 
media conglomerates, “many top media executives today come from the 
corporate world, and no longer from the ranks of journalists. They are less 
sensitive to the quality and truthfulness of pictures. In their eyes, the mar-
ket for information, the news business, is first and foremost a means of 
making profits.”12 The ways in which corporate news networks choose to 
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cover tragic events, such as terrorist attacks, are often “formulated to pro-
long the salience and news-worthiness of the event. This is done, in part, 
by frame-changing the evolving news story and by raising controversial is-
sues.”13 Entertainment and “news formats, or the way of selecting, organ-
izing, and presenting information, shape audience assumptions and pref-
erences for certain kinds of information,”14 and the ways in which news 
is packaged and presented influences the way audiences are expected to 
think about an event. It is becoming standard practice for media networks 
to turn stories into protracted dramas in which “violence is not something 
to be condemned but to be appropriated,”15 a key feature of how the West-
gate Mall attacks were represented by news networks all over the world.
While the proliferation of alternative sources of information may be 
regarded as more inclusive, and even more democratic, they remain large-
ly unaccountable to the notion of media ethics. As news media rush to 
broadcast their latest findings regarding a media-saturated event, they 
often release not only unverified information, but sensitive pieces of in-
formation—ones that could ultimately have consequences for the victims 
and their families, as well as impacts on steering police operations and ter-
rorist actions in such situations. In many instances, reporters attempting 
to cover the active Westgate Mall attacks interfered with or influenced po-
lice operations. Outside the mall, crowds of reporters gathered and shared 
a variety of information, footage, and photos, regarding the whereabouts 
of Kenyan security forces, which may have “endanger[ed] the lives of the 
responders, and might have contributed to the prolonged siege, as the 
terrorists received live information detailing the armed response against 
them and were able to use this information to enhance their response.”16
Similarly, the media’s compromising of victims occurred during the 
Hyper Cacher supermarket siege in Paris in 2015. A number of media net-
works, including 24-hour news channel BFMTV, delivered a live broad-
cast during the siege revealing the location of six people who were hiding 
in the supermarket’s cold room, and endangered their lives in the process. 
As a result, in the aftermath of the events, victims and their families re-
sorted to suing these channels, arguing that “the working methods of me-
dia in real time in this type of situation were tantamount to goading some-
one to commit a crime.”17 Similarly, in the aftermath of the Westgate Mall 
attacks, the Media Council of Kenya released a report criticizing media 
coverage of the events, stating “that journalists, in their bid to report from 
the scene, breached the Code of Ethics by publishing graphic pictures of 
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the dead and injured.”18 The Media Council further found that the Kenyan 
media failed in its duties of informing the public, and made no attempts 
to give a “historical, cultural and social explanation of terrorism and in-
stead focused on [the] dramatic, most violent, bizarre, tantalising and 
brutal accounts of the attack magnifying the impact of their horrifying 
brutality.”19 In an attempt to call for unity in the face of public anger and 
confusion, the Kenyan government promoted the Twitter hashtag “we are 
one,” which was subsequently subverted into “we are wondering” when no 
official reports were forthcoming in the aftermath of the attacks.20 To date, 
there is still no definitive official report that comprehensively explains the 
details of the Westgate Mall atrocities. 
Digital Media and the Globalization of Terror
The reach of international terrorists extends into new parts of the world 
with the expansion of globalization processes, the proliferation of infor-
mation and communication technologies, and extremists’ access to these 
media tools. Terrorists are “no longer geographically constrained within a 
particular territory, or politically or financially dependent on a particular 
state, they rely on technologically modern forms of communication” to 
create global communities and connections.21 In this sense, terrorism, is 
“one side of a globalized modernity made possible by advanced technolo-
gy, geographical mobility, open flows of communication, and the breaking 
down of territorial divisions.”22
With the help of media networks, terrorists broadcast their unprec-
edented efforts at producing content, creating a cache of media texts.23 
Al-Shabaab is adept at digital communication, and delivers its message 
through a variety of media, including a radio station, Radio Andalus, 
with presentations and programs delivered in the English language, and 
its media center, the al-Kataib Foundation for Media Production, regu-
larly produces high quality films and documentaries that are fluent in 
the visual grammar and cultural codes of professional media texts.24 In 
today’s media saturated environment, terrorist organizations use the in-
ternet as the primary form of communication to release their messages to 
the world, whether to eager subscribers, to oppositional authorities, or to 
horrified publics. During the Westgate Mall attacks, al-Shabaab’s media, 
and especially its social media accounts, were operating at full force with 
multiple and constant communications over the four-day siege.25 The ter-
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rorist group live-tweeted “258 times between September 21 and September 
25”26 in order to claim direct responsibility for the attack, referring to it as 
the “Westgate spectacle.”27 This was the first time that a terrorist group 
used Twitter to make such an announcement.28 
In the aftermath of al-Qaeda’s September 11, 2001 attacks, terrorism 
supporters had to seek out specific clandestine websites in order to ex-
press their solidarity, and the terrorist group was beholden to traditional 
and mainstream media for the global dissemination and recognition of its 
messages. The form and structure of traditional mass media, including 
television and newspapers, meant that stories and footage needed to be 
verified by researchers and fact checkers at these networks. For a story 
to be publicized largely depended on editors and network owners, and 
whether they dared to engage in unverified sensationalization, or whether 
they upheld strict gatekeeping media principles of informing and educat-
ing the public. In the early 2000s, al-Qaeda was obliged to fax statements 
to corporate news networks with a hope that they would be noticed and 
circulated publicly.29 Even though some networks responded, other broad-
casters were able to simply ignore the extremist message, making it more 
difficult for supporters to access these pronouncements.30 In many ways, 
while traditional media forms still reported on terrorist activities, they 
served to withhold the circulation of terrorist messages.
With increased accessibility and ubiquity of digital media networks, 
“social media has changed the dynamic fundamentally. It has eliminated 
the terrorists’ dependency on mainstream media, reversing the relation-
ship by making mainstream media dependent on” terrorist media con-
tent.31 Making full use of information and communication technologies, 
“terrorists have direct control over the content of their messages by con-
structing and operating their own websites and online forums, effectively 
eliminating the ‘selection threshold.’”32 With the advent of digital media 
networks, all information and communication technology users, whether 
terrorist or otherwise, gain new controls over the dissemination of their 
own messages and publicize their own news without having to wait for the 
necessary permissions from editors and network owners. Those afforded 
the technological means are able to gain access to international audiences 
through digital technologies which, in many ways, are “designed to ac-
count for the entry of nonstate actors into the fields of war and diplomacy 
and to describe how information works as a weapon within this extensive 
field of combat.”33 Social media platforms offer open access to the public 
Target Markets—International Terror ism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall100
domain and allow for extremist ideologies to be shared with audiences be-
yond specific support groups of like-minded people. Terrorist ideologies, 
and “messages posted to social networking sites reach audiences immedi-
ately, and are extremely easy to access and redistribute, exponentially mul-
tiplying their audience.”34 Where once media was defined by gatekeepers, 
it is now beset by gatecrashers. 
Through digital communication technologies, terrorists and their sup-
porters are able to engage with other audiences on a number of fronts, 
where the “internet contributes to several activities of terrorist groups, 
such as fundraising, networking, and coordination, as well as informa-
tion gathering.”35 Terrorists are able to communicate their messages, to 
engage in their own research regarding best practices on their violent ac-
tivities, to educate others in their ideologies, and to build radical global 
communities of like-minded people.36 The rise of online extremist activity 
correlates directly with the rise of digital global networks and access to 
these technologies. In 1998, there was a total of fifteen officially defined 
terrorist organizations that had some kind of online presence. In 2005, 
extremist related online sites mushroomed to over 4,000.37 Most terrorist 
organizations use a multitude of digital technologies and are active on a 
number of media channels, including Facebook, Twitter, Whatsapp, You-
Tube, Google Earth, etc.38 In 2014, the Islamic State terrorist organization 
even managed to create an Arabic-language Twitter app, translated into 
English as “The Dawn of Glad Tidings,” which posted tweets directly from 
the group’s account to users’ personal accounts after soliciting their per-
sonal information.39 The app was seemingly straightforwardly uploaded 
to Google Play, the official application store for Android mobile devices, 
and was instantly and easily downloaded by many of the terrorist group’s 
supporters.40 It was used to channel “40,000 tweets in one day as ISIS 
marched into the northern Iraqi city of Mosul,” making the story “trend” 
due to the large and sustained volume of online traffic.41 The application 
has since been removed by Google.42 Communication through digital 
media has become the norm for people all over the world, provided they 
have access to the means of communication, and terrorist groups are no 
exception.43 
Extremists are especially active on the internet as various digital plat-
forms provide the requisite anonymity for their messages to be publicly 
dispersed, and also shelters these actors from the reach of authorities as 
they are able to better obscure their identities and locations.44 The ability 
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to operate multiple accounts is an integral feature of contemporary so-
cial media platforms allowing anyone with access and ability to operate 
numerous accounts with a high degree of anonymity. When and if an ac-
count is reported and shut down, this causes only a temporary disruption, 
and users are able to easily open alternative accounts. During the Westgate 
attacks, for example, al-Shabaab used five different Twitter handles.45 Any 
time one of these was taken down and made inactive, news media “report-
ers received an email from the group’s press office informing them that 
they could now follow” a new Twitter handle.46 
At times when there is an ongoing investigation of suspected terrorist 
activities, authorities and network owners will deliberately keep these so-
cial media platforms and accounts open in order to better monitor the on-
line messages and to gather information regarding the identity and loca-
tions of those communicating.47 Consequently, in many instances, those 
policing terror and opposing terrorist ideology are “liking,” “friending,” 
and “following” known terrorists’ Facebook and Twitter accounts, and 
adding to the audience and follower numbers of extremists. At one point, 
one of al-Shabaab’s Twitter accounts boasted more than 15,000 followers, 
including journalists and terrorism analysts.48 Thus, the anonymity af-
forded by digital media platforms has served to complicate discernable 
divides between terrorists, their supporters, policing authorities, and in-
quisitive members of the public.
Information technologies have allowed for both terrorists and antiter-
rorists to communicate back and forth with each other on a regular basis. 
Since waging war on the battlefield of the media has become a paramount 
concern for counter-insurgency operations, government efforts have been 
targeted at online message battles and promoting a direct counter-narra-
tive to terrorist ideologies. At one time, the traditional stance of authorities 
was to not deal with terrorists in any way. However, this denial of commu-
nication, or even acknowledgement of terrorist messages, is unsustaina-
ble in the age of digital communication, significantly changing the para-
digm. The US State Department has even created the Center for Strategic 
Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), which is a government unit 
dedicated to communicating with terrorist supporters in an effort to coun-
ter their ideologies with alternative messages.49 In the age of digital me-
dia, there has been a crucial transformation in the stance of authorities, 
with communication at the heart of the contemporary anti-terror strategy. 
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In order to speak directly to all these disparate audiences, terrorist 
networks have taken to communicating in a variety of different languag-
es, with an emphasis on English. In this way, terrorists respond to the 
contemporary tenets of globalization, and especially the global culture 
promoted by Western power holders. Communication in English belies 
two different trends. The first is that, since modern terrorist networks 
are made up of a collection of foreign fighters hailing from a variety of 
different countries and linguistic backgrounds, English then becomes the 
common language of communication for these disparate group of actors. 
The second is that the audiences of terrorist messages, whether willing 
or unwilling, are also global, and so many of the “official” and central-
ized terrorist communication channels use English as a unified narrative 
trend. The Islamic State’s Al Hayat Media Center, for example, “is spe-
cifically aimed at non-Arabic speakers, particularly younger viewers, and 
its output is closer to mainstream broadcast standards than” that of any 
other terrorist group.50 Similarly, al-Qaeda publishes an English language 
online magazine called Inspire, and factions of the Taliban post English 
language retorts online with the aim of communicating a message to in-
ternational audiences and to speak directly to Western authorities.51 
During the Westgate Mall attacks, al-Shabaab released a barrage of 
social media messages, mostly in English, with the aim of connecting 
with, and appealing to, an international audience.52 During the attacks, 
many of the messages and tweets emanating from al-Shabaab’s social 
media accounts showed a sophisticated use of the English language with 
phrases such as “reap the bitter fruits of your harvest,”53 and “#Westgate: 
a 14-hour standoff relayed in 1400 rounds of bullets and 140 characters of 
vengeance.”54 The widespread use of English on social media channels is 
interesting insofar as it complicates the normative figure of the terrorist—
once largely defined as a provincial, regressive other—who now appears 
more global, connected, and educated, and thus more difficult to define.55 
Social Media and Personal Narratives
Especially during times of upheaval and unrest, and in emergency situ-
ations, reporting on active events, including live reporting on platforms 
such as Twitter, has become a common feature of online news gathering 
and dissemination. Most recently, Twitter has proved its importance as the 
source of breaking news, rather than just an optimal medium for report-
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ing breaking news, in what is termed “real time.” During the Westgate 
Mall attacks, Twitter emerged as the main social media accompaniment 
to the tragedy, and its specific method of communication suited the needs 
of many of those involved.56 Twitter was key to relaying short, rapid mes-
sages from inside and outside the mall, and, importantly, was the chief 
communication platform used simultaneously by the terrorists and their 
supporters, the victims and their families, the local public, the news me-
dia, government officials, and international audiences. 
Because social media channels allow for a fast and efficient means 
of communicating news, people from outside and inside the mall were 
the first to raise the alarm about the unfolding tragedy, with many com-
menting on the sound of gunshots and explosions. The first public alert 
that something was amiss at Westgate Mall was relayed through Twitter 
within minutes of the first explosions by someone from outside the mall 
at 12:38 pm, a few minutes after al-Shabaab launched the attack.57 In quick 
succession, the next few tweets came from people within the mall, direct-
ly experiencing the attacks, followed by a barrage of tweets exchanging 
queries, concerns, fears, prayers, and other snippets of information—both 
true and false.58 These user-generated exchanges of information created a 
matrix of questions and answers regarding events on the ground, and es-
tablished narratives of the attacks long before the Kenyan authorities and 
the news media became involved. 
During the first few hours of the Westgate Mall attack, it became ap-
parent that not only was there little coordination between the Kenyan se-
curity forces on the ground, there was also poor coordination between 
them on digital communication platforms. The Kenya Police and Kenya 
Military were new to the platform having “joined Twitter less than ten 
days prior to the attack,”59 and many of the government departments were 
not connected to each other, leading the Ministry of Interior to publicly 
ask the Kenya Military account to “follow” it back on the second day of the 
siege. These disorganized attempts at communicating through the plat-
form prompted Twitter itself to ask Kenyan government units to verify 
their accounts.60 The National Disaster Operations Centre (NDOC Kenya) 
was the first government body to tweet about the Westgate attacks at 1:05 
pm, and “the first (local) media house to tweet about the incident was K24 
TV at 1.11 PM, 33 minutes and 17 seconds after the first tweet.”61 This was 
followed by a tweet from an international news organization, Associated 
Press, at 1:15 pm.62 Thus, ordinary people were the first in the chain of 
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communication to break the news about what was happening at Westgate 
Mall, followed by a government unit, then confirmed by a local news net-
work, and, finally, circulated by an international news organization.
After the news about al-Shabaab’s Westgate Mall attack became pub-
lic and was broadcast on local and international news channels the story 
gained worldwide momentum, and social media channels were abuzz 
with multiple messages posted by those hiding in the mall, along with 
those posted by al-Shabaab and their networks in Somalia and abroad, 
government authorities, emergency responders, and the general publics 
in Kenya and abroad. Westgate Mall became a site for the production, 
consumption, and commodification of terror, where corporate news net-
works, extremists, and government authorities all competed for control of 
the public story. There was an extraordinary array of messages volleyed 
back and forth from a variety of perspectives, arguing from a diversity of 
ideologies, pleading for prayers, asking for assistance, accusing, justify-
ing, boasting, gloating, and informing—and misinforming. 
With over 67,849 tweets posted over the four-day attack, the chaotic 
multiplicity of voices, opinions, and information relayed through Twitter 
made it increasingly difficult for authorities, terrorists, witnesses, and 
news networks to maintain a coherent narrative.63 The PSCU Digital Ken-
ya Twitter account, the official communications channel of the Kenyan 
Government, tried and failed to control the flow of information, tweeting: 
“We are appealing to Media to avoid showing photos of our @kdfinfo sol-
diers. Kindly, Only tweet what you are absolutely sure about #Westgate.”64 
In another tweet, “the Kenya Police asked a Twitter user to delete a mes-
sage that contained pictures of military helicopters preparing to launch an 
attack on the mall,”65 and the Kenyan Disaster Operation Center contacted 
a news channel asking it to delete a story. Through these failed attempts 
at controlling information, it becomes apparent that in the sphere of dig-
ital communication “censorship and regulation are alien to the nature of 
social media,”66 and unverified stories receive the same circulation and 
publicity as official pronouncements, further eroding the concept of me-
dia gatekeeping.
Despite the Kenyan government’s attempts at separating fact from fic-
tion, it too was guilty of releasing a great deal of false information.67 Many 
of the news items released, even though false, were capitalized upon by 
anti-terror authorities at home and abroad, and were used to align with 
wider political interests and foreign policy concerns, especially in the for-
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mation of the global narrative of the “war on terror.” For example, in the 
aftermath of the attacks, there was an immediate backlash against Somali 
refugees in Kenya, with the Joint Committee on Administration and Na-
tional Security, and Defence and Foreign Relations recommending that 
the Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps “be closed and resident refugees 
repatriated to their country of origin.”68 The Westgate Mall attacks became 
a blank slate upon which a multitude of fears were projected. Some of the 
unsubstantiated information relayed by witnesses, the media, and govern-
ment sources, included: there were ten to fifteen terrorists; the attackers 
took hostages and tortured them; one of the terrorists dropped his gun, 
changed his clothes, and slipped into the crowd of people escaping the 
mall; and that the terrorists were a coalition of Somalis, Kenyans, and 
Arabs, led by a white woman.69 Even Interpol became embroiled in the 
circling of misinformation and “issued an international arrest notice for 
Samantha Lewthwaite, a British woman who is the widow of one of four 
London suicide bombers.”70 When news of Lewthwaite’s implication was 
created through false social media stories and on news networks, it was 
al-Shabaab who later made the correction, tweeting: “We have an adequate 
number of young men who are fully committed & we do not employ our 
sisters in such military operations #Westgate.”71 Thus, through social me-
dia platforms, terrorists are afforded the opportunity to directly oppose 
official pronouncements with their own personal narratives.
Information and communication technologies allow for users to gen-
erate their own narratives and social realities, and these same privileges 
are extended to terrorist organizations and their supporters. Through a 
variety of online communication platforms and social media campaigns, 
terrorists “can directly share their positions—on their own terms and in 
their own words—to shape media coverage of their actions,”72 even as they 
perform heinous acts. During the Westgate Mall attacks, al-Shabaab’s 
tweets repeatedly attempted to justify their actions by constantly referring 
to atrocities perpetrated by Kenyan troops in Somalia. They also attempt-
ed to highlight themselves as protagonists taking center stage in the West-
gate Mall story by live-tweeting the events,73 and by announcing a series 
of heroic justifications, including: “The Mujahideen entered #Westgate 
Mall today at around noon and are still inside the mall, fighting the #Ken-
yan Kuffar inside [sic] their own turf.”74 The term “Mujahideen,” meaning 
holy warriors in Arabic, was used repeatedly in al-Shabaab’s online post-
ings to imbue the Westgate gunmen with a heroic status. In another tweet 
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posted on one of al-Shabaab’s accounts, the attackers were further hailed 
as “Westgate Warriors.”75 The seminal phrase coined by Jenkins in 1974 
that “terrorism is theater” has never sounded louder than in the contem-
porary media-saturated environment, where extremists have positioned 
themselves as protagonists in their own mediated dramas.76 During the 
Westgate attacks, al-Shabaab said as much, tweeting that “the mesmeric 
performance by the #Westgate Warriors was undoubtedly gripping, but 
despair not folks, that was just the premiere of Act 1.”77 
Commodification of Terror and Media Productions
As with most ideological battles, narrative construction and opposition 
take center stage, and play out in a variety of available media and digital 
platforms. Modern terrorist identities are created through a multitude of 
different media platforms, including self-produced films, social media 
campaigns, applications, and videogames. Much extremist video footage 
is expertly filmed, edited, and distributed, and shows a sophisticated un-
derstanding of the medium of film, including the use of dramatic license 
and synchronization of music and image. One al-Qaeda supporter, Younis 
Tsouli, identifies as “Irhabi007,”78 meaning Terrorist 007 in Arabic, in 
order to endow himself with elements of spy thrillers and movie culture. 
Despite terrorists’ outspoken disavowal of the corruptions of Western cul-
ture, the connection between popular cultural artifacts such as movies 
and videogames and terrorist activity can be read in many of their online 
narratives, and terrorists are fluent in the language of media texts. 
In the contemporary era, it has become the norm for terrorists to re-
cord themselves before an attack in order to validate their actions and to 
leave behind a record in the form of an autobiography. In the age of digi-
tally-enabled international terrorism, audiences are key to the action, and 
have become privy to viewing an event from a variety of different angles. 
Advances in digital technology and ubiquitous CCTV footage has meant 
that audiences are not only able to witness footage from “within” a terror-
ist attack, but often footage that is recorded by the perpetrators themselves 
as they commit their atrocities. For example, French extremist Mehdi 
Nemmouche used a GoPro-style camera when he killed four people at the 
Brussels Jewish Museum in 2014,79 as did Mohamed Merah who recorded 
“a series of attacks in which he killed seven people” in 2012.80 Following 
the trend, during the attack on the Hyper Cacher supermarket in Paris in 
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2015, Amédy Coulibaly wore a GoPro camera as he took hostages. Audi-
ences confronted with a terrorist’s first-person point of view footage, are 
obliged to, willingly or unwillingly, become part of the spectacle. Produc-
ing subjective-view footage, terrorists simultaneously shoot weapons and 
camera footage, while those watching become the simulated shooter, see-
ing what the attacker sees and doing what the attacker does—techniques 
normally employed in videogames. 
Such comparisons between terrorist activities and video game content 
have become a discursive norm. In first-person-shooter videogames “con-
flict is experienced from an embodied, subjective viewpoint, rather than 
from the detached overhead view that is common in other types of games. 
The simulation of embodiment connects players to a character and en-
courages them to identify with the character’s experiences and motives.”81 
The structure of a videogame has even been utilized in terrorist recruit-
ment and training methods whereby in some clandestine operations re-
cruits are required to pass “through a series of tests in password protected 
websites and restricted chat rooms before [being] accepted and joining the 
terrorist group.”82 Abu Sumayyah Al-Britani, a British fighter for the Is-
lamic State, describes the act of shooting as being: “better than, what’s 
that game called, Call of Duty? It’s like that, but really, you know, 3D. You 
can see everything’s happening in front of you.”83 Thus, everyday cultural 
practices and videogame enthusiasm and proficiency can then be used in 
the enactment of violence outside of the mediated text. 
Through mediated communication, and especially through cultural 
texts, both terrorists and anti-terrorists communicate in a shared language 
based on similar cultural media codes. The US government similarly uses 
entertainment products to bridge the gap between real and symbolic vi-
olence with appeals to mainstream commercial media forms. Films and 
videogames “work like advertisements for the military lifestyle, interpel-
lating players into a military mind-set and turning them into ‘virtual cit-
izen-soldiers,’ ready to accept the legitimacy of hard power and willing to 
apply it to virtually any social problem.”84 The US government produces 
its own videogames, including the US Army’s America’s Army and the US 
Marines’ Full Spectrum Warrior. These games “allow players to slay terror-
ists in fictionalized and Orientalized cities in frameworks based directly 
on those of the US military’s own training systems.”85 In these forms of 
popular entertainment, the distinction is blurred “between virtual enter-
tainment and remote killing,”86 and to make these games more appealing 
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“control panels for the latest US weapons systems—such as the latest con-
trol stations for the pilots of armed Predator drones […] now imitate the 
consoles of PlayStations, which are, after all, very familiar to recruits.”87 
Both the terror and the anti-terror stances justify their particular forms of 
mediated violence and encourage the dissemination of these texts across 
media platforms. In this sense, “the spectacularization of fear and the in-
creasing militarization of everyday life have become the principal cultural 
experiences shaping identities, values, and social relations”88 where the 
“threat of terrorism and violent crime provides the state with the legiti-
mating power to increase its security and militaristic directions.”89 
The war on terror has been actively promoted as a communication and 
military strategy in a variety of cultural texts serving to “position milita-
rism at the center of public policy and social life.”90 In many ways, such 
Western media efforts “only seem to be providing more raw material for 
Isis’s image library. Hollywood has even been accused of setting the tone, 
with its dark, doomsday scenarios, not to mention its own expensive re-
cruitment films, from Top Gun to Transformers, made with the coopera-
tion (and conditional approval) of the US military.”91 Similarly, the US De-
partment of State often overlays its own anti-terror messages edited with 
violent extremist footage, creating a hybrid collage of terrorist brutality, 
including “gruesome images of beheadings and executions.”92 The US De-
partment of State’s Twitter site, Think AgainTurn Away, regularly “links 
to Isis-related news stories” to highlight their depravity, but in doing so 
also gives the terrorist group further publicity. This strategy only helps 
to normalize violence, and anti-terror media efforts often engage in the 
creation, circulation, and consumption of terrorist violence. For example, 
when the Islamic State released a recruitment video using snippets of the 
Grand Theft Auto videogame, the US Department of State parodied this 
very same footage with their own anti-terror message that reads: “Don’t let 
Isis be your controller!” Over time, “Isis supporters have parodied Think 
AgainTurn Away’s parodies. It becomes a hall of mirrors.”93 Since “the 
spectacle of terrorism trades in moral absolutes whether it makes such 
claims in the name of religion or human rights,”94 representations of vio-
lence in the media escalates as each side of the war on terror rationalizes 
its actions even as they produce more violent media content.
Previously, one of the key differences between how this violence was 
represented on both sides of the divide was typically through the art direc-
tion and choice of camera angles: messy, blood-splattered close-up shots 
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of death favored by extremists, versus clean and detached wide shots fa-
vored by state authorities, and often delivered by technologies of distance 
such as drones and satellites.95 This distinction is gradually changing, 
and corporate media networks are increasingly pandering to more vio-
lent depictions of terrorist events. In a world defined by ideologies of glo-
balized economic liberalization, the ideational forces of marketization and 
commodification shape value systems and extend “beyond the commer-
cial realm into other spheres of human society,”96 and media coverage of 
atrocity is no exception. In such ways, “as image-based technologies have 
redefined the relationship between the ethical, political and aesthetic, they 
are largely used to service the soft war of consumerism and the hard war 
of militarism.”97 The ideological dovetailing between the state and cul-
tural industries can be seen most acutely during times of conflict, when 
it becomes especially pertinent to construct particular ideological alle-
giances and to counter others. The communication strategy wherein the 
state appeals to the expertise and persuasive skills of the entertainment 
industry has been prevalent since the early twentieth century. “American 
military propaganda was transformed during World War II when Holly-
wood directors went to work for the government and injected a sense of 
drama into documentary formats. The Why We Fight series, in particular, 
is well known for its rousing tone, appeals to the emotions, and, above all, 
its Walt Disney animation sequences.”98 Today, the war on terror is being 
“mediated through an overwhelming array of visual forms and media, 
including photography, sculpture, painting, film, television, advertise-
ments, cartoons, graphic novels, video games, and the Internet.”99 The 
formal articulation of terrorism has, in many ways, been propagated as 
much by the counter-narratives of the media and government authorities 
as it has by acts of terror. 
The discourse of terrorism is propagated from multiple angles and 
players, including the terrorists who enact violence in public space; the 
militarized response that engages in counter violence; the security appa-
ratus that locates, observes, and monitors; the corporate news and social 
media networks that circulate and sensationalize; and the authorities that 
capitalize on terrorism for creation of policy and deployment of retaliatory 
action at home and abroad. The narrative of terrorism is being fed by the 
input of all these actors and activities, and, with the aid of information and 
communication technologies, “is constantly retold and re-evoked by wid-
er audiences.”100 As the US enacts such tactical operations as “Burnish-
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ing the Steel,”101 audiences all over the world have grown accustomed to a 
seemingly unending cycle of mediated violence, obtrusive surveillance of 
public and private spaces, intensified militarization of spaces of consump-
tion, and increased commodification of terror. Although the militarism of 
everyday spaces since September 11, 2001 has been most actively promoted 
by the United States, the powerful anti-terror discourse has become global 
in its reach and influence.
Through mediated cultural texts, the parallels between corporate cap-
italism and terrorism can be read most acutely at the symbolic level and 
in many of the images and recorded footage that emerges during global 
tragic events. “While the merging of terror, violence, and screen culture 
has a long history, a new type of spectacle—the spectacle of terrorism—
has emerged in the post-9/11 world, inaugurated by the video images of the 
hijacked planes crashing into the World Trade Center,”102 and all the sub-
sequent cultural texts these images engendered. Nowhere was the inter-
section of corporate capitalism and terrorism more symbolically manifest 
than in the spectacle of terror produced on September 11, 2001, which, as 
has been mentioned countless times, “looked like a disaster film.”103 Be-
cause most international audiences experience terrorist atrocities through 
the media, a common initial reaction to the brutal images and footage 
emanating from disastrous situations is to associate them with the fic-
tion of film.104 Moreover, during major contemporary terror spectacles, 
news media networks provide all the hallmarks of a film production, and 
expertly provide and set up cameras, personnel, sets, newsrooms, editing 
suites, pundits, reviews, interviews, and audiences. In similar fashion to 
the highly orchestrated visual culture of terrorism produced in the wake 
of September 11, 2001, footage of al-Shabaab’s Westgate Mall attacks was 
repetitively circulated in a steady stream of images that were instantly 
consumed by audiences struggling to understand the sudden penetration 
of violence into the predictable everyday backdrop of a city central urban 
commercial venue.105
The confined space of Westgate Mall provided a camera-ready action 
set for al-Shabaab’s attacks, and became a microcosm for the filmed ac-
tion viewed through the lenses of hundreds of cameras, beamed into the 
centralized command station of a remote security office, and then via 
media networks. During the attacks, there was an extraordinary amount 
of footage recorded by “more than 100 security cameras inside the mall, 
video from television crews and modest cellphones, as well as still photo-
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graphs.”106 Audiences watching the tragic scenes unfold on the news were 
presented with the precise moment when shoppers, only a few minutes 
ago engaged in all kinds of commercial activities, were transformed into 
frightened captives attempting to escape from view.107 With omnipres-
ent CCTV security cameras, not much could escape being recorded, and 
the architecture of the typical mall designed as an open, panoptic space 
worked against those trying desperately to avoid detection. 
The CCTV cameras rolled for most of the first day of the attacks like a 
reality television show in which audiences all around the world were taken 
inside the mall to watch what was happening on the ground.108 News or-
ganizations released streams of video from the multiple security cameras 
and from personal cameras, capturing much of the rampage, including 
victims being killed or others hiding in the private areas reserved for staff 
and not normally traversed by mall visitors: in ventilation shafts, toilets, 
stairwells, and storerooms. The cameras also recorded the more quiet mo-
ments taking place “behind the scenes” when the attackers seemingly de-
cided to no longer pursue any more victims, and to take refuge in the Na-
kumatt supermarket’s storeroom. The security cameras recorded several 
hours of the attackers’ actions, including relaxing and temporarily putting 
down their weapons, tending to one of their wounded accomplices, eating 
and drinking, taking turns to pray on a mat on the ground, and audio-free 
hours in which the perpetrators idled while waiting to be confronted by 
government forces.109 
The acute juxtaposition of extreme violence and the everyday color-
ful commercial products and advertising billboards of the shopping mall 
presents some of the most memorably shocking images to emerge from 
the Westgate massacre. After the attacks, Reuters photographer Goran To-
masevic described the scenes at Westgate Mall as a warzone, and that al-
though he had “been stationed in Syria during the worst of their devastat-
ing civil war, not to mention Libya, Kosovo, and Afghanistan,” Tomasevic 
said “the massacre in the upscale mall was still more shocking.”110 Instead 
of the generic placeless familiarity and predictability of the commercial 
surroundings, Westgate Mall became imbued with the signifiers of war 
ricocheting through its fantasy-laden corridors. 
The atrocities, combined with the ways in which the public and the 
international news media covered the events, produced powerfully evoca-
tive images that transformed the ordinary and everyday space of the mall 
into a defamiliarized world where the boundaries of reality became in-
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creasingly blurred. There is a surreal quality to much of the footage and 
many of the photos that emerged from the attacks, and an acute contrast 
between the world of the real—frightened and injured people cowering in 
the aisles of the mall—and the pristine world created by the surrounding 
corporate culture—aisles filled with colorful products and advertisements 
featuring smiling, happy people.111 In an image of the Westgate attacks 
reminiscent of a horror film poster, it is difficult to untangle reality and 
fantasy wherein a body lies in a pool of blood directly under a macabre 
advertisement for a Halloween event due to take place at the mall the fol-
lowing week.112 Highlighting the symbolic capitalism/terrorism nexus are 
further images of the wounded and dead being pushed out of the mall 
in shopping trolleys, themselves now ironically a “product” of the mall 
and of the massacre. The striking effect that is produced during these 
atrocities is the manner in which these images defamiliarize and confuse 
a peaceful, casual, or sunny setting with the extreme violence that has 
occurred. With the help of information and communication technologies, 
never have international audiences been presented with such a plethora of 
imageries of violence creeping into their everyday lives. 
Except, international audiences have been presented with violent 
imagery in the media, but in different circumstantial settings and with 
different effects—as entertainment or news that does not elicit the same 
audience or government reaction. Such an intersection of different forms 
of violence is exemplified by an image in which armed Kenyan soldiers 
crouch at the entrance of Westgate Mall cinema and are framed by a poster 
of the film Elysium,113 making it hard to separate the terrorism-induced 
theater from the corporate entertainment theater and the sanitized vio-
lence packaged as a blockbuster film. As the Kenyan soldiers are pictured 
during their disorganized rescue attempt, they are overseen by a gun-tot-
ing Matt Damon, and the unwavering certainty of commodified corporate 
culture. In this cinematic representation of warfare, the Hollywood hero 
is likely to be successful, translating into the victory of corporate cultur-
al hegemony. French philosopher Jean Baudrillard reminds us that even 
though the Vietnam War signaled a colossal moral and tactical loss, the 
United States was able to not only recoup, but to achieve success in the 
many films made subsequently and to be victorious at the box office.114 
Two days into the siege, Kenyan security forces detonated a rocket-pro-
pelled grenade, effectively destroying the mall, shutting down the power, 
and wiping out the camera feeds.115 Without a complete visual reference 
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from which to construct a narrative of events, what could not be seen on 
screen either did not exist as part of the Westgate Mall attacks narrative, or 
could not be verified—especially since witness testimonies, news reports, 
and government statements were often contradictory and even false.116 By 
sifting through recorded footage gathered through CCTV surveillance, 
news networks, and personal mobile cameras, one can begin attempting 
to piece together how the events unfolded. However, even then, the story 
of the Westgate Mall attacks, like any film, can only be represented as frag-
mentary and refractory, and its interpretation subject to edits and camera 
angles. To date, a documentary film titled Terror at the Mall contains one 
of the most comprehensive collections of footage and images that emerged 
from the attacks, and includes a variety of witness interviews. The direc-
tor, Dan Reed, and his team sifted through more than 2,000 hours of 
footage, witness testimonies, and “information that none of the investigat-
ing authorities had reached.”117 One of the survivors of al-Shabaab’s attack 
notes “that the film offered the first true depiction of what had happened 
that afternoon in Nairobi, a story that was muddled and meddled with 
by [sic] conflicting reports coming from media, government, and foreign 
intelligence agencies.”118 
Not to be outdone by official media networks in the aftermath of the 
Westgate Mall attack, al-Shabaab’s own dedicated media unit, al-Kataib 
Foundation for Media Production, released a feature-length film titled 
The Westgate Siege: Retributive Justice, which was “distributed on Twitter 
on February 21, 2015 in two versions: one in Arabic and another in Eng-
lish.”119 Information and communication technologies have thus enabled 
terrorists to not only present their own propaganda and versions of events, 
but to do so in a highly professional and packaged way and to compete 
with official media networks. Additionally, with the prevailing capitalist 
forces encircling Westgate Mall, it is unsurprising that the tragedy was 
commodified almost immediately after the attacks, with street hawkers 
in Nairobi touting “different movies depicting the attack and hundreds 
of copies were sold on the first day they became available.”120 One of these 
documentaries was titled Terror Attack at Westgate. It “has little in the way 
of a plot or commentary, [and] was manufactured by a group called Titanic 
Videos,”121 an organization that pirated the MGM lion logo as part of its 
branding. 
The wealth of visual material and the abundance of recordings that 
emerged from the Westgate attacks were used by the various sides of 
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the war on terror, as well as by opportunistic others, in their efforts to 
condemn, congratulate, or profit from the atrocities. The fluid combina-
tion of different types of commodities and marketing activities within 
the same space of the shopping mall suspends and decontextualizes the 
normative and discursive differences between capitalism and terrorism, 
imbuing them with attributes of other objects strategically placed around 
them so as to create a complementary and commerce-driven continuous 
narrative. The next chapter concludes with an examination of how the 
constant threat of terrorism has been similarly commodified in the form 
of the ubiquitous security apparatus. Under the rubric of neoliberal prac-
tice, terrorist activities are rendered profitable for both terrorists and those 
opposing them.
6. Conclusion:       
 Specters of the Shopping Mall
“Westgate is back, shoppers said with their shillings.”1
Spectacular and contemporary architectural symbols of modernity—
whether skyscrapers or shopping malls—that have been scarred by terror-
ist attacks or that are considered likely targets are infused with a curious 
mix of exhilaration and fear. Affected venues are defiantly reconstructed 
or injected with renewed fervor and people are encouraged to visit or revis-
it these spaces as a way to defy terrorist ideologies. In the hope of return-
ing to these everyday places of work and leisure a semblance of the nor-
mal, people are persuaded to enter these specter-filled city central sites, 
but they do so in the knowledge of the history of violence that has befallen 
these spaces and are troubled by the possibility of future attacks. These 
public venues “become places ‘in terror,’” and the surveillance apparatus 
and security services deployed to protect them do “not alleviate this terror 
in place, but rather re-assert it.”2 While such fears may be overcome with 
time, “terror is inscribed upon places” and “produces and reflects a kind of 
cultural neurosis.”3 The constant reminders of past and potential violence 
are issued by both terrorists aiming to instill public fears, by authorities 
striving to win the war on terror, and by private interests attempting to 
profit from the security industry.4
Westgate Mall has now been “reconstructed using government funds 
as a symbol of the resilience of Kenya’s capitalist path.”5 This is testament 
to how shopping malls, and the act of shopping, continue to be politicized, 
and how consumer cultures are being actively promoted through the com-
bined efforts of government and private interests. The new Westgate Mall 
cannot afford another terrorist attack and so economic and ideological dif-
ferentiation and exclusion policies will be more forcibly enacted, further 
feeding many foundational problems and exacerbating the grievances 
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voiced against such private developments. As expected, the reconstruct-
ed Westgate Mall has invested heavily in a more robust security archi-
tecture by installing “x-ray machines, explosive detectors and bullet-proof 
guard towers,”6 and by complying and collaborating with international 
anti-terrorism standards and organizations.7 In the aftermath of the at-
tacks, “IRG, the Israeli security company hired in 2014, insists that with 
its overhaul, Westgate is the safest mall in Nairobi today. Managing Di-
rector Haim Cohen’s team of ex-Israeli commandos has trained the mall’s 
security personnel assiduously.”8 This new security-minded environment 
of the shopping mall requires “a geography of fortifications and enclo-
sures; increasing demand for spatial and social insulation; and reliance on 
technologies of security, control, and surveillance.”9 While these increased 
security measures may work towards mitigating against future terrorist 
attacks, they simultaneously work towards the exclusion of many other 
kinds of activities and people considered undesirable to the commercial 
world of the shopping mall.
In order for the military-industrial complex to continue being prof-
itable, terrorism is a constant threat and is perpetuated as such. In this 
regard, terrorism is good for business and keeps the security industry 
buoyed as it continues to construct ever more impregnable structures 
that require constant improvement by both security agents and security 
technologies. In an ultimate form of exchange that is exemplary of mar-
ket forces, the fear of future attacks encourages people to trade their civil 
liberties for increasingly pervasive forms of security, and all the panoptic 
invasions these entail. Investing in the security mindset promotes both a 
culture of vulnerability as well as “a belief that personal security can be 
purchased; that with the right accessories, [people] can make themselves 
impervious to foreign threats.”10 
Since al-Shabaab’s 2013 Westgate Mall attack, the number of private 
security guards in Kenya has swelled “and there are now about 300,000 
employed by some 429 private security firms—vastly outnumbering Ken-
ya’s police force of 60,000.”11 These security features have been extended 
from the shopping mall into other areas of public life, and the Kenyan 
government is working with telecommunications company Safaricom “to 
lay out a national surveillance programme, including the installation of 
tamper-proof CCTV cameras in most major streets in Nairobi and Mom-
basa. While such projects might trigger an outcry about privacy, in Kenya 
reaction has largely been muted, driven in part by shock over al-Shabaab’s 
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tactics.”12 Terror and the war on terror provoke a state of permanent fear 
among international publics, each achieving its specific objects by capital-
izing on the same discourse. Promoted through the constant media focus, 
people encounter a normalized and entrenched daily narrative “that is in-
extricably tied to the spectacle of terrorism and the move toward a state of 
emergency.”13 
As the dust settles over Westgate Mall, other large-scale developments 
are being constructed within the ever expanding influence of capitalist ac-
quisition to offer far more than Westgate ever did in terms of commodities, 
entertainment, services, and security. One of these, “Migaa—a 20-minute 
drive from the rubble of the Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi, Kenya—
is a new development complete with a private hospital, conference centre, 
‘shop till you drop’ mall facilities and a 200-acre executive golf course.”14 
In addition are a variety of other mixed-use complexes springing up all 
over Nairobi, including Garden City and The HUB.15 A few miles down 
the road from Westgate Mall, the Two Rivers Development is billed as 
“the largest lifestyle centre within Sub Saharan Africa, outside of South 
Africa,”16 and features “$10m in security technology, which has become 
a major concern for shoppers following the 2013 Westgate mall attack.”17 
The new incarnations rising from Westgate Mall’s ashes are self-enclosed 
mega developments guarded ever more closely by an all pervasive—and 
invasive—security apparatus.
Privatizing Public Space
In a series of hybrid private-public partnerships, and by instituting their 
own private security apparatus, corporate private spaces are no longer un-
der the control of, and in many ways no longer answerable to, local au-
thorities. In many cases, “by resorting to private methods of order mainte-
nance rather than relying on assistance from the police, property owners…
ensure that policing strategies within their territories complement their 
profit-maximisation objectives.”18 Privatized spaces, from shopping malls 
and mixed-use complexes have “been removed from the hands of the local 
authority, and hence the public domain.”19 While the commercial property 
itself is often privately funded and financed, the public services around it 
in terms of public transport hubs and surrounding roads are often govern-
ment- or publicly-funded. Once people cross the private property thresh-
old of the shopping mall, they become consumers governed by the rules 
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and regulations of the mall. Contemporary shopping malls are architec-
turally designed to create a reality that operates according to the logic of 
capitalism—one that can sideline the practicalities of the outside world. 
Paradoxically, shopping malls are insular worlds that deliberately dis-
tance themselves from prevailing economic, political, and social challeng-
es, even as they respond to the dominant anti-terror discourse in order 
to strengthen their security apparatus. The critical analysis of shopping 
malls serves to highlight the increasingly fractured meaning of the “po-
litical.” While malls do not tolerate disruptive forms of political behavior, 
they revel in other overtly “political” displays of patriotism, especially dur-
ing times of crisis and as a response to terrorist activity. The active polit-
icization of shopping enacted by governments and businesses is despite 
the fact that the typical shopping mall expressly prohibits any form of 
challenging political activities like protests and worker strikes. The mall is 
simultaneously politicized and depoliticized depending on the prevailing 
discourse. Within the world of the shopping mall, both terrorist strikes 
and labor strikes are equally prohibited. Thus, within the space of the 
shopping mall, the very notion of the “political” is being rearticulated by 
private interests: to spend money is framed as political, but to protest low 
wages is a subversive breach of mall regulations. 
Most shopping malls have a strict policy of barring any form of overt 
political behavior despite the fact that, in some cases, malls may provide 
government services such as the “City Hall in the Mall” office in Florida’s 
Coral Springs mall, which provides passport services and fingerprint-
ing.20 In the case of the Mall of America, “although parts were designed to 
mimic Main Street and it benefited from public financing when built,”21 
it was officially designated as private property in the 1999 Wicklund case 
when animal-rights activists protesting the sale of fur-coat were declared 
trespassers.22 In 2014, this designation was challenged by around 3,000 
“Black Lives Matter” protestors who targeted the Mall of America for pro-
test and disrupted the busy Christmas shopping period to highlight racial 
injustice.23 The organizers of the protest argued that the mall occupied an 
ambiguous space between public and private, giving people the right to 
protest there. 
People are likely to regard a mall as a public space if they are obliged to 
visit these arenas to engage in a variety of necessary daily activities such 
as government services, health checks, and postal services. The strategic 
veering between public and private activities and facilities only serves to 
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make further opaque the relationship between government and private 
interests and to further complicate the public’s relationship to shopping 
malls. The mall provides a space for social life, and the satisfaction of daily 
needs, but within a very narrowly defined sense of community. Its gravita-
tional pull is fashioned from its own unique form of community engage-
ment predicated on commercial rather than social or political ideals. As 
shopping malls purport to offer everything under one roof, the conflict 
between private and public is accentuated.24 While the mall promises the 
world, it delivers a world—one that is shaped and dictated by specific mar-
ket forces at the expense of other social needs. 
Social Contract vs. Commercial Contract
Along with the reconstruction of Westgate Mall in the aftermath of al-
Shabaab’s attack, there have been simultaneous calls for the demolition of 
the neighboring Deep Sea slum in order to rid the city center of the visual 
pollution of poverty and to clear the way for a new road project termed 
the “missing link,”25 a name that symbolically highlights its evolutionary 
imperative in the context of a modernizing Kenya. The development is 
funded by the European Union—an entity that has distanced itself from 
any human rights issues resulting from the project, with representatives 
from the EU stating “that their role was limited to financing and super-
vising the road construction and that responsibility for any eviction and 
resettlement lay with the Kenyan government.”26 For such modernization 
projects to be realized there is a basic violence, actual and symbolic, that 
must be enacted. Such acts of “creative destruction” are argued to be nec-
essary to fulfill a nation’s economic visions of urban expansion in which 
reforms are “accelerated in order to create a better environment for doing 
business.”27
In their attempts to modernize and fit into a new liberalized global 
economy, developing nations are undergoing a series of urban growth 
schemes that are highly profitable for some, while they are decidedly dis-
missive of others—especially those who are unable to share in the new 
economic ideology. The poor and the disenfranchised figure little in these 
grand economic plans. As urban planners and corporate enterprises cap-
italize on middle-class fears of urban crime, cities are being reoriented 
according to the dictates of the security industry, with increasingly en-
closed and gated urban complexes comprised of “mixed-use” facilities 
Target Markets—International Terror ism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall120
complete with shopping malls, offices, hotels, and recreation centers. As 
such complexes are increasing in number and size they are being connect-
ed by private walkways and roads linking these islands of tranquility at the 
same time as they are being separated from more chaotic urban areas, fur-
ther eroding the notion of public space, and increasing hostilities against 
them.28 In this sense, the new shopping malls do not pretend to represent 
public spaces; “these privately owned emporia encourage discreet forms 
of economic exclusion and social regimentation. As entertainment and 
tourist landscapes, they are open only to those who can pay.”29 Increased 
private takeover of public spaces and resources has become especially ac-
tive in the aftermath of terrorist activity and in the name of security.
In many instances, governments in developing countries are only too 
happy to be released from the responsibility—and with it the accounta-
bility—of providing for their citizenries and are eager to pass on any 
developmental and infrastructure requirements to private interests.30 
If a government is unable “to provide the requisite infrastructure for a 
growing population, it is no surprise that private developers have stepped 
in.”31 With the liberalization of markets, crucial urban infrastructures 
and government functions are then necessarily privatized to come under 
the purview of profit-making corporations. The result, in many cases, is 
that people become “progressively unable to question corporate influence, 
challenge public officials, or engage in political dissent.”32 With the refor-
mulation of the government’s social contract into a private economic con-
tract, public services, like transportation and sanitation, once considered 
the responsibility of the state, are only provided for those who can afford to 
pay for them. Because many people pay high fees in order to live in gated 
communities, they expect that the privately managed housing estates will 
furnish them with a range of basic services, such as street maintenance 
and garbage collection. In these private spaces, “paying high fees, in effect 
taxes, in their local communities, members of these communities are apt 
to vote against new taxes that support the needs of the larger society.”33
As national interests become privatized under corporate control, these 
must abide by whatever particular corporate laws govern space and behav-
ior, including particular types of taxation and legislation.34 The govern-
ment’s relinquishing of responsibility and “the partial retreat of public 
authorities from the provision of collective consumption has left the peo-
ple’s everyday necessities to either the whim of private capital, the reach 
of the NGOs, or the mercy of charitable institutions.”35 Since the idea of 
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“development” is often heavily skewed towards “economic” development 
rather than any other form of social development, preferential treatment 
is given to investors, and various funds previously aimed at aid have in-
stead been injected into the capitalist infrastructure. In Kenya, for exam-
ple, “millions of pounds of British aid money to tackle poverty overseas 
has been invested in builders of gated communities, shopping centres 
and luxury property in poor countries” such as the CDC, formerly the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation.36 Projects include such devel-
opments as Nairobi’s Garden City, which will be home to east Africa’s larg-
est shopping mall.37 Even as the rhetoric of corporate social responsibility 
revolves around the power of enterprise to solve poverty issues, businesses 
blame governments for the conditions of the poor, arguing that “stronger 
government intervention is required.”38 As the government moves aside 
for corporations to take over provisions in the wealthier neighborhoods, 
slums and other impoverished districts of developing countries are ne-
glected by both private and government interests. 
The poor are often expected to fend for themselves, and many do so by 
organizing “self-help” schemes and engaging in informal markets or illicit 
activities. However, “by criminalizing every attempt by the poor…to use 
public space for survival purposes, law-enforcement agencies have abol-
ished the last informal safety-net separating misery from catastrophe.”39 
The development vacuum left by corporate and government disinterest 
is quickly filled by terrorist organizations, who attempt to gain legitima-
cy through provision of some basic services such as ad hoc healthcare, 
sanitation, and education schemes—the hallmarks of communal govern-
ance.40 Within Somalia, although largely disorganized and inconsistent, al-
Shabaab has established “a range of administrative bodies that are far more 
effective than those of the Somali National Government and its predeces-
sors.”41 Within this socioeconomic context, and since a link can be estab-
lished “between urban poverty and terrorism, the best strategy to limit the 
power of militant groups to seduce recruits is to fight poverty.”42 The ques-
tion of who should help alleviate conditions for the poor is tossed back and 
forth between the government, civil society organizations, and the market.
Escape from the Mall
The structures of malls are increasingly fortified by a panoptic securi-
ty apparatus in order to keep the money flowing within the walls of the 
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mall, and in order to keep out the undesirable and disruptive elements of 
modern society.43 Increasingly, the contemporary shopping mall “epito-
mises this carceral city,”44 and especially in places considered to be dan-
gerous—unsurprisingly often found in many developing nations where 
there is a sharp divide between affluence and impoverishment—shopping 
malls ward off external threats by employing a deliberately threatening 
security apparatus that is intentionally visible, and theatrically exhibits 
security sensors and metal detectors at entrances, and guards brandishing 
batons, and guns in some cases. In order to guard against violence, shop-
ping malls must themselves exhibit the outward signifiers of violence. 
In poorer neighborhoods, shopping malls are designed with security in 
mind from their conceptual stages, and according to the logic of the pano-
pticon.45 In this sense, the shopping mall and the prison share a common 
bond in many aspects of their design, and especially in the ideology of 
their architecture as a disciplining force.46 
Similarities between the prison and the shopping mall are exemplified 
by how easily one can be morphed into the other with little reconstructive 
design necessary for the conversion. The Headquarters shopping center in 
San Diego, for example, was developed “to capitalize on the former head-
quarters of the San Diego Police Department.”47 The mall still retains “a 
prominent 68-foot tall watch tower,” and original “fortress-like design.”48 
When the building still housed the police department, it was already 
moving towards an all-encompassing mall-like concept, and so required 
only minor modification into its current form. Before its conversion into 
a shopping mall, the “state-of-the-art facility brought all police operations 
together under one roof; administration, courts, jails, law library, crime 
lab, exercise areas, vehicle maintenance, and even a pistol range. In later 
years the headquarters even had a four-lane bowling alley, utilizing jail 
inmates as pinsetters.”49 Today, the mall’s website reminds visitors to “ex-
plore our fully restored 8 cell jail block which houses historic photos and 
police memorabilia. Also, don’t forget to snap a photo at our lineup wall. 
Jail cell block is located in between Kitson and Madison San Diego,”50 two 
of the retail stores in the mall.
Similarly, the Uruguayan Punta Carretas Penitentiary, once a notori-
ous emblem of the historical atrocities and political grievances of a mil-
itary dictatorship, exemplifies the expert rehabilitation of a prison into a 
shopping mall. The prison, originally built in 1895 to incarcerate mostly 
political prisoners was transformed into a shopping mall in 1994 with 
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few modifications to its main architectural and panoptic elements.51 Like 
Westgate Mall, and the socioeconomic pitfalls that surround it, Punta 
Carretas “is located in one of Montevideos’s most coveted residential loca-
tions.”52 The rising real estate cost of the area was key to the government’s 
decision to sell the land to developers, which ultimately rested on the fact 
that the prison was not a profit-making enterprise.
Not only was Punta Carretas Penitentiary unprofitable, the prison 
was unsuccessful at incarcerating inmates: in 1971, there was a mass out-
break of 111 prisoners, earning the escape a Guinness World Record.53 Of 
these, 106 were political prisoners, members of the urban guerrilla group, 
Tupamaros, “notorious for Robin Hood-esque economic redistribution 
stunts.”54 Many of these ex-prisoners are still living in the area and are 
encouraged, through the persuasive gravitational pull of the mall, to vis-
it the 215 stores replacing their former cells.55 While the prisoners may 
have escaped the penal institution, they are increasingly engulfed by the 
corporate capitalist institution of the shopping mall overtaking the neigh-
borhood.
In a deliberate act of erasing Punta Carretas’s past, “there are no tour 
guides or plaques to inform the 1.2 million visitors each month of the 
mall’s turbulent past.”56 Its developer, Mario J. Garbarino, noted: “We pre-
fer not to identify ourselves with the prison, although we did maintain 
some of its architectural elements.” The developer’s elision of history is 
a deliberate choice in order to “associate the mall with freedom.” 57 The 
word “freedom” in this instance is one associated with the “right” to shop. 
The developer continues by noting: “We have turned a prison into a space 
of complete freedom”—provided, of course, one buys into this particu-
lar phantasmagorical notion of freedom promoted through the shopping 
mall, through consumption, and through erasure of a traumatic past.58 
While the physical abuse of detainees in the building may be a thing of 
the past, arguably, the psychological conditioning and the carceral effect 
have only been enhanced through the premeditated structure—and stric-
ture—of the captivating and panoptic shopping mall environment.
Similarly, the newly reconstructed Westgate Mall, in its promotion of 
an ahistorical and ageographic space, is built upon the ruins of its for-
mer scarred self, and knowingly erases its troubled history of al-Shabaab’s 
terrorist violence. Since there is still no definitive government report on 
the details of al-Shabaab’s 2013 Westgate Mall attack, Patrick Gathara, a 
satirical cartoonist for Kenya’s The Daily Nation newspaper notes that “by 
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rebuilding the mall, we are covering over everything that we don’t know…
It’s a symbol of our continued and deliberate ignorance.”59 This act of eli-
sion has been extended into Westgate Mall’s marketing efforts with no 
mention of the terrorist attack in any of its social media accounts or public 
profiles. Even as Westgate Mall refrains from mentioning the atrocities, 
the memory of the attack is instilled in the new security apparatus con-
structed within the mall and the surrounding areas. Urban spaces scarred 
by terrorist attacks “both represent and avoid this trauma, enabling a play 
of remembering and forgetting,”60 depending on how useful the mem-
ory is to fulfilling a particular political or commercial agenda. Thus, al-
Shabaab’s attacks are remembered when it comes to extra enforcement 
of security, but people are persuaded to forget when the mall attempts 
to encourage people to shop within it. The atemporal and ageographic 
qualities of Westgate Mall enact a deliberate “amnesia without which the 
smooth advancement of its business would be impossible. If the traces of 
history were too evident and went beyond their decorative function, the 
mall would experience a conflict of functions and meanings: The mall’s 
semiotic machinery has to be that provided by its project alone.”61 
All around the newly built Westgate Mall banners drop from the ceil-
ing instructing customers to “Experience Lifestyle,”62 and this mantra is 
echoed by authorities as well as the media. During the 2015 opening cer-
emony of the reconstructed Westgate Mall, Inspector General of Police 
Joseph Boinett declared to a cluster of reporters that the terrorists “will not 
mess up our way of life.”63 Which particular way of life was he referring 
to, considering Kenya’s mutli-ethnic and multi-class society? The kind of 
lifestyle offered through the mall is one that can only be afforded by a mi-
nority of wealthy elite. After talking to the reporters, the Inspector Gener-
al “went on a shopping trip in Nakumatt’s entertainment store. He bought 
copies of George W. Bush’s Decision Points and Malcom Gladwell’s Outli-
ers.”64 The Inspector General’s choice of literature was strategic and sym-
bolic—one book to promote the war on terror, and the other to promote a 
capitalist ethos. By promoting shopping malls, authorities, city planners, 
and private interests are promoting the notion of “modernity” as a type of 
urban lifestyle being created and sold in these commercial venues. 
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Chimeras of Consumption
In countries where the mall is a relatively recent phenomenon, the lifecy-
cle of shopping centers has only just begun. However, even as shopping 
malls are breaking new ground all over developing countries that have 
eagerly adopted a neoliberal ideology to become part of the global econo-
my, these commercial venues are experiencing a decline in other areas of 
the world. Even though megamalls such as the Mall of America and the 
West Edmonton Mall continue to thrive out of sheer force of spectacle, the 
concept of the shopping mall in many Western contexts is undergoing a 
conceptual transformation. While Victor Gruen based his original design 
of the shopping mall on the ideals of “the Greek agora,”65 and had high 
hopes of forging enhanced civic connections in the sprawling suburbs 
of the United States, he became critical of the orchestrated and artificial 
modern formulations of these venues. He witnessed how “social change, 
cultural drift, economic developments, and commercial dynamics gradu-
ally eroded the original basis on which the mall was founded and this had 
implications for the architectural delight and community factor of malls, 
two of the pillars of his project.”66 After years living and working in the 
United States, Gruen returned to his native Austria—from which he had 
escaped during Nazi occupation—disappointed with what his vision had 
become.67
There are a variety of factors conspiring to transform the concept of 
the shopping mall, and in the United States, where the number of shop-
ping malls grew voraciously in the 1980s and 1990s to dominate the 
landscapes of most city centers and suburbs, the current outlook is that 
“anywhere from 10 to 20 percent of malls are expected to fail in the next 
ten years.”68 As these venues become inscribed by fear of terrorist attacks, 
other spaces open up as safe, convenient, and efficient—and online. In the 
Western context, where organized urban and digital infrastructures allow 
for increased ease of virtual shopping, online stores are being promoted 
as secure alternatives—ones that contain a theoretically unlimited sur-
plus of goods and services to rival the spectacular nature of any physical 
shopping mall.69 As fast, efficient, nimble, and versatile, the paradigm of 
online shopping has rendered the idea of the shopping mall a relic of a 
cumbersome capitalism assembled through the needs of an old-fashioned 
industrial revolution. Online shopping is the ultimate triumph of a global 
corporate consumer culture in which shoppers, like those who practice 
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most forms of faith, “bring the creed home, and practise it there.”70 While 
the traditional mall works hard at achieving a sense of wonder and enter-
tainment, the online shopping experience is a spectacle in and of itself. 
Physical goods are reduced to a referent of themselves, and are purchased 
largely on the basis of their image qualities—spectacles of consumption 
that are further distanced from production processes and the many power 
structures and injustices therein.71 
In order to fully engage in a culture of consumption, it is necessary to 
cultivate a “commodity fetishism—that is, the tendency to abstract mate-
rial goods and the pleasures they promise from the human and environ-
mental costs of production.”72 This dissonance creates a space of elision so 
one does not have to acknowledge or concede one’s own implication in how 
personal purchasing choices affect people in other parts of the world. This 
is a dissonance that is facilitated through “outsourcing” accountability in 
the same way that multinational corporate strategies are characterized by 
transferring risk, and culpability, outward upon an “other,” whether it is 
the subcontractor or the informal trader.73 By shifting the problem else-
where, both corporate and social entities can absolve themselves of blame, 
both legally and perceptually.
This chimera of consumerism does not mean, however, that dominant 
systems cannot be changed. Indeed, the system of corporate capitalist pro-
duction can be most affected by, and disciplined through, the very crea-
ture it brought into being: conspicuous consumption. If we acknowledge 
that “consumption and production are inexorably linked,”74 and that one 
has direct effects on the other, then it follows that by changing personal 
consumption patterns, no matter how small or insignificant these might 
seem in the grand scheme, this will have knock-on effects upon the wider 
global corporate capitalist system. Although “economic power is deployed 
by dominant global actors, analysts of globalizing processes have largely 
overlooked how quotidian acts such as consumer demand across the globe 
influence economic relations, however asymmetrical those relationships 
may be.”75 
Similarly, the relationship between corporate capitalist gains and the 
promotion of the terrorism discourse, as well as the relationship between 
terrorism practice and daily disenfranchisement, need to be made more 
explicit. In this context, “the debate over terrorism cannot be isolated from 
a larger, comprehensive understanding of the diverse threats to democra-
cy taking place under the regime of neoliberalism.”76 Through “consump-
6. Conclusion: Specters of the Shopping Mall 127
tion consciousness,” there can be a more effective demand for corporate 
accountability. It is through education of market practices, and how they 
affect societies, that unequal and unfair systems of wealth accumulation 
and power can be shifted. Herein lies the meaning of the “agora:” a mar-
ketplace where both commodities and knowledge are circulated, creating 
an informed public that neither worships, nor is ashamed of its consump-
tion practices. The accumulation by dispossession practiced by many neo-
liberal schemes, although overpowering and dominant, have faced much 
resistance. These resistances need to enact dignified and measured re-
sponses in order to guard against the more extreme forms of contestations 
against corporate expansion such as terrorist retaliations and attacks such 
as those against Westgate Mall.
This study has illustrated how contemporary capitalism and contem-
porary terrorism inhabit the same social, political, and financial world, 
separated largely by a discourse that seeks to represent them as antithet-
ical practices. This discursive formation, which suggests capitalism and 
terrorism occupy opposite poles on an ethical spectrum, increasingly can-
not paper over the reality that these concepts inhabit, occasionally inhib-
it, but most often complement each other.  By examining the shopping 
mall, with an emphasis on Westgate as a point of convergence for many 
of these contemporary complexities, this study localizes a variety of differ-
ent global exchanges, geographies, ideologies, and consumption practices. 
The Westgate Mall case study, much like the contemporary shopping mall 
experience, offers “everything under one roof,”77 including elements of 
a global corporate capitalism, as well as the various contestations—both 
meaningfully constructive and devastatingly destructive—leveled against 
it. In its desire to create a world in miniature, the mall inexorably bears the 
seeds of its own unraveling.
The original architects of the archetype of the mall thought “that by 
putting everything under one roof, the retailer and the developer gained, 
for the first time, complete control over their environment.”78 The shop-
ping mall, despite its many attempts, cannot exist in isolation. Just as the 
mall has direct or indirect effects on the immediate and global environ-
ments, the outside world will also necessarily find ways of invading the 
shopping mall. Although behavior in shopping malls is highly scripted 
through mall atmospherics and design, and even as shopping malls at-
tempt to control their engineered environments in a securitized and 
systematized manner, there are always moments of rupture that pierce 
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through the mall’s atmosphere, disturbing its illusion.79 For all of the 
mall’s attempts at controlling the environment, it could do little to stop 
terrorism from entering the confines of this capitalist stronghold. Despite 
the mall’s preoccupation with surveillance and control, and its endeav-
ors to create a systematized and predictable world, there will always be 
a breach that disturbs its carefully crafted spectacle. The contemporary 
shopping mall promises to provide a spectacle, and, in the case of West-
gate, it was the site of one of the greatest spectacles ever seen in a shopping 
mall—only this spectacle was not of its own design.
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dislavić  (Rotterdam: NAi, 1998).
Boddy, Trevor. “Underground and Overhead: Building the Analogous 
City,” in Variations on a Theme Park: The New American City and the 
End of Public Space, ed., Michael Sorkin (New York, NY: Hill and 
Wang, 1992), 123-153.
Boggs, Carl, and Tom Pollard. “Hollywood and the Spectacle of Terror-
ism,” New Political Science 28, no. 3 (2006): 335-351. 
Borg, Chris, and Earl Nurse. “Mall the Merrier: Africa’s Growing Appetite 
for Shopping,” CNN, October 2, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/02/
africa/shopping-malls-africa/.
Bourdieu, Pierre. Firing Back: Against the Tyranny of the Market 2 (New 
York, NY: The New Press, 2003).
Bradley, Bud. “Shopping Mall Security: Keeping Pace with a Changing 
Venue.” April 29, 2014, AlliedBarton Security Services, http://www.
alliedbarton.com/About-Us/Blog/Article/94/Shopping-Mall-Security-
Keeping-Pace-with-a-Changing-Venue. 
Broll Property Group. “The Broll Report 2014/2015,” 2015, http://www.
broll.com/assets/uploads/documents/2015/04/The_Broll_Report_ 
2014-2015.pdf. 
Bures, Frank. “The Life and Death of Malls,” July 25, 2014, http://www.
minnpost.com/thirty-two-magazine/2014/07/life-and-death-malls. 
Burke, Jason. “Paris shootings: investigation launched into where gunmen 
got GoPro cameras,” The Guardian, January 12, 2015, http://www.the 
Target Markets—International Terror ism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall176
guardian.com/world/2015/jan/12/paris-shootings-cameras-kouachi- 
brothers-amedy-coulibaly.
Burke, Timothy. Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consump-
tion, and Cleanliness in Modern Zimbabwe (Durham, NC: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 2003). 
Burns Security Institute. “National Survey on Shopping Center Security” 
(Briarcliff Manor, NY, May 1978). 
Bush, George W. “At O’Hare, President Says ‘Get On Board:’ Remarks by 
the President to Airline Employees O'Hare International Airport Chi-
cago, Illinois.” September 27, 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010927-1.html.  
______“President Holds Prime Time News Conference,” The White 
House, Press Release, October 11, 2001, http://georgewbush-white 
house.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011-7.html.
Chakravorti, Bhaskar, Jianwei Dong, and Kate Fedosova. “Colonialism’s 
Enduring Dividends: Why European Companies Have an Advantage 
in Emerging Markets,” Foreign Affairs, February 13, 2014, https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2014-02-13/colonialisms-enduring- 
dividends. 
“Charlie Hebdo attack: Three days of terror.” BBC News, January 14, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237.
Chege, Miriam Mukami. “Competitive Strategies Adopted by Nakumatt 
Holdings Limited to Gain Competitive Advantage,” MA Thesis, Uni-
versity of Nairobi, October 2014, p. 27.
Chomsky, Noam. Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order (New 
York, NY: 2011). 
Clapper, James R. “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assess-
ment of the US Intelligence Community,” Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence, 2014.
Clymer, Jeffory A. America’s Culture of Terrorism: Violence, Capitalism, and 
the Written Word (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2003). 
Cohen, Lizabeth. “A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Con-
sumption in Postwar America,” Journal of Consumer Research 31, no. 1 
(June 2004): 236-239. 
Cohen, Neil, Jay Gattuso, Ken MacLennan-Brown. “CCTV Operational 
Requirements Manual,” Home Office Scientific Development Branch, 
2007, http://www.globalmsc.net/pdfs/operational-requirements.pdf. 
Bibliography 177
Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine. “From Residential Segregation to African 
Urban Centres: City Planning and the Modalities of Change in Africa 
South of the Sahara,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 32, no. 1 
(2014): 1-12.
Cowell, Alan. “Subway and Bus Blasts in London Kill at Least 37,” The 
New York Times, July 8, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/08/
world/europe/subway-and-bus-blasts-in-london-kill-at-least-37.html. 
Crawford, Margaret. “The World in a Shopping Mall,” in Variations on a 
Theme Park: The New American City and the End of Public Space, ed., 
Michael Sorkin, (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1992): 3-30.  
Crossick, Geoffrey, and Serge Jaumain, eds. Cathedrals of Consumption: 
The European Department Store, 1850-1939 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999). 
Csaba, Fabian Faurholt, and S°ren Askegaard. “Malls and the Orchestra-
tion of the Shopping Experience in a Historical Perspective,” Advanc-
es in Consumer Research 26, no. 1 (1999), http://www.acrwebsite.org/
search/view-conference-proceedings.aspx?Id=8221. 
Czinkota, Michael R, Gary Knight, Peter W Liesch, and John Steen. “Ter-
rorism and International Business: A Research Agenda,” Journal of In-
ternational Business Studies 41 (2010): 826-843. 
David, Herbling. “Westgate aftershock cuts Nakumatt sales by Sh4bn,” 
Business Daily, August 5, 2014, http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/
Corporate-News/Westgate-aftershock-cuts-Nakumatt--sales-by-Sh4-
billion-/-/539550/2410022/-/10ab1lkz/-/index.html. 
Davidson, Helen, Peter Walker and Michael Safi. “Sydney siege ends as 
police storm Lindt Cafe and hostages run out,” The Guardian, De-
cember 15, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2014/
dec/15/sydney-siege-ends-police-storm-lindt-cafe-hostages-run-out.
Davis, Mike. “Fortress Los Angeles: The Militarization of Urban Space,” 
in Michael Sorkin, ed., Variations on a Theme Park: The New American 
City and the End of Public Space (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1992).
______Planet of Slums (London: Verso, 2006): 154-180. 
De Boef Suzanna, and Paul M. Kellstedt. “The Political (and Economic) 
Origins of Consumer Confidence,” American Journal of Political Sci-
ence 48, no. 4 (October 2004): 633-649.
Debord, Guy. The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith 
(New York, NY: Zone Books, [1967] 1994). 
Target Markets—International Terror ism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall178
Decker, Stephanie. “Corporate Legitimacy and Advertising: British Com-
panies and the Rhetoric of Development in West Africa, 1950-1970,” 
The Business History Review 81, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 59-86. 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia, 10th ed., Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). 
Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Trans. 
(Johns Hopkins Press, 2013).
Dickey, Christopher. “Inside the NYPD’s Report on the Kenya Shopping 
Mall Massacre,” The Daily Beast, October 12, 2013, http://www.thedai-
lybeast.com/articles/2013/12/10/inside-the-nypd-s-report-on-the-ken-
ya-shopping-mall-massacre.html.
Dijck, José van. “Datafication, Dataism and Dataveillance: Big Data be-
tween Scientific Paradigm and Ideology.” Surveillance & Society 12, no. 
2 (2014): 197-208.
Dupree, Catherine. “Designed to Shop.” Harvard Magazine, July-August 
2002 http://harvardmagazine.com/2002/07/designed-to-shop.html. 
Eachus, Peter, Alex Stedmon, and Les Baillie. “Hostile Intent in Public 
Crowded Spaces: A field Study.” Applied Ergonomics 44 (2013): 669-
670. 
“Eat, pray, shop: Philippines embraces mall worshipping.” January 17, 2015, 
Inquirer.net, http://lifestyle.inquirer.net/182411/eat-pray-shop-philip 
pines-embraces-mall-worshipping. 
Embassy of the United States, “State, Defense Officials Work with African 
Partners for Stability,” October 24, 2013, http://london.usembassy.gov/
africa181.html.
Epstein, Marni. “How the Cold War Shaped the Design of American 
Malls.” Curbed, June 11, 2014, http://curbed.com/archives/2014/06/11/
how-the-cold-war-shaped-the-design-of-american-malls.php.
Fairbanks, Eve. “Africa’s Obsession with Shopping Malls,” September 23, 
2013, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114826/westgate-mall-attack- 
al-shabab-assaults-symbol-african-urban-life. 
Farhat, Maymanah. “New Media and the Spectacle of the War on Terror.” 
in Uncommon Grounds: New Media and Critical Practices in North Af-
rica and the Middle East, ed. Anthony Downey (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2014): 184-200.
Bibliography 179
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “A Conversation with Our Legal Attaché in 
Nairobi, Part 1.” January 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/
january/a-conversation-with-our-legal-attache-in-nairobi-part-1. 
Feingold, Stan, and David McIlvride, It’s a Mall World (New York: NY, 
Films Media Group, 2006), Running time 47 minutes.
Ferguson, Harvie. “Watching the World go Round: Atrium Culture and 
the Psychology of Shopping,” in Lifestyle Shopping: The Subject of Con-
sumption, ed. Rob Shields (London and New York: Routledge, 1992): 
21-39. 
Fickes, Michael. “ICSC’s Terrorist Awareness Training Program.” January 
7, 2014, http://www.chainstoreage.com/article/icsc%E2%80%99s-ter 
rorist-awareness-training-program. 
Foster, Hal. “Bigness,” London Review of Books 23, no. 23 (November 29, 
2001): 13-16, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v23/n23/hal-foster/bigness. 
Francis, David. “Al-Shabab Threat against Mall of America Could Be a 
Call to Action.” Foreign Policy, February 23, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.
com/2015/02/23/al-shabab-threat-against-mall-of-america-could-be-a-
call-to-action/. 
Friedman, Vanessa. “After a Tragedy, the Memorabilia,” New York Times, 
January 21, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/fashion/after-a-
tragedy-like-the-charlie-hebdo-shooting-come-the-products.html.
Gachino, Geoffrey. “Industrial Policy, Institutions and Foreign Direct In-
vestment: The Kenyan Context,” African Journal of Marketing Manage-
ment 1, no. 6 (September 2009): 140-160.
Garreau, Joel. Edge City - Life on the New Frontier (Double Day, 1988). 
Gateway Theatre of Shopping. “Welcome to Gateway Theatre of Shop-
ping.” 2015, http://gatewayworld.co.za/. 
______“About Us.” http://gatewayworld.co.za/home/about. 
Gettleman, Jeffrey. “Ominous Signs, Then a Cruel Attack,” New York 
Times, September 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/sun 
day-review/making-sense-of-kenyas-westgate-mall-massacre.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
Gettleman, Jeffrey, and Nicholas Kulish. “Gunmen Kill Dozens in Terror 
Attack at Kenyan Mall,” The New York Times, September 21, 2013, http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/09/22/world/africa/nairobi-mall-shooting.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
Target Markets—International Terror ism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall180
Giroux, Henry A. “Beyond the Spectacle of Terrorism: Rethinking Politics 
in the Society of the Image,” Situations: Project of the Radical Imagina-
tion 2, no. 1 (2007): 17-51.
______“ISIS and the Spectacle of Terrorism: Resisting Mainstream 
Workstations of Fear,” September 30, 2014, http://www.truth- 
out.org/news/item/26519-isis-and-the-spectacle-of-terrorism-resist 
ing-mainstream-workstations-of-fear#a2 
______“Neoliberalism’s War against the Radical Imagination,” Tikkun 
29, no. 3 (2014), https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/tikkun/v029/29.3.gi 
roux.pdf. 
______“Selfie Culture at the Intersection of the Corporate and the Sur-
veillance States,” Counter Punch, February 6, 2015, http://www.coun 
terpunch.org/2015/02/06/selfie-culture-at-the-intersection-of-the-cor 
porate-and-the-surveillance-states/. 
Gladwell, Malcolm. “The Terrazzo Jungle.” The New Yorker, March 15, 
2004, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/03/15/the-terraz 
zo-jungle. 
Glanz, James, Sebastian Rotella, and David E. Sanger. “In 2008 Mum-
bai Attacks, Piles of Spy Data, but an Uncompleted Puzzle,” The New 
York Times, December 21, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/22/
world/asia/in-2008-mumbai-attacks-piles-of-spy-data-but-an-uncom 
pleted-puzzle.html.
Global Impact Investing Network. “The Landscape for Impact Investing 
in East Africa: Kenya,” August 2015, http://www.thegiin.org/assets/
documents/pub/East%20Africa%20Landscape%20Study/05Kenya_
GIIN_eastafrica_DIGITAL.pdf. 
Goss, Jon. “The ‘Magic of the Mall’: An Analysis of Form, Function, and 
Meaning in the Contemporary Retail Built Environment,” Annals of 
the Association of American Geographers 83, no. 1. (1993): 18-47.
______“Once-upon-a-Time in the Commodity World: An Unofficial 
Guide to Mall of America,” Annals of the Association of American Geog-
raphers 89, no. 1 (1999): 45-75. 
Gottdiener, Mark, ed. “Approaches to Consumption: Classical and Con-
temporary Perspectives,” in New Forms of Consumption: Consumers, 
Culture, and Commodification (Lanham,MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2000): 3-31. 
______“Introduction,” in New Forms of Consumption: Consumers, Culture, 
and Commodification (Lanham,MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).  
Bibliography 181
______“The Consumption of Space and Spaces of Consumption,” in New 
Forms of Consumption: Consumers, Culture, and Commodification (Lan-
ham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000): 265-284.
Government of the Republic of Kenya. “Kenya Vision 2030: The Popu-
lar Version,” 2007, http://www.vision2030.go.ke/wp-content/uploads 
/2015/06/Popular_Version1.pdf. 
______“Nairobi Metro 2030: A World Class African Metropolis.” 2008, 
https://fonnap.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/metro2030-strategy.pdf. 
Government of Namibia. Namibia’s Vision 2030. http://www.npc.gov.
na/?page_id=210. 
Government of the State of Qatar. Qatar’s Vision 2030. http://www.gsdp.
gov.qa/portal/page/portal/gsdp_en/qatar_national_vision. 
Graham, Stephen. Cities under Siege: The New Military Urbanism (London: 
Verso, 2010). 
Grossberg, Lawrence, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler, eds. Cultural 
Studies (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992).
Gruen, Victor. “Dynamic Planning for Retail Areas.” Harvard Business Re-
view 22 (November - December 1954), mall.lampnet.org/filemanager/
download/1474/Gruen_HBR_54.pdf. 
Gruen, Victor, and Larry Smith. Shopping Towns USA: The Planning of 
Shopping Centers (New York, NY: Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 
1967). 
Gundan, Farai. “Kenya Joins Africa’s Top 10 Economies after Rebasing of 
its Gross Domestic Product (GDP),” Forbes, October 1, 2014, http://
www.forbes.com/sites/faraigundan/2014/10/01/kenya-joins-africas-
top-10-economies-after-rebasing-of-its-gross-domestic-product/. 
Harding, Luke, and Kim Willsher. “'Something from Dante's hell': har-
rowing details of Bataclan siege,” The Guardian, November 17, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/17/something-from-
dantes-hell-harrowing-details-of-bataclan-siege.
Harvey, David. “Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction,” The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 610, no. 1 (2007): 21-
44.
Hausmann, Melissa. “Two Fundamental Rules for Integrating People Coun- 
ting into Your Culture Using Traffic Data to Deliver Incremental Reve-
nues,” ShopperTrak, 2012, http://shoppertrak.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/05/Two-Fundamental-Rules-for-Integrating-People-Counting-in 
to-Your-Culture.pdf?mkt_tok=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRonu6%2FNZKX 
Target Markets—International Terror ism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall182
onjHpfsX56egsWaW%2BlMI%2F0ER3fOvrPUfGjI4ATMZkI%2BSLD 
wEYGJlv6SgFT7PDMbR00LgMWhM%3D.
“Hawkers.” News 24 Kenya. 2015, http://www.news24.co.ke/Tags/Topics/
hawkers. 
Hayward, Keith J. City Limits: Crime, Consumer Culture and the Urban Ex-
perience (London: Glasshouse Press, 2004). 
Hirsch, Afua. “Kenyan authorities had been warned about threat to build-
ings ‘day before attacks’,” The Guardian, September 28, 2013, http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/28/kenya-authorities-warned-of-at 
tack.
“History.” 2015, http://www.westgateoxford.co.uk/history. 
Hobden, Deborah. “A Man, A Plan, A Mall: The Role of Globalizing Elites 
in the Development of Accra, Ghana,” Global-e, http://global-ejournal.
org/2014/09/08/vol8iss7/. 
______“‘Your Mall with it All:’ Luxury Development in a Globalizing Af-
rican City,” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 13 (2014): 
129-147.
Hodge, Nel. “How Somalia’s al-Shabab militants hone their image,” BBC 
News, June 5, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27633367.
Hoganson, Kristin. “Bernath Lecture - Stuff It: Domestic Consumption 
and the Americanization of the World Paradigm,” Diplomatic History 
30, no. 4 (2006): 571-594.
Holston, James. “Insurgent Citizenship in an Era of Global Urban Periph-
eries.” City & Society 21, no. 2 (2009): 245-267.
Hoskins, Tansy. “Westgate: Kenyan guards on the frontline,” Al Jazeera, 
September 21, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/09/
westgate-kenyan-guards-frontline-201492154142406265.html. 
Houssay-Holzschuch, Myriam, and Annika Teppo. “A Mall for All? Race 
and Public Space in Post-Apartheid Cape Town,” Cultural Geographies 
16, no. 3 (2009): 309-379. 
Howden, Daniel. “Terror in Westgate mall: the full story of the attacks 
that devastated Kenya,” The Guardian, October 4, 2013, http://www. 
theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-at 
tacks-kenya-terror.
HSM Press Office. “TRANSCRIPT: Speech of HSM Leader, Shaykh 
Mukhtar Abu Zubayr, regarding the #Westgate Operation,” Twitlonger, 
September 25, 2013, http://www.twitlonger.com/show/n_1rp1qpv. 
Bibliography 183
Human Rights Watch. “Somalia: Stop War Crimes in Mogadishu,” Febru-
ary 14, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/14/somalia-stop-war- 
crimes-mogadishu. 
Insurance Information Institute. “Does My Business Need Terrorism In-
surance?” 2015, http://www.iii.org/article/does-my-business-need-ter-
rorism-insurance. 
International Council of Shopping Centers. “Nairobi retail bouncing back 
from terrorist attack,” August 19, 2015, http://www.icsc.org/press/nai-
robi-mall-scene-back-to-normal-a-year-after-terrorist-attack. 
“International CPTED Association.” http://www.cpted.net/. 
Islamic State Report no. 1 (May-June 2014). https://azelin.files.wordpress.
com/2014/06/islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shc481m-22islamic-state-report- 
122.pdf. 
Jacobs, Jerry. The Mall: An Attempted Escape from Everyday Life (Prospect 
Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1984). 
Jackson, Kenneth T. “All the World’s a Mall: Reflections on the Social 
and Economic Consequences of the American Shopping Center,” The 
American Historical Review 101, no. 4 (October 1996): 1111-1121. 
Jamaica’s Vision 2030. http://www.vision2030.gov.jm/. 
Janz, Bruce. “The Terror of the Place: Anxieties of Place and the Cultural 
Narrative of Terrorism,” Ethics, Place & Environment, 11, no. 2 (2008): 
191-203. 
Jerde. “What We Do.” 2015, http://www.jerde.com/Jerde-Philosophy.html. 
Jogee, Rubina. “A K-Means Cluster Analysis of Mall Shopping Motivations 
in a Developing Context,” Proceedings of 9th Annual London Busi-
ness Research Conference, August 4-5, 2014, Imperial College, Lon-
don, http://www.wbiworldconpro.com/uploads/london-conference- 
2014-august/marketing/1418271332_513-Rubina.pdf. 
Johnson, Leo. “Petropolis now: Are cities getting too big?” November 14, 
2013, New Statesman, http://www.newstatesman.com/2013/11/petropo 
lis-now. 
Joseph, Jonathan. “Terrorism as a social relation within capitalism: theo-
retical and emancipatory implications,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 4, 
no. 1 (2011): 23-37. 
Judin, Hilton, and Ivan Vladislavic.’ Blank: Architecture, Apartheid and Af-
ter (Rotterdam: NAi, 1998).
Karimi, Faith, Ashley Fantz and Catherine E. Shoichet. “Al-Shabaab Threat-
ens Malls, Including Some in U.S.; FBI Downplays Threat.” CNN, 
Target Markets—International Terror ism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall184
February 21, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/21/us/al-shabaab- 
calls-for-mall-attacks/index.html. 
Kaysen, Ronda. “Malls Work on their Security, but Keep it in the Back-
ground.” New York Times, November 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/11/27/realestate/commercial/malls-work-on-their-security-
but-keep-it-in-the-background.html?_r=0. 
Kearney, A. T. “The 2015 African Retail Development Index – Retail in 
Africa: Still the Next Big Thing,” 2015, https://www.atkearney.com/
documents/10192/6437503/Retail+in+Africa.pdf/b038891c-0e81-
4379-89bb-b69fb9077425. 
“Kenya: A Different Country.” The Economist, September 28, 2013, http://
www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21586851-national- 
politics-has-shifted-response-attack-somali-terrorists/print. 
“Kenya: New Mall Set to Change How Kisumu Shops.” The Nation, July 2, 
2015, http://allafrica.com/stories/201507020248.html. 
“Kenya’s Westgate Shopping Mall Reopens.” Aljazeera, July18, 2015, http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/kenya-westgate-shopping-mall-re 
open-150718012221949.html. 
Khera, Jastinder. “Authorities and militants take Nairobi battle to Twitter,” 
September 24, 2013, BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-afri 
ca-24218276.
Kilcullen, David. “Westgate mall attacks: urban areas are the battleground 
of the 21st century,” The Guardian, September 27, 2013, http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/27/westgate-mall-attacks-al-qaida.
Klein, Naomi. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New 
York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2008). 
Kleinman, Arthur, and Joan Kleinman, “Cultural Appropriations of Suf-
fering,” in Cultures of Fear: A Critical Reader, Danielle Taana Smith 
and Uli Linke, eds. (London: Pluto Press, 2009), 288-303.
Klopp, Jacqueline M. “Pilfering the Public: The Problem of Land Grabbing 
in Contemporary Kenya,” Africa Today 47, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 7-26.
Kowinski, William S. “Mall-aise: American Society Might Literally Shop 
Till It Drops.” Chicago Tribune, May 21, 1987, http://articles.chicagotri 
bune.com/1987-05-21/features/8702070556_1_shopping-mall-subur 
ban-downtown-citicorp-center. 
Krieger, Tim, and Daniel Meierrieks. “The Rise of Capitalism and the 
Roots of Anti-American Terrorism,” CESifo Working Paper no. 4887 
(July 2014).
Bibliography 185
Kriel, Robyn. “Kenya’s Westgate Mall Reopens, Nearly Two Years af-
ter Bloody Terror Attack,” July 19, 2015, CNN, http://www.cnn.
com/2015/07/18/africa/kenya-westgate-mall-reopens/. 
Kroes, Rob. If You’ve Seen One, You’ve Seen the Mall: Europeans and Ameri-
can Mass Culture (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1996). 
Kulish, Nicholas. “In This Horror Film, Blood Is All Too Real: ‘Terror at 
the Mall’ on HBO Documents an Attack in Kenya,” New York Times, 
September 14, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/15/arts/televi 
sion/terror-at-the-mall-on-hbo-documents-an-attack-in-kenya.html?_
r=0.
Kuruvilla, Shelja Jose, and Nishank Joshi. “Influence of demographics, 
psychographics, shopping orientation, mall shopping attitude and 
purchase patterns on mall patronage in India,” Journal of Retailing and 
Consumer Services 17 (2010): 259-269. 
Kusno, Abidin. “Remembering/Forgetting the May Riots: Architecture, 
Violence, and the Making of ‘Chinese Cultures’ in Post-1998 Jakarta,” 
Public Culture 15, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 153-154. 
Lakhani, Sadaf. “What Does Social Exclusion Have to Do with the Attacks 
at Westgate, Nairobi? Asking the Right Questions,” December 11, 2013, 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/what-does-social-exclusion-
have-do-attacks-westgate-nairobi-asking-right-questions. 
Larobina, Michael D., and Richard L. Pate. “The Impact of Terrorism on 
Business,” Journal of Global Business Issues 3, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 147-
156. 
LaTourrette, Tom, David R. Howell, David E. Mosher, and John MacDon-
ald. “Reducing Terrorism Risk at Shopping Centers: An Analysis of 
Potential Security Options” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Technical Re-
port, 2006), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_
reports/2006/RAND_TR401.pdf. 
Linehan, Denis. “Re-ordering the Urban Archipelago: Kenya Vision 2030, 
Street Trade and the Battle for Nairobi City Centre,” Aurora Geography 
Journal 1 (2007): 21-37.
Linke, Uli, and Danielle Taana Smith. “Cultures of Fear: Introduction,” in 
Cultures of Fear: A Critical Reader (London: Pluto Press, 2009): 19-23. 
Loewenstein, Antony. Disaster Capitalism: Making a Killing Out of Catastro-
phe (London: Verso, 2015). 
Lough, Richard, and Abdi Sheikh. “UPDATE 3-Kenya launches probe as 
Shabaab leader confirms mall attack,” Reuters, September 25, 2013, 
Target Markets—International Terror ism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall186
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/25/kenya-attack-idUSL5N-
0HL0MS20130925. 
Makoha, Timothy. “Eastleigh deserves Government tour,” Standard, No-
vember 3, 2009, http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/1144027579/
eastleigh-deserves-government-tour. 
Makori, Ben. “Kenya's Westgate shopping mall reopens after massacre,” 
Reuters, July 18, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-at-
tacks-westgate-idUSKCN0PS0HZ20150718. 
“Mall.” Merriam Webster. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
mall
Mall of America. “Facts.” 2015, http://www.mallofamerica.com/about/
moa/facts. 
______“History.” 2015, http://www.mallofamerica.com/about/moa/histo-
ry. 
______“Mall of America.” 2015, http://www.mallofamerica.com/. 
Mamdani, Mahmood. “Senseless [and sensible] violence: Mourning the 
dead at Westgate Mall,” Aljazeera, September 26, 2013, http://www.
aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/09/senseless-sensible-violence- 
mourning-dead-at-westgate-mall-201392563253438882.html. 
Manji, Ambreena. “Bulldozers, Homes and Highways: Nairobi and the 
Right to the City,” Review of African Political Economy 42, no. 144 
(2015): 206-224.
Marks, Rafael, and Marco Bezzoli. “Palaces of Desire: Century City, Cape 
Town and the Ambiguities of Development,” Urban Forum 12, no. 1 
(January 2001): 27-48. 
Masters, Jonathan. “Al-Shabab,” September 5, 2014, Council on Foreign 
Relations, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650. 
Mbembé, J.-A., and Sarah Nuttall. “Writing the World from an African 
Metropolis,” Public Culture 16, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 347-372. 
Mbote, Kamau. “East Africa’s Growing Middle Class Demands for More 
Shopping Malls,” April 29, 2014, http://afkinsider.com/53224/east- 
africas-growing-middle-class-demands-shopping-malls/. 
McConnell, Tristan. “‘Close Your Eyes and Pretend to Be Dead’: What re-
ally happened two years ago in the bloody attack on Nairobi’s West-
gate Mall,” Foreign Policy, September 20, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.
com/2015/09/20/nairobi-kenya-westgate-mall-attack-al-shabab/.
Bibliography 187
Menkhaus, Ken. “Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate,” CTC Sentinel 7, 
no. 2 (February 24, 2014), Special Issue, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/
posts/al-shababs-capabilities-post-westgate. 
Michona, Richard, Jean-Charles Chebat, L.W. Turley. “Mall Atmospherics: 
The Interaction Effects of the Mall Environment on Shopping Behav-
ior,” Journal of Business Research 58 (2005): 576-583. 
Miller, Darlene. “Changing African Cityscapes – Regional Claims of Af-
rican Labor at South-African Owned Shopping Malls” Conference Pa-
per no. 24 (Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos, September 19, 
2007, Mozambique). 
______“New Regional Imaginaries in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa – 
Retail Workers at a Shopping Mall in Zambia.” Journal of Southern 
African Studies 31, no. 1 (2005): 117-145. 
Miller, Darlene, Etienne Nel, and Godfrey Hampwaye. “Malls in Zambia: 
Racialised retail expansion and South African foreign investors in 
Zambia,” African Sociological Review 12, no. 1 (2008): 35-54. 
Morell, Michael, and Bill Harlow. The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’s 
Fight Against Terrorism—From al Qa’ida to ISIS (New York, NY: Twelve 
Hachette Book Group, 2015).
Mousseau, Michael. “Urban Poverty and Support for Islamist Terror: Sur-
vey Results of Muslims in Fourteen Countries,” Journal of Peace Re-
search 48, no. 1 (2011): 35-47.
Mugera, Solomon, and Moses Rono. “Could Westgate deal a fatal blow 
to the ICC?” BBC News, October 17, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa-24562337.
Mukoya, Thomas. “Man allegedly attempts to enter Kenyan shopping mall 
with bomb.” CBS News, September 8, 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/suspect-attempts-to-enter-kenyan-shopping-mall-with-bomb/. 
Mulupi, Dinfin. “East Africa’s largest shopping mall to have strong in-
ternational flavor,” April 22, 2015, http://www.howwemadeitinafrica.
com/east-africas-largest-shopping-mall-to-have-strong-international-
flavour/48405/. 
Murillo, Bianca. “‘The Modern Shopping Experience’: Kingsway Depart-
ment Store and Consumer Politics in Ghana,” Africa 82, no. 3 (2012): 
368-392. 
Murphy, Jarrett. “Feds Allege Ohio Mall Terror Plot.” CBS News, June 15, 
2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/feds-allege-ohio-mall-terror-plot/. 
Target Markets—International Terror ism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall188
Mutambo, Aggrey. “Bodies of Westgate terrorists ‘are with the FBI’, says 
KDF Chief Julius Karangi,” The Nation, February 7, 2014, http://mo 
bile.nation.co.ke/news/Julius-Karangi-Kenya-Defence-Forces-West 
gate-Attack/-/1950946/2196566/-/format/xhtml/-/r6oqhdz/-/index.
html. 
Mwakideu, Chrispin, and James Shimanyula, “Kenya’s Westgate Mall Re-
opens amid Security Concerns,” Deutsche Welle, July 17, 2015, http://
www.dw.com/en/kenyas-westgate-mall-re-opens-amid-security-con 
cerns/a-18591953. 
“Nairobi anti-Hawking squad to be unveiled.” News 24 Kenya, Septem-
ber 20, 2013, http://www.news24.co.ke/National/News/Nairobi-anti-
Hawking-squad-to-be-unveiled-20130920. 
Nance, Malcolm W. Terrorist Recognition Handbook: A Practitioner’s Man-
ual for Predicting and Identifying Terrorist Activities, 3rd ed. (Boca Raton, 
FL: CRS Press, 2014).
Nath, Anjali. “Seeing Guantánamo, Blown Up: Banksy’s Installation in 
Disneyland.” American Quarterly 65, no. 1 (2013): 185-192. 
National Counter Terrorism Security Office. “Counter Terrorism Protec-
tive Security Advice for Shopping Centres,” (London, 2014).
National Crime Prevention Council. “Crime Prevention through Envi-
ronmental Design Training Program.” 2015, http://www.ncpc.org/
training/training-topics/crime-prevention-through-environmental-de 
sign-cpted-. 
Nava, Mica. “Cosmopolitan Modernity: Everyday Imaginaries and the 
Register of Difference,” Theory, Culture & Society, Special Issue on Cos-
mopolis 19, no. 1-2 (2002): 81-99. 
______“Modernity’s Disavowal: Women, the City and the Department 
Store,” in Modern Times: Reflections on a Century of English Modernity, 
Mica Nava and Alan O’Shea, eds. (1997): 38-76. 
New York City Police Department. “Analysis of Al-Shabaab’s Attack at 
the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya.” November 1, 2013, http://www.
scribd.com/doc/190795929/NYPD-Westgate-Report.
Nichols, J.C. “Mistakes We Have Made in Developing Shopping Centers,” 
Technical Bulletin no. 4 (August 1945), Urban Land Institute, Planning 
for Permanence: the Speeches of J.C. Nichols Western Historical Manu- 
script Collection-Kansas City, http://shs.umsystem.edu/kansascity/
manuscripts/nichols/JCN078.pdf. 
Bibliography 189
Nielson. “2014 State of the Shopping Center.” 2014, http://www.nielsen.
com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reports-downloads/2014%20Re 
ports/state-of-the-shopping-center-report-may-2014.pdf. 
Nitzan, Jonathan. “Human Security, Consumer Confidence and the Fu-
ture of Neoliberalism.” The Collaboratory for Digital Discourse and 
Culture (November 5, 2001): 1, http://www.cddc.vt.edu/digitalfordism/
fordism_materials/Nitzan.pdf. 
Nitzan, Jonathan, and Shimshon Bichler. “Economy of the Occupation: 
Cheap Wars.” Socioeconomic Bulletin 10 (September 2006). 
Njogu, Kimani, Kabiri Ngeta, and Mary Wanjau, eds. Ethnic Diversity in 
Eastern Africa: Opportunities and Challenges (Nairobi: Twaweza Com-
munications, 2010). 
Obonyo, Raphael. “Nairobi’s Emerging Cities Dilemma.” March 24, 2014, 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/03/24/kenyas-emerging-cities- 
dilemma. 
Odedejan, Kennedy. “Terrorism’s Fertile Ground,” New York Times, Janu-
ary 8, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/09/opinion/terrorisms- 
fertile-ground.html?_r=0. 
Okamoto, Kotaro, et al. “Classification of Pedestrian Behavior in a Shop-
ping Mall Based on LRF and Camera Observations,” MVA2011 IAPR 
Conference on Machine Vision Applications, June 13-15, 2011, Nara, Ja-
pan. 
Okari, Dennis. “Kenya’s Westgate attack: Unanswered questions one 
year on,” September 21, 2014, BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa-29282045. 
Örtenwalla, Per, Ola Almgrenb, and Edward Deverell. “The Bomb 
Explosion in Myyrmanni, Finland 2002,” International Journal of Di-
saster Medicine 1, no.2 (2003): 120-126. 
Otiso, Kefa M., and George Owusu. “Comparative Urbanization in Ghana 
and Kenya in Time and Space,” Geojournal 71 (2008): 143-157.
“Outside Westgate.” Radiolab, November 29, 2014, http://www.radiolab.
org/story/outside-westgate/. 
Owuor, Samuel, and Teresa Mbatia. “Nairobi.” In Capital Cities in Afri-
ca: Power and Powerlessness, eds. Simon Bekker and Göran Therborn 
(Dakar and Cape Town: CODESRIA and Human Sciences Research 
Council, 2011): 119-140. 
Target Markets—International Terror ism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall190
“Paris Supermarket Siege Survivors Sue Media over ‘Dangerous’ Cov-
erage.” The Guardian, April 3, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/apr/03/paris-supermarket-siege-survivors-sue-media.
“Patents: Shopping Mall US 3992824 A.” March 22, 1973, https://www.
google.com/patents/US3992824. 
Percy, Sarah, and Anja Shortland. “The Business of Piracy in Somalia,” 
Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 4 (2013): 541-578.
Petrecca, Laura. “39 Die in Kenya Mall Siege; Hostages Still Held,” USA 
Today, September 21, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
world/2013/09/21/witness-kenya-mall-attackers-target-non-muslims/ 
2846319/. 
Pflanz, Mike. “Kenyan army admits that soldiers looted Westgate mall 
during siege,” The Telegraph, October 29, 2013, http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/10411403/Ken-
yan-army-admits-that-soldiers-looted-Westgate-mall-during-siege.
html. 
“Police Probe Blasts at Bangkok Shopping Centre.” BBC News, February 2, 
2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31087786. 
Powell, Arthur G, Eleanor Farrar, and David k. Cohen. The Shopping Mall 
High School: Winners and Losers in the Education Marketplace (Boston, 
MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1985). 
Prestholdt, Jeremy. Domesticating the World: African Consumerism and the 
Genealogies of Globalization (Berkeley: CA, University of California 
Press, 2008).
______“On the Global Repercussions of East African Consumerism,” The 
American Historical Review 109, no. 3 (June 2004): 755-781. 
Prinsloo, Dirk A. “Cannibalisation amongst Same Retailers & Shopping 
Centres in South Africa.” South African Council of Shopping Cen-
tres, 2009, http://urbanstudies.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/
SACSC-CANIBALISATION-PAPER.pdf. 
______“Past and Future Changes in Shopping Patterns, Behaviour and 
Centre Development,” Urban Studies, http://www.urbanstudies.co. 
za/past-and-future-changes-in-shopping-patterns-behaviour-and- 
centre-development/. 
“Protesters Mass at Mall of America on Busy Shopping Day.” NBC News, 
December 20, 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/protest-
ers-mass-mall-america-busy-shopping-day-n272326.
Bibliography 191
Provost, Claire. “British Aid Money Invested in Gated Communities and 
Shopping Centres,” The Guardian, May 2, 2014, http://www.theguar 
dian.com/global-development/2014/may/02/british-aid-money-gated- 
communities-shopping-centres-cdc-poverty. 
Purdum, Todd S. “After the Attacks: The White House; Bush Warns of a 
Wrathful, Shadowy and Inventive War,” New York Times, September 
17, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/17/us/after-attacks-white-
house-bush-warns-wrathful-shadowy-inventive-war.html?pagewant-
ed=all. 
Purkiss, Jessica. “The Westgate mall attack highlights Kenya-Israel ties.” 
September 27, 2013,” Middle East Monitor, https://www.middleeast-
monitor.com/articles/africa/7551-the-westgate-mall-attack-highlights- 
kenya-israel-ties. 
Rajagopal, Arvind. “The Violence of Commodity Aesthetics: Hawkers, 
Demolition Raids, and a New Regime of Consumption,” Social Text 
68, 19, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 91-113.
Reed, Dan. Terror at the Mall, 2014, Home Box Office.
Reinan, John. “Black Lives Matter protesters question ‘intertwined’ relation-
ship between Mall of America and Bloomington.” Star Tribune, July 4, 2015, 
http://www.startribune.com/black-lives-matter-protesters-question- 
intertwined-relationship-between-mall-of-america-and-blooming-
ton/311587741/. 
Research ICT Africa, “Kenya Vision 2030.” http://www.researchictafrica.
net/countries/kenya/Kenya_Vision_2030_-_2007.pdf.
Ritzer, George. “McUniversity in the Postmodern Consumer Culture.” 
Quality in Higher Education 2 (1996): 185-199.
______Enchanting a Disenchanted World: Revolutionizing the Means of Con-
sumption, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2010). 
______“New Cathedral of Consumption.” September 30, 2012, https://
georgeritzer.wordpress.com/2012/09/30/new-cathedral-of-consump 
tion/. 
Rodnitzky, Adam. “Best Practices for Implementing In-Store Analyt-
ics in Bricks and Mortar Retail.” ShopperTrak, http://shoppertrak. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Best-Practices-for-Implementing-
In-Store-Analytics-in-Bricks-and-Mortar-Retail.pdf?mkt_tok=3RkMM 
JWWfF9wsRonu6%2FPZKXonjHpfsX56egsWaW%2BlMI%2F0ER 
3fOvrPUfGjI4ATMZnI%2BSLDwEYGJlv6SgFT7PDMbR00LgMWhM 
%3D. 
Target Markets—International Terror ism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall192
Rogers, Simon. “England Riots: Which Shops were Looted?” The Guardi-
an, December 6, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/datablog/2011/
dec/06/england-riots-shops-raided. 
Ruetalo, Victoria. “From Penal Institution to Shopping Mecca: The Eco-
nomics of Memory and the Case Of Punta Carretas,” Cultural Critique 
68 (Winter 2008): 38-65. 
Salcedo, Rodrigo. “When the Global Meets the Local at the Mall,” Ameri-
can Behavioral Scientist 46, no. 8 (April 2003): 1084-1103. 
Sarlo, Beatriz. Scenes from Postmodern Life, trans. Jon Beasley-Murray 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2001). 
Schulzke, Marcus. “Simulating Terrorism and Insurgency: Video Games 
in the War of Ideas,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 27, no. 
4 (2014): 627-643. 
“Security Information.” Mall of America, 2015, http://www.mallofamerica.
com/guests/security. 
Sedlmaier, Alexander. “From Department Store to Shopping Mall: New 
Research in the Transnational History of Largescale Retail,” Jahrbuch 
fur Wirtschaftsgeschichte [Economic History Yearbook] 46, no. 2 (De-
cember 2005): 9-16.
Seierstad, Åsne. One of Us: The Story of Anders Breivik and the Massacre in 
Norway, trans. Sarah Death (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2015).
Selfridge, Harry Gordon. The Romance of Commerce (London: John Lane, 
1918). 
Seva, Rosemary R., Henry Been Lirn Duh, Martin G.Helander. “Structur-
al Analysis of Affect in the Pre-purchase Context,” DLSU Business and 
Economics Review 19, no. 2 (2010): 43-52. 
Shearing, Clifford D., and Phillip C. Stenning. “From the Panopticon to 
Disney World: the Development of Discipline.” in Anthony N. Doob 
and Edward L. Greenspan, Q.C., eds, Perspectives in Criminal Law: Es-
says in Honour of John LL.J. Edwards (Canada Law Book Inc 1984): 335-
349.
Shields, Rob, ed. “Spaces for the Subject of Consumption,” in Lifestyle 
Shopping: The Subject of Consumption (London and New York: Rout-
ledge, 1992): 1-19.
Shiner, Cindy. “Rioters Torch Aspirations of Upper Class,” The Washing-
ton Post, May 17, 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/
longterm/indonesia/stories/rioters051798.htm. 
Bibliography 193
Shultz, James M. et al., “Multiple Vantage Points on the Mental Health 
Effects of Mass Shootings,” Current Psychiatry Reports 16, no. 9 (2014): 
4, DOI 10.1007/s11920-014-0469-5.
Smith, Danielle Taana, and Uli Linke, eds. “Fear: A Conceptual Frame-
work,” in Cultures of Fear: A Critical Reader (London: Pluto Press, 
2009): 1-18. 
Smith, David, Abdalle Ahmed, and Tom McCarthy. “Al-Shabaab leader 
Ahmed Abdi Godane killed by US air strike in Somalia,” The Guard-
ian, September 5, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
sep/05/al-shabaab-leader-godane-killed-us-airstrike-somalia. 
Smith, Jennifer. “The Mall in Motion: A Narrative Stroll through the Ob-
stacle Course,” Speed: Technology, Media, Society 1, no. 3 (June 1996). 
“Somali al Shabaab rebels ban use of the Internet,” Reuters, January 9, 
2104, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/09/us-somalia-rebels- 
internet-idUSBREA080M920140109.
Sorkin, Michael, ed. “Introduction,” in Variations on a Theme Park: The 
New American City and the End of Public Space (New York,: NY: Hill 
and Wang, 1992): xi-xv. 
Soto, Hernando De. “The Capitalist Cure for Terrorism,” The Wall Street 
Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-capitalist-cure-for-terrorism- 
1412973796. 
“Southdale Center: The First Indoor Shopping Mall.” Minnesota History 
Center, 2015, http://libguides.mnhs.org/southdale. 
Springs, Coral. “City Hall in the Mall,” 2015, http://www.coralsprings.org/
government/other-departments-and-services/city-hall-in-the-mall. 
Staples, William G. Everyday Surveillance: Vigilance and Visibility in Post-
modern Life (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). 
Steadman, Philip. “The Changing Department Store Building, 1850 to 
1940,” The Journal of Space Syntax 5, no. 2 (2014): 151-167. 
Sterne, Jonathan. “Sounds Like the Mall of America: Programmed Music 
and the Architectonics of Commercial Space,” Ethnomusicology 41, no. 
1 (Winter 1997): 22-50.
______“Sounds Like the Mall of America: Programmed Music and the 
Architectonics of Commercial Space,” in Music and Technoculture, 
Rene T. A. Lysloff and Jr. Leslie C. Gay, eds (Middletown CT: Wesleyan 
University Press, 2003). 
Stewart, Catrina. “Nairobi Westgate Mall Attack: Shopping Centre Re-
opens Two years after Terror Siege where al-Shabaab Killed 67 People,” 
Target Markets—International Terror ism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall194
The Independent, July 14, 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/africa/nairobi-westgate-attack-shopping-mall-re-opens-two-
years-after-terror-siege-where-al-shabaab-killed-10389082.html. 
Stillerman, Joel, and Rodrigo Salcedo. “Transposing the Urban to the 
Mall: Routes, Relationships, and Resistance in Two Santiago, Chile, 
Shopping Centers,” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 4, no. 3 
(2012).
Straziuso, Jason. “NYPD report on Kenya attack isn’t US gov’t view,” As-
sociated Press, December 13, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/nypd-
report-kenya-attack-isnt-us-govt-view.
Swaine, Jon, Ben Jacobs, and Paul Lewis. “Baltimore Protests Turn into 
Riots as Mayor Declares State of Emergency.” The Guardian, April 28, 
2015, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/27/baltimore- 
police-protesters-violence-freddie-gray. 
Takacs, Stacy. “Real War News, Real War Games: The Hekmati Case and 
the Problems of Soft Power,” American Quarterly 65, no. 1 (2013): 177-
184. 
Tanguay, Liane. Hijacking History: American Culture and the War on Terror 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2013). 
“‘Terror at the Mall,’ Documentary on Siege of Westgate Mall in Nairobi, 
Kenya, Coming to HBO,” Press Release, September 2, 2014, http://
blogs.indiewire.com/shadowandact/terror-at-the-mall-an-inside-look-
at-the-siege-of-westgate-mall-in-nairobi-kenya-debuts-sept-15-on-hbo- 
20140902.
Tharoor, Shashi. “Globalization and the Human Imagination,” World Poli-
cy Journal 21, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 85-91. 
The Dubai Mall. “The Dubai Mall.” 2015, http://www.thedubaimall.com/
en/Index.aspx.
“The Great Sixth-Avenue Bazaar.; Opening Day at Macy & Co.’s--A Place 
Where Almost Anything May be Bought,” New York Times, April 4, 
1878, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9F0CE5DB143 
EE73BBC4C53DFB2668383669FDE. 
The Headquarters. “Headquarters History.” 2015, http://theheadquarters.
com/history. 
The International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC). “2014 Economic 
Impact of Shopping Centers,” 2015, http://www.icsc.org/uploads/de-
fault/2014-Economic-Impact-Kit.pdf. 
______“About,” 2015, http://www.icsc.org/. 
Bibliography 195
The Joint Committee on Administration and National Security, and De-
fence and Foreign Relations. “Report of the Joint Committee on Ad-
ministration and National Security; and Defence and Foreign Rela-
tions on the Inquiry into the Westgate Terrorist Attack, and Other 
Terror Attacks in Mandera in North-Eastern and Kilifi in the Coastal 
Region,” December 2013, http://info.mzalendo.com/media_root/file_
archive/REPORT_OF_THE_COMMITTEE_ON_WESTGATE_AT-
TACK_-_4.pdf. 
“The ‘Magic of the Mall’: An Analysis of Form, Function, and Meaning in 
the Contemporary Retail Built Environment.” Annals of the Association 
of American Geographers 83, no. 1. (1993): 18-47.
The National Center for Biomedical Research and Training. “Shopping 
Center Security Terrorism Awareness Training Program,” n.d. https://
www.ncbrt.lsu.edu/pdf/Shopping%20Center%20Security%20Aware 
ness%202014213.pdf. 
Topping, Alexandra. “France sieges: After Charlie Hebdo attack, how 
terror unfolded,” The Guardian, January 10, 2015, http://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2015/jan/10/france-sieges-charlie-hebdo-gunmen- 
killed-printworks-kosher-supermarket.
UN Habitat. “The State of African Cities 2010: Governance, Inequality 
and Urban Land Markets,” 2010, https://www.citiesalliance.org/sites/
citiesalliance.org/files/UNH_StateofAfricanCities_2010.pdf.
Underhill, Paco. Call of the Mall: The Geography of Shopping (New York, 
NY: Simon & Schuster, 2005).
United Nations. “International Day of Peace,” http://www.un.org/en/
events/peaceday/. 
United States Department of State. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2013,” 
2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf. 
Varman, Rohit, and Russell W. Belk. “Consuming Postcolonial Shopping 
Malls,” Journal of Marketing Management 28, nos. 1-2 (February 2012): 
62-84.
Vogt, Heidi, and Patrick Mcgroarty. “Before Kenya Attack, a Warning on 
Terrorism,” Wall Street Journal, September 30, 2013, http://www.wsj.
com/articles/SB10001424052702303643304579105222268968650. 
Walton, Brett. “The Westgate Shopping Centre Siege – an Attack on Free-
dom, Society and the Future,” http://www.fortitudemagazine.co.uk/in 
dustry/politics/westgate-shopping-centre-siege-attack-freedom-socie 
ty-future/12447/.
Target Markets—International Terror ism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall196
Wakefield, Alison. “The Public Surveillance Functions of Private Securi-
ty,” Surveillance & Society 2, no. 4 (2005): 529-545. 
Walton, Brett. “The Westgate Shopping Centre Siege – an Attack on Free-
dom, Society and the Future,” http://www.fortitudemagazine.co.uk/in 
dustry/politics/westgate-shopping-centre-siege-attack-freedom-socie 
ty-future/12447/. 
Weimann, Gabriel. “Terror on Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube,” Brown 
Journal of World Affairs 16, no. 2 (2010): 45-56.
______“Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, 
no. 10 (2011): 765-781.
“Westgate.” http://westgate.com.sg/en/. 
“Westgate.” 2015, http://westgateohio.com/. 
“Westgate Center.” 2015, http://shopwestgatecenter.com/. 
“Westgate Mall.” 2015, http://www.thewestgatemall.com/.  
“Westgate Mall.” 2015, http://www.shopatwestgatemall.com/. 
“Westgate Mall.” 2015, http://www.westgatemall.com/. 
“Westgate Mall.” 2015, http://www.westgatemall.com.cn/#. 
“Westgate Mall.” 2015, http://www.westgatemalltx.com/.  
“Westgate Mall Photographer Goran Tomasevic: ‘If I Get Shot, I Get Shot’,” 
September 28, 2013, http://www.buzzfeed.com/rachelzarrell/inter-
view-with-westgate-mall-photographer-goran-tomasevic#.nsDaOr 
NN2.
“Westgate Shopping City.” 2015, http://westgate-shopping.com/. 
“Westgate Shopping Centre.” 2015, http://www.westgateshoppingcentre.
ca/. 
Westgate Shopping Mall Facebook page. December 8, 2015, https://www.
facebook.com/westgateshoppingmall/. 
Williams, Paul D. “After Westgate: Opportunities and Challenges in the 
War against Al-Shabaab,” International Affairs 90, no. 4 (2014): 907-
923. 
Willis Retail Practice. “Security and Terrorism Guidance for Retailers.” 
March 24, 2015, http://www.willis.com/Documents/Publications/Ser 
vices/Political_Risk/20150324_Retail_Risk_Insight_Security_and_
Terrorism_Guidance_for_Retailers.pdf. 
Winseck, Dwayne. “The Political Economies of Media: The Transforma-
tion of the Global Media.” In The Political Economies of Media: The 
Transformation of the Global Media, eds. Dal Yong Jin and Dwayne 
Winseck (London: Bloomsbury, 2011): 3-48.
Bibliography 197
Woodhams, Frances. “Mall Attack: Will Kenya’s Shopping Centre Culture En-
dure?” The Telegraph, September 30, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
expat/10340179/Mall-attack-will-Kenyas-shopping-centre-culture- 
endure.html.
World Travel and Tourism Council. “Economic Impact Analysis,” 2015, 
http://www.wttc.org/research/economic-research/economic-impact- 
analysis/. 
Yardley, Jim. “Report on Deadly Factory Collapse in Bangladesh Finds 
Widespread Blame,” New York Times, March 22, 2013, http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/05/23/world/asia/report-on-bangladesh-building-
collapse-finds-widespread-blame.html?_r=0.
“Your Westgate Oxford.” 2015, http://www.westgateoxford.co.uk/. 
Zeleza, Tiyambe. A Modern Economic History of Africa: The Nineteenth 
Century (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1997). 
Zimmerman, Andrew. “Africa in Imperial and Transnational History: 
Multi-Sited Historiography and the Necessity of Theory.” Journal of Af-
rican History 54, no. 3 (November 2013): 331-340.  
Zirulnick, Ariel. “Kenyan consumers win this round against Al Shabaab 
as Westgate Mall reopens.” Quartz Africa, July 18, 2015, http://
qz.com/457808/kenyan-consumers-win-this-round-against-al-shabaab- 
as-westgate-mall-reopens/. 
Zwerdling, Daniel, G.W. Schulz, Andrew Becker, and Margot Williams. 
“Under Suspicion at the Mall of America.” National Public Radio, Sep-
tember 7, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/09/07/140234451/under-sus 
picion-at-the-mall-of-america. 
Zeitdiagnosen bei  t r anscr ipt
Ferdi De Ville, 
Gabriel Siles-Brügge
TTIP
Wie das Handelsabkommen 
den Welthandel verändert und 
die Politik entmachtet 
(übersetzt aus dem Englischen 
von Michael Schmidt) 
 TTIP – das Ende von Politik und Demokratie? Die erste politikwissen-
schaftliche Analyse zum umstrittenen Handelsabkommen blickt hinter 
die Fassaden von Chlorhühnern und Hormonfleisch. Sie zeigt: TTIP ra-
dikalisier t einen längst eingeleiteten Prozess einer depolitisierenden 
»deep liberalization«. Sie zeigt aber auch: Der zivilgesellschaftliche 
Protest birgt die Chance, die Handelspolitik zu repolitisieren. 
»Das Buch [ist] nicht nur eine genaue Analyse des geplanten Abkom-
mens, sondern auch der Rolle und Funktion des EU-Binnenmarktes und 
damit eine implizite Kritik an so mancher Abstrusität des TTIP-Widers-
tandes, die man nur dringend zur Lektüre empfehlen kann.«
Werner Rätz/attac, www.werner-raetz.de, 10.08.2016
www.transcr ipt-ver lag.de
Mai 2016, 192 Seiten, kar t., 
19,99 E,
ISBN 978-3-8376-3412-9,
E-Book/E-PUB: 17,99 E
